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I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  theoretical	  unity	  considerations	  for	  rejecting	  
psychologistic	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  even	  though	  the	  theory	  has	  many	  
virtues.	  	  However,	  many	  recent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  
are	  deeply	  problematic	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  account	  properly	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  
agents	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs.	  	  Thus,	  I	  defend	  and	  develop	  a	  novel	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reasons,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  avoid	  these	  problems.	  	  I	  contend	  
that	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  regardless	  of	  their	  truth-­‐values.	  	  I	  call	  the	  view	  
propositionalism.	  	  I	  show	  that	  together	  with	  a	  novel	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation,	  
propositionalism	  is	  able	  to	  preserve	  many	  of	  the	  virtues	  possessed	  by	  a	  
psychologistic	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  development	  
of	  propositionalism,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  an	  essential	  place	  for	  Russellian	  
propositions,	  qua	  reasons,	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  against	  those	  who	  have	  
argued	  otherwise.	  	  Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  teleological	  theories	  of	  reasons	  fail	  for	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   This	  essay	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons	  grew	  out	  of	  deep	  interest	  of	  mine	  
regarding	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  agency.	  	  As	  I	  studied	  philosophers	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
agency,	  I	  kept	  reading	  about	  reasons	  influencing	  or	  determining	  agents	  to	  act	  as	  
they	  do,	  but	  I	  did	  not	  know	  what,	  ontologically	  speaking,	  these	  reasons	  were.	  	  Thus,	  I	  
set	  out	  to	  find	  out	  what	  reasons	  are.	  	  In	  the	  pages	  that	  follow,	  we	  will	  have	  much	  to	  
say	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons,	  but	  in	  what	  immediately	  follows	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
write	  a	  bit	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  gratitude.	  	  	  
	   I	  had	  the	  good	  fortune	  of	  having	  Professor	  Mark	  Heller	  as	  the	  supervisor	  of	  
this	  dissertation.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  this	  project	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  several	  philosophical	  
arguments	  we	  had	  back	  in	  2008	  while	  playing	  basketball	  together	  with	  other	  SU	  
philosophy	  graduate	  students	  on	  Saturday	  mornings.	  	  We	  argued	  about	  issues	  
within	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  agency,	  and	  his	  interest	  in	  my	  ideas	  and	  work	  impelled	  
me	  to	  write	  a	  dissertation	  on	  such	  issues.	  	  	  
	   I	  am	  extremely	  grateful	  for	  all	  that	  Heller	  has	  given	  to	  this	  project—the	  
countless	  hours	  reviewing,	  commenting,	  and	  meeting	  with	  me	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  it	  
at	  every	  step.	  	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  for	  his	  constant	  patience;	  Heller	  was	  always	  willing	  
to	  work	  carefully	  through	  the	  work	  I	  submitted,	  paying	  very	  close	  attention	  to	  each	  
philosophical	  move	  made,	  which	  always	  helped	  me	  to	  work	  out	  my	  ideas	  and	  saved	  
me	  from	  making	  many	  mistakes.	  	  Most	  of	  all,	  it	  taught	  me	  how	  to	  do	  philosophy	  
better.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   v	  
I	  also	  received	  significant	  guidance	  from	  professors	  Thomas	  McKay	  and	  Ben	  
Bradley.	  	  Their	  comments	  on	  earlier	  drafts	  of	  this	  project	  were	  very	  helpful,	  indeed.	  
Both	  McKay	  and	  Bradley	  helped	  me	  to	  see	  where	  I	  was	  unclear	  or	  where	  I	  needed	  to	  
develop	  stronger	  arguments	  for	  my	  positions.	  	  This	  helped	  me	  to	  see	  more	  clearly	  
the	  nature	  of	  my	  project.	  	  	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  what	  they	  gave	  to	  make	  this	  project	  
better	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been	  without	  their	  help.	  
I	  also	  thank	  professor	  Laurence	  Thomas	  for	  reading	  a	  very	  early	  draft	  of	  the	  
first	  chapters	  of	  my	  dissertation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  later	  drafts.	  	  His	  encouraging	  
feedback	  has	  meant	  very	  much	  to	  me	  and	  had	  a	  large	  role	  in	  sustaining	  the	  effort	  to	  
keep	  moving	  forward	  with	  the	  dissertation	  process.	  
I	  thank	  professor	  Hille	  Paakkunainen	  for	  very	  helpful	  feedback	  about	  the	  
framing	  of	  this	  project.	  	  She	  helped	  me	  to	  see	  that	  I	  needed	  to	  say	  more	  about	  why	  
the	  project	  here	  matters	  and	  to	  get	  clearer	  about	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  project.	  
I	  also	  thank	  my	  undergraduate	  thesis	  advisor,	  professor	  Paul	  Miklowitz	  for	  
reading	  instantiations	  of	  early	  chapters	  and	  for	  talking	  (and	  e-­‐mailing)	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  reasons	  with	  me	  back	  when	  the	  project	  was	  still	  in	  its	  nascent	  stages.	  	  
Many	  of	  his	  comments	  were	  helpful	  and	  provided	  me	  with	  some	  early	  direction.	  	  
Also,	  his	  encouragement	  during	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  dissertation	  has	  meant	  a	  great	  
deal	  to	  me.	  
I	  am	  grateful	  for	  the	  conversations	  I	  had	  with	  Deke	  Gould,	  Andrew	  Corsa,	  
professor	  Pat	  Kenny,	  Brian	  Looper,	  and	  Daniel	  Fogal	  about	  various	  topics	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  	  Each	  of	  them	  helped	  me	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  reasons.	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Finally,	  a	  very	  large	  expression	  of	  gratitude	  goes	  to	  my	  brother,	  Devon	  
Dickinson.	  	  I	  have	  spent	  many	  hours	  talking	  to	  him	  about	  this	  dissertation,	  from	  its	  
earliest	  conceptions	  to	  some	  its	  latest	  written	  expressions.	  	  These	  conversations	  
also	  helped	  me	  to	  get	  clearer	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  project.	  	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  
Devon’s	  faithful	  encouragement	  and	  support	  that	  have	  been	  most	  significant	  to	  me	  
during	  this	  process.	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1.0	  Brief	  Statement	  of	  Project	   	  
The	  topic	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  reasons.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  topic	  is	  the	  
ontology	  of	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  I	  seek	  to	  discover	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  ontological	  
question	  regarding	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act:	  	  to	  what	  ontological	  kind	  do	  these	  
reasons	  belong?	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	  question	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  is	  whether	  
reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act	  are	  psychological	  or	  non-­‐psychological	  entities.	  	  	  I	  will	  
examine	  both	  possible	  answers,	  and,	  to	  anticipate,	  I	  argue	  that	  reasons	  for	  which	  
agents	  act	  are	  non-­‐psychological	  entities.	  
	   This	  dissertation	  responds	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  
debate	  regarding	  the	  ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  The	  dominant	  position	  in	  
literature	  on	  this	  debate	  has	  been,	  following	  the	  work	  of	  Donald	  Davidson,	  the	  thesis	  
that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  agents.1	  	  Maria	  Alvarez	  
asserts	  that,	  “Davidson’s	  conception	  of	  reasons,	  or	  something	  close	  to	  it,	  became	  the	  
orthodoxy	  and	  remains	  so	  to	  this	  day.”2	  	  	  This	  project	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  contribution	  
to	  the	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  psychologistic	  theories	  of	  reasons.	  	  I	  join	  the	  
philosophical	  ranks	  of	  philosophers	  like	  Maria	  Alvarez,	  Jonathan	  Dancy,	  and	  
Constantine	  Sandis	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  develop	  anti-­‐psychologism,	  which,	  as	  the	  name	  
suggests,	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  To	  be	  very	  clear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Davidson	  (1963/1980).	  
2	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  2).	  
	   2	  
from	  the	  outset,	  I	  intend	  to	  argue	  that	  no	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  
states.3	  	  	  Much	  of	  my	  work	  here	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  preserve	  some	  of	  the	  
insights	  of	  Alvarez,	  Dancy,	  and	  Sandis,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  improve	  upon	  their	  
foundational	  work	  and	  what	  their	  work	  has	  established	  to	  challenge	  orthodoxy.	  
	   Working	  out	  the	  ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
larger	  project	  of	  developing	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  agency.	  	  Traditionally	  
conceived,	  reasons	  are	  among	  the	  things	  that	  influence	  agents	  to	  act,	  and	  are	  also	  
often	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  role	  in	  guiding	  the	  actions	  of	  agents.	  	  It	  stands	  to	  reason,	  then,	  
that	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  things	  that	  have	  such	  a	  
significant	  role	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  agency.	  	  	  In	  connection	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  
ontological	  status	  of	  motivating	  reasons,	  we	  will	  also	  deal	  with	  the	  following	  
questions:	  	  How	  do	  motivating	  reasons	  fit,	  ontologically	  speaking,	  within	  a	  larger	  
theory	  of	  reasons?	  	  Do	  motivating	  reasons	  cause	  agents	  to	  act?	  	  What	  is	  their	  role	  in	  
motivating	  agents	  to	  act,	  assuming	  they	  have	  one?	  
	   I	  note	  that	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons	  does	  not	  appear	  
to	  help	  us	  with	  the	  further	  project	  of	  figuring	  out	  whether	  agents	  are	  determined	  to	  
act	  by	  the	  antecedents	  of	  action.	  	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  I	  considered	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  interest	  as	  this	  dissertation	  began.	  	  I	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  even	  if	  reasons	  
themselves	  cannot	  determine	  actions,	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  believing	  reasons	  (or	  
reason-­‐states)	  can.4	  	  Thus,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons	  does	  not	  appear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Dancy	  (2000),	  and	  Sandis	  (forthcoming,	  draft).	  	  Note,	  it	  is	  not	  
always	  clear	  whether	  these	  anti-­‐psychologists	  are	  arguing	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  no	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states.	  	  Dancy	  (2000)	  seems	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  
weaker	  claim,	  namely,	  that	  most	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  	  
4	  Markus	  Schlosser	  (2011)	  also	  makes	  this	  claim.	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to	  have	  a	  direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  human	  actions	  can	  be	  caused	  or	  
determined	  by	  reasons.	  	  Nevertheless,	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  reasons	  will	  help	  
us	  to	  figure	  out	  whether	  reasons	  themselves,	  as	  those	  things	  that	  are	  typically	  
among	  the	  antecedents	  of	  action,	  are	  causes	  or	  determiners	  of	  actions.	  	  The	  main	  
project	  here	  is	  to	  find	  out	  the	  ontological	  kind	  to	  which	  reasons	  belong,	  and	  once	  
this	  is	  accomplished	  we	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  whether	  reasons	  themselves	  
have	  causal	  powers.	  	  To	  anticipate,	  the	  anti-­‐psychological	  nature	  of	  reasons	  here	  
denies	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  themselves	  have	  a	  causal	  or	  determining	  role	  in	  
action.	  	  Though	  this	  conclusion	  will	  feature	  only	  in	  later	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  
it	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  follow	  almost	  directly	  from	  claims	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons	  
argued	  for.5	  
Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  significantly	  in	  this	  introductory	  section,	  there	  are	  
two	  underlying	  goals	  that	  motivate	  this	  entire	  project.	  	  The	  first	  general	  goal	  is	  to	  
offer	  novel	  arguments	  against	  psychologism	  based	  on	  general	  considerations	  of	  
theoretical	  unity.	  	  That	  is,	  I	  argue	  that	  psychologistic	  theories	  are	  false	  because	  if	  
they	  were	  true	  they	  would	  lead	  to	  disjunctivistic	  theories	  of	  reasons,	  which	  are	  
ultimately	  theoretically	  less	  unified	  than	  anti-­‐disjunctivist	  theories.	  	  That	  is,	  once	  the	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  nature	  of	  normative	  reasons	  is	  argued	  for,	  we	  see	  that	  we	  have	  
very	  strong	  theoretical	  considerations	  that	  count	  against	  psychologism.	  	  The	  second	  
goal	  is	  to	  develop	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  that	  has	  the	  
theoretical	  virtues	  of	  both	  psychologistic	  and	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories.	  	  As	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  I	  say	  that	  the	  noncausalist	  conclusion	  follows	  “almost	  directly”	  from	  the	  view	  
developed	  here	  because	  the	  claim	  that	  abstract	  entities	  are	  causally	  inert	  must	  also	  
be	  true	  for	  it	  to	  follow.	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be	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  psychologistic	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  have	  many	  
virtues	  and	  that	  contemporary	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  are	  at	  least	  partially	  
deficient	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another	  when	  compared	  to	  psychologistic	  theories.	  	  The	  
virtues	  of	  psychologism	  have	  most	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  its	  contemporary	  
dominance.	  	  The	  correct	  and	  novel	  theory	  of	  reasons	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  
will	  preserve	  all	  of	  the	  virtues	  of	  psychologistic	  theories	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  virtues	  of	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories.6	  	  	  
	  	   In	  Section	  1.1	  below	  I	  situate	  motivating	  reasons	  (also	  called	  ‘agential	  
reasons’)	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  reasons	  in	  order	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  reasons	  
this	  dissertation	  is	  about.	  	  In	  Section	  1.2	  I	  provide	  a	  sketch	  of	  the	  content	  of	  Chapters	  
2-­‐5,	  and	  then	  in	  Section	  1.3	  below	  I	  lay	  out	  some	  of	  the	  assumptions	  of	  this	  project.	  
	  
1.1	  Kinds	  of	  Reasons:	  A	  Brief	  Sketch	  
Most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  our	  actions	  are	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  intuitive	  
difference	  between	  behaviors	  like	  blinking	  and	  other	  purely	  reflexive	  behaviors	  
(call	  these	  mere	  behaviors)	  and	  behaviors	  like	  walking	  the	  dog	  or	  cooking	  a	  meal	  or	  
ordering	  a	  cup	  of	  coffee	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  done	  for	  reasons	  while	  the	  former	  are	  
not.	  	  It	  is	  widely	  agreed	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	  behaviors	  done	  for	  reasons	  are	  
actions.7	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  Chapter	  2	  below	  for	  these	  virtues.	  
7	  Some	  philosophers	  of	  action	  think	  that	  some	  actions	  are	  done	  without	  reasons.	  	  
They	  have	  actions	  like	  purely	  expressive	  actions	  in	  mind.	  	  Anscombe	  (1971)	  has	  a	  
famous	  example	  of	  someone	  who	  just	  feels	  like	  whistling,	  and	  Alvarez	  (2010)	  has	  an	  
example	  of	  someone	  who	  just	  feels	  like	  doing	  a	  cartwheel.	  	  Also,	  some	  philosophers	  
(Hacker,	  2009)	  think	  that	  non-­‐actions	  can	  be	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  Alvarez	  &	  Hyman	  
(1998)	  argue	  that	  omissions	  are	  not	  actions,	  yet	  they	  are	  performed	  for	  reasons.	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This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  mere	  behaviors	  occur	  without	  reason.	  	  
There	  may	  well	  be	  reasons	  why	  humans	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  animal	  life	  blink;	  it	  is	  
likely	  that	  evolutionary	  biology	  will	  provide	  us	  with	  these	  reasons.	  	  But	  these	  
reasons	  are	  different	  from	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act.	  	  Evolutionary	  biology	  will	  
not	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  merely	  blink	  because,	  presumably,	  
there	  are	  no	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  merely	  blink	  (though	  there	  may	  well	  be	  ones	  for	  
which	  we	  exhibit	  identical	  behaviors	  via,	  say,	  winking).	  	  As	  other	  examples,	  surely	  
there	  are	  reasons	  why	  the	  Earth	  is	  the	  third	  planet	  from	  the	  Sun	  in	  our	  solar	  system,	  
or	  why	  Mount	  Vesuvius	  erupted	  when	  it	  did.	  	  However,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  an	  
event	  occurs	  or	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs	  obtains	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  
which	  the	  event	  occurs	  or	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs	  obtains.	  	  These	  are	  good	  examples	  
where	  this	  implication	  does	  not	  hold.	  
Of	  course,	  there	  are	  many	  behaviors	  we	  perform	  that	  seem	  quite	  unlike	  
reflexive	  behaviors	  like	  blinking	  but	  which	  are	  also	  not	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  Marija’s	  
polite	  behaviors	  are	  performed	  out	  of	  her	  psychological	  disposition	  to	  be	  kind	  to	  
others.	  	  James’	  lack	  of	  eye	  contact	  in	  conversation	  is	  the	  result	  of	  his	  bashfulness.	  	  
Dirk’s	  making	  of	  a	  three-­‐pointer	  in	  the	  basketball	  game	  is	  a	  function	  of	  many	  years	  
of	  practicing	  that	  shot.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  behaviors	  is	  certainly	  less	  reflexive	  than	  
blinking,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  not	  behaviors	  that	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  say	  are	  done	  for	  
reasons.	  	  However,	  they	  are	  like	  reflexive	  behaviors	  in	  that	  we	  would	  typically	  
explain	  them	  by	  citing	  the	  reasons	  why	  they	  occurred.	  	  In	  the	  Marija	  and	  James	  
examples	  we	  cite	  the	  reason	  why	  they	  behave	  as	  they	  do	  by	  citing	  their	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psychological	  dispositions.	  	  In	  the	  Dirk	  example	  we	  cite	  his	  years	  of	  practicing	  a	  
certain	  kind	  of	  shot	  as	  the	  reason	  why	  he	  made	  the	  shot	  he	  did.	  	  	  
The	  reason	  our	  explanations	  cite	  reasons-­‐why	  of	  Marija,	  James,	  and	  Dirk	  is	  
that	  we	  were	  picking	  out	  features	  of	  their	  behaviors	  that	  are	  not	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  behaviors	  we	  wanted	  explanations	  for	  are	  not	  the	  kinds	  for	  
which	  Marija,	  James,	  or	  Dirk	  did	  in	  response	  to—or	  out	  of	  sensitivity	  for—a	  reason.	  	  
And	  this	  is	  true	  even	  though	  there	  could	  be	  other	  features	  of	  the	  their	  behaviors	  that	  
call	  for	  explanations	  involving	  the	  reasons	  they	  were	  sensitive	  to	  when	  they	  
behaved	  as	  they	  did.	  	  Marija	  may	  have	  invited	  you	  to	  dinner,	  politely,	  for	  the	  reason	  
that	  there	  is	  much	  for	  you	  to	  catch	  up	  on	  with	  her.	  	  James	  might	  bashfully	  avoid	  eye	  
contact	  while	  talking	  with	  you,	  but	  he	  talks	  with	  you	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  you’re	  his	  
friend.	  	  And	  Dirk	  might	  make	  the	  three-­‐pointer,	  but	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  he	  
attempted	  it	  (not	  for	  his	  making	  it)	  is	  that	  he	  was	  left	  unguarded	  on	  the	  perimeter	  of	  
the	  court.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  difference	  between	  the	  examples	  of	  reasons-­‐why	  and	  the	  reasons-­‐for	  
seems	  to	  come	  to	  this:	  	  the	  reasons-­‐for	  explanations	  we	  offered	  above	  necessarily	  
involve	  agents,	  actions,	  and	  agents	  having	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  and	  the	  reasons-­‐why	  
explanations	  do	  not.	  	  Reasons-­‐why	  explanations	  can	  also	  involve	  processes	  that	  do	  
not	  obviously	  or	  directly	  involve	  agency.	  	  The	  crucial,	  and	  quite	  general,	  difference	  
between	  reasons-­‐why	  and	  reasons-­‐for	  seems	  to	  come	  to	  this:	  	  only	  agents	  act	  for	  
reasons;	  however,	  reasons-­‐why	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  agents	  and	  non-­‐agents	  alike.	  	  
Also,	  reasons-­‐why	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  more	  general	  category	  of	  reasons,	  and	  reasons-­‐for	  
fall	  under	  reasons-­‐why	  as	  a	  more	  specific	  kind	  of	  reason.	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We	  call	  the	  reasons	  to	  which	  an	  agent	  was	  responsive	  or	  sensitive	  in	  her	  
behaviors	  motivating	  or	  agential	  reasons.	  	  Thus	  Marija’s	  motivating	  (or	  agential)	  
reason	  for	  inviting	  you	  to	  dinner	  is	  to	  catch	  up	  on	  things	  with	  her.	  	  Motivating	  
reasons	  are	  usually	  also	  contrasted,	  at	  least	  conceptually,	  with	  normative	  reasons.	  	  
Normative	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  that	  agents	  have	  to	  behave	  in	  certain	  ways.	  	  One	  
common	  form	  of	  normative	  reason	  is	  moral	  reasons.	  	  Moral	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  that	  
agents	  have	  to	  Φ	  (where	  ‘Φ’	  refers	  to	  an	  action-­‐type)	  that	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  moral	  
import.	  	  For	  example,	  Rich	  might	  have	  the	  moral	  reason	  to	  serve	  at	  the	  soup	  kitchen	  
tonight	  because	  he	  made	  a	  promise	  to	  serve.	  	  His	  reason,	  then,	  might	  be	  something	  
like	  that	  he	  promised	  to	  serve	  dinner	  at	  the	  soup	  kitchen	  tonight.8	  	  There	  are	  other	  
kinds	  of	  normative	  reasons	  corresponding	  to	  other	  normative	  systems,	  e.g.,	  
prudence,	  aesthetics,	  etc.	  
We	  have	  looked	  briefly	  at	  three	  kinds	  of	  reasons:	  	  reasons-­‐why,	  motivating	  
reasons,	  and	  normative	  reasons.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  has	  a	  role	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  	  However,	  motivating	  reasons—reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ—have	  the	  
dominant	  role.	  	  The	  longstanding	  debate	  between	  those	  philosophers	  who	  think	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  entities	  and	  those	  who	  think	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
psychological	  entities	  will	  occupy	  Chapters	  2-­‐7.	  	  There	  I	  argue	  for	  an	  anti-­‐
psychological	  ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  simplicity,	  I	  assume	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  conception	  of	  normative	  reasons.	  	  I	  
argue	  for	  this	  claim	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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1.2	  Sketch	  of	  the	  Project	  
	   I	  begin	  Chapter	  2	  by	  introducing	  the	  debate	  between	  psychologists	  and	  anti-­‐
psychologists.	  	  I	  do	  so	  in	  part	  by	  examining	  the	  virtues	  of	  each	  view.	  	  Then	  I	  show	  
that	  there	  are	  several	  serious	  problems	  for	  several	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  
motivating	  reasons.	  	  In	  particular,	  there	  are	  problems	  for	  those	  who	  claim	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  facts,	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs,	  or	  other	  such	  things	  
necessarily,	  it	  seems,	  grounded	  in	  the	  way	  things	  are.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  
there	  are	  countless	  cases	  in	  which	  agents	  act	  but	  are	  wrong	  about	  what	  they	  take	  to	  
be	  the	  case.	  	  Error	  cases	  like	  these	  might	  pressure	  some	  anti-­‐psychologists	  to	  deny	  
that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  such	  cases.9	  	  This	  leads	  to	  significant	  problems,	  
though.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  tend	  to	  think	  that	  agents	  do	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  and	  
that	  their	  actions	  are	  explainable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  they	  act	  in	  such	  
cases.	  	  These	  problems	  might	  in	  turn	  pressure	  other	  anti-­‐psychologists	  to	  claim	  that	  
agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  so	  their	  reasons	  are	  either	  propositions	  or	  
states	  of	  affairs,	  more	  generally,	  rather	  than	  true	  propositions	  or	  obtaining	  states	  of	  
affairs.10	  	  However,	  this	  leads	  to	  problems	  regarding	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  	  Anti-­‐psychologists	  claiming	  that	  reasons	  can	  be	  false	  propositions	  or	  
states	  of	  affairs	  that	  do	  not	  obtain	  seem	  committed	  to	  denying	  that	  reason-­‐
explanations	  are	  factive	  contexts.	  	  Yet	  another	  problem	  surfaces	  if	  anti-­‐
psychologists	  deny	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  When	  negations	  of	  the	  
reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act	  are	  conjoined	  to	  standard	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐
explanations,	  paradoxical	  statements	  form.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  Jones	  is	  wrong	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Stout	  (2009)	  
10	  Dancy	  (2000)	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traffic	  being	  bad	  on	  highway	  690,	  and	  he	  claims	  that	  is	  his	  reason	  for	  taking	  highway	  
481,	  then	  when	  he	  offers	  his	  reason	  for	  taking	  highway	  481,	  namely,	  that	  traffic	  was	  
bad	  on	  690,	  when	  we	  conjoin	  that	  traffic	  was	  not	  bad	  on	  690,	  Jones’	  explanation	  
leads	  to	  paradox.	  	  These	  are	  serious	  problems	  indeed.	  
	   There	  is	  yet	  another	  problem	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  that	  is	  not	  related	  to	  
error	  cases.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  with	  providing	  an	  adequate	  explanation	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  necessary	  connection	  between	  an	  agent’s	  psychology	  and	  her	  acting	  for	  a	  
reason.	  	  I	  examine	  two	  recent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  efforts	  to	  explain	  the	  necessary	  
connection,	  and	  show	  that	  they	  both	  fail.11	  Given	  all	  the	  problems	  just	  presented,	  
anti-­‐psychologism	  seems	  in	  trouble	  as	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  
	   What	  adds	  insult	  to	  injury	  here	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  that	  psychologism	  is	  
able	  to	  avoid	  each	  of	  these	  problems	  concerning	  error	  cases.	  	  If	  motivating	  reasons	  
are	  psychological	  states,	  then	  while	  agents	  can	  be	  wrong	  about	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  
be	  the	  case,	  they	  are	  not	  wrong	  about	  their	  believing	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  And	  their	  
believing	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  is	  their	  reason.	  	  Furthermore,	  psychologists	  seem	  to	  have	  
a	  ready	  answer	  to	  the	  problem;	  namely,	  psychological	  states	  are	  identical	  to	  agents’	  
reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  I	  take	  it	  that	  these	  are	  among	  the	  virtues	  had	  by	  a	  psychologistic	  
theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  	  
In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  examine	  psychologism	  more	  carefully.	  	  (To	  be	  clear,	  
psychologism	  is	  typically	  defined	  as	  the	  thesis	  that	  all	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states	  of	  agents.)	  	  Specifically,	  I	  look	  at	  two	  recent	  arguments	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Dancy	  (2000).	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literature	  presented	  against	  psychologism	  and	  show	  that	  they	  both	  fail.12	  	  The	  first	  
argument	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  agents	  
act	  for	  something	  non-­‐psychological	  when	  they	  act.	  	  The	  second	  argument	  tries	  to	  
saddle	  psychologistic	  theories	  with	  an	  error	  problem	  of	  its	  own.	  	  It	  does	  this	  by	  
providing	  a	  case	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  error	  cases	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  agent’s	  
reason	  is	  not	  the	  case;	  but	  psychologistic	  reasons	  are	  always	  the	  case,	  so	  
psychologism	  must	  be	  false.13	  	  I	  show	  that	  both	  arguments	  fail.	  
	   Next,	  I	  take	  an	  argument	  that	  has	  been	  offered	  in	  the	  literature	  against	  
psychologism	  and	  both	  develop	  and	  defend	  it	  differently	  than	  it	  has	  been.14	  	  My	  
approach	  is	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  dealing	  with	  potential	  psychologistic	  responses	  to	  
it.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  enables	  me	  to	  get	  at	  what	  is	  deeply	  problematic	  about	  psychologistic	  
theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  More	  concretely,	  I	  argue	  that	  because	  motivating	  
reasons	  are	  sometimes	  normative	  reasons,	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  denying	  the	  
claim	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  entities.	  	  These	  reasons	  will	  include,	  
among	  others,	  a	  more	  general	  argument	  against	  psychologism	  briefly	  described	  
above	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  theoretical	  unity	  that	  will	  not	  be	  complete	  until	  
the	  end	  of	  Chapter	  6.	  	  	  
	   Chapter	  4	  takes	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  developing	  an	  account	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  
In	  particular,	  it	  takes	  up	  the	  problems	  we	  showed	  it	  had	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  
propositionalist	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  novel	  view	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  arguments	  are	  from	  Alvarez	  (2010).	  
13	  The	  expressions	  ‘is	  the	  case’	  and	  ‘is	  not	  the	  case’	  are	  admittedly	  not	  
metaphysically	  neutral,	  but	  I	  use	  them	  here	  out	  of	  simplicity.	  	  If	  one	  prefers	  another	  
metaphysical	  expression	  here	  instead	  of	  the	  ones	  used,	  feel	  free	  to	  substitute	  them	  
accordingly.	  
14	  Versions	  of	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Alvarez	  (2010)	  and	  Dancy	  (2000).	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motivating	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  regardless	  of	  their	  truth-­‐value.15	  I	  argue	  for	  
this	  view	  by	  developing	  a	  view	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  in	  line	  with	  the	  work	  of	  a	  
current	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  philosopher,	  Constantine	  Sandis.16	  I	  show	  that	  several	  of	  
the	  serious	  problems	  with	  anti-­‐psychologism	  have	  been	  the	  result	  of	  false	  
presuppositions	  regarding	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  Specifically,	  if	  we	  think	  of	  reason-­‐
explanations	  as	  having	  agential	  beliefs	  as	  their	  explanantia,	  then	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  problems	  here	  can	  be	  solved.	  	  Agents	  can	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  
cases,	  and	  the	  explanations	  of	  their	  actions	  can	  be	  true	  even	  though	  the	  reasons	  for	  
which	  they	  act	  are	  false.	  	  This	  is	  because	  proper	  explanations,	  of	  the	  kind	  we	  are	  
interested	  in	  when	  providing	  reason-­‐explanations,	  must	  cite	  (or	  at	  least	  
conventionally	  imply)	  agential	  psychologies	  (in	  particular,	  and	  usually,	  their	  
beliefs),	  otherwise	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  actions.	  	  
	   This	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  puts	  us	  in	  a	  position	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
challenge	  against	  anti-­‐psychologism	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  
agential	  psychologies	  are	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  agential	  reasons	  has	  not	  been	  
adequately	  forthcoming.	  	  On	  the	  view	  of	  agential	  reasons	  developed	  here,	  as	  is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanation,	  agents	  believing	  their	  reasons	  (that	  
p)	  are	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  
with	  the	  claim	  that	  agential	  beliefs	  are	  constitutive	  of	  agential	  reasons	  themselves.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  I	  should	  note	  here	  that	  though	  I	  defend	  a	  propositionalist	  view	  of	  reasons,	  a	  view	  
of	  reasons	  as	  states	  of	  affairs,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  obtain,	  could	  also	  be	  the	  
correct	  view	  of	  reasons.	  	  I	  take	  up	  the	  debate	  between	  propositionalists	  and	  state	  of	  
affairs	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  here	  only	  insofar	  as	  I	  consider	  a	  recent	  
argument	  against	  propositionalism	  by	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  theorist	  (Dancy:	  2000).	  	  See	  
Chapter	  5	  for	  more	  on	  this.	  
16	  Sandis	  (forthcoming,	  draft)	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Thus,	  the	  necessary	  connection	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  agential	  
psychologies	  are	  essential	  constituents	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons,	  which	  in	  turn	  explains	  
the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  agential	  psychologies	  and	  their	  motivating	  
reasons.	  
	   Chapter	  5	  deals	  with	  an	  objection	  to	  propositionalism.	  	  The	  objection	  is	  based	  
on	  purported	  problem	  with	  reasons	  being	  identified	  with	  propositions.	  	  The	  first	  
objection	  maintains	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  metaphysically	  robust	  enough	  to	  be	  
reasons.17	  	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  objection	  is	  vague,	  but	  when	  clear	  content	  is	  provided	  to	  
it,	  it	  fails.	  	  Next,	  I	  deal	  with	  issues	  that	  arise	  for	  propositionalism	  regarding	  whether	  
the	  correct	  theory	  of	  reasons	  is	  Russellian	  or	  Fregean.18	  	  In	  other	  words,	  does	  the	  
correct	  theory	  also	  countenance	  Russellian	  propositions	  as	  reasons,	  or	  must	  all	  
reasons	  be	  of	  the	  general	  Fregean	  kind?	  	  I	  argue	  that	  Russellian	  theories	  of	  reasons	  
have	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  Next,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  powerful	  prima	  
facie	  objection	  to	  the	  Russellian	  theory	  fails.	  	  Then	  I	  argue	  further	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
significant	  problem	  with	  Fregean	  reasons	  as	  the	  exclusive	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  Thus,	  I	  
argue	  for	  Russellian	  propositionalism.	  
	   Then	  in	  Chapter	  6	  I	  deal	  with	  the	  objection	  that	  reasons	  cannot	  be	  
propositions	  because	  if	  they	  were,	  then	  they	  could	  not	  be	  motivating.	  	  But	  surely,	  the	  
objection	  goes,	  reasons	  can	  be	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  
themselves	  motivating	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  psychological	  states	  (typically	  beliefs)	  
with	  reasons	  as	  their	  propositional	  contents	  are	  what	  motivate	  actions.	  	  Moreover,	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Dancy	  (2000)	  
18	  Everson	  (2009)	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argue	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  motivation	  causally	  such	  that	  agents’	  
psychological	  states	  have	  a	  causal-­‐motivational	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  action.19	  
	   Finally,	  in	  Chapter	  6	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  purposes	  are	  not	  reasons.	  	  Here	  I	  follow	  
Alvarez’	  Aristotelian-­‐inspired	  theory	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  main	  
claim	  in	  this	  section.20	  	  That	  is,	  I	  argue	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  reasons	  we	  use	  
to	  practically	  reason,	  and	  that	  purposes,	  or	  goals,	  are	  the	  things	  that	  stimulate	  us	  to	  
reason,	  and	  are	  the	  things	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  we	  reason.	  	  I	  also	  consider	  several	  
attempts	  to	  show	  that	  purposes	  are	  reasons	  and	  show	  that	  they	  fail.	  
	  
1.3	  Three	  Assumptions	  
Although	  I	  argue	  that	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  I	  will	  by	  and	  large	  assume	  
that	  reasons	  are	  something,	  that	  is,	  that	  they	  are	  entities	  belonging	  to	  some	  
ontological	  kind	  or	  other.	  	  Some	  contemporary	  philosophers	  argue	  that	  reasons	  are	  
not	  entities	  of	  any	  kind.21	  I	  have	  no	  knockdown	  argument	  against	  these	  deflationist	  
theories	  of	  reasons,	  but	  I	  do	  have	  one	  simple	  line	  of	  argument	  against	  it.	  	  It	  is	  this:	  	  
reasons	  seem	  to	  be	  something.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  seeming	  is	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  
have	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  action.	  	  Reasons	  at	  least	  appear	  to	  be	  metaphysically	  robust	  
enough	  to	  guide	  our	  actions.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  powerful	  argument	  in	  the	  least,	  but	  I	  take	  
it	  to	  have	  some	  force	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  should	  endeavor	  to	  save	  the	  appearances	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  I	  do	  not	  say	  much	  about	  the	  causal-­‐motivational	  role	  psychologies	  have	  in	  action.	  	  
For	  recent	  work	  on	  this	  these	  issues,	  see	  Aguilar,	  Jesus	  and	  Buckareff,	  Andrei	  
(2010a),	  (2010b)	  and	  Aguilar,	  Jesus	  and	  Buckareff,	  Andrei	  and	  Frankish,	  Keith	  
(2011).	  	  For	  a	  noncausal	  theory	  of	  action,	  see	  Ginet	  (1990).	  	  	  
20	  Alvarez	  (2010a)	  
21	  Sandis	  (forthcoming,	  draft),	  Davis	  (2005).	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unless	  we	  are	  given	  good	  reasons	  not	  to.	  	  That	  said,	  the	  deflationist	  and	  I	  agree	  on	  
something	  important,	  namely,	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  psychological	  entities.	  
	   I	  assume,	  by	  and	  large,	  that	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  psychologist	  and	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  is	  not	  merely	  verbal.	  	  The	  psychologist	  claims	  that	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states,	  and	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  denies	  this.	  	  On	  the	  account	  
developed	  here,	  reasons	  are	  the	  propositional	  contents	  of	  belief-­‐states.	  	  But	  I	  also	  
claim	  that	  believing	  the	  relevant	  reason	  is	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  a	  reason.	  	  
Psychologists	  claim,	  in	  part	  at	  least,	  that	  reasons	  are	  belief-­‐states,	  which	  include	  
their	  propositional	  contents.22	  	  Thus	  the	  same	  ontological	  pieces	  are	  in	  play	  in	  both	  
theories;	  only	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  denies	  that	  the	  psychological	  state	  minus	  the	  
propositional	  content	  is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  agential	  reason.	  	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  
substantive	  ontological	  disagreement	  between	  the	  psychologist	  and	  anti-­‐
psychologist.	  	  In	  Chapter	  7	  I	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  this	  issue,	  but	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  project	  here	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  debate	  here	  is	  substantive.	  
	   Lastly,	  I	  think	  we	  should	  avoid,	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  disjunctive	  theories,	  
including	  disjunctive	  theories	  of	  reasons.	  	  There	  are	  theoretical	  simplicity	  or	  unity	  
arguments	  to	  be	  given	  for	  this	  assumption,	  and	  I	  will	  say	  something	  more	  about	  
them	  when	  they	  become	  pertinent	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  6.	  	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  take	  up	  
the	  arguments	  with	  the	  thoroughness	  that	  they	  would	  need,	  so	  I	  largely	  assume	  the	  
theoretical	  simplicity	  and	  unity	  arguments	  for	  anti-­‐disjunctivism	  are	  right.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  I	  say	  that	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  psychologistic	  theory	  because	  they	  also	  typically	  claim	  
that	  desire-­‐states	  are	  reasons.	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Chapter	  2	  
The	  Ontology	  of	  Motivating	  Reasons	  
The	  Debate	  &	  	  
Problems	  with	  Anti-­Psychologism	  	  




There	  are	  two	  main	  goals	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  first	  goal	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  
debate	  regarding	  the	  ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  (the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  
Φ,	  where	  ‘Φ’	  denotes	  an	  action-­‐type).	  	  The	  debate	  is	  between	  those	  who	  adopt	  
psychologistic	  ontologies	  of	  reasons	  and	  those	  who	  deny	  such	  ontologies.	  	  The	  
second	  goal	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  show	  that	  recent	  prominent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
views	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  face	  serious	  problems.	  
The	  structure	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  as	  follows.	  	  First,	  I	  briefly	  set	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  
debate	  by	  introducing	  the	  relevant	  terminology	  (Section	  2.1)	  and	  explaining	  in	  more	  
detail	  the	  nature	  of	  psychologism	  and	  anti-­‐psychologism	  (Section	  2.2)	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  
what’s	  intuitive	  about	  them	  as	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Then	  I	  develop	  and	  
consider	  several	  lines	  of	  argument	  against	  recent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  
(Section	  2.3).	  
	  
2.1	  Setting	  the	  Stage	  
	   There	  are	  some	  matters	  that	  need	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  potential	  
confusion.	  	  This	  chapter,	  as	  stated,	  is	  about	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  This	  means,	  among	  
other	  things,	  that	  this	  chapter	  is	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act	  (or	  upon	  
which	  they	  will	  act	  or	  have	  acted,	  etc.).	  	  Thus,	  Stephane’s	  action	  of	  mowing	  his	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neighbor’s	  lawn,	  or	  Katherine’s	  action	  of	  driving	  to	  Napa	  Valley	  are	  performed	  for	  
reasons	  that	  in	  some	  manner	  had	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  moving	  them,	  i.e.,	  motivated	  
them	  (or	  had	  a	  motivational	  role	  for	  them),	  to	  act	  as	  they	  did.	  	  
Motivating	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  reasons	  agents	  may	  have	  
independently	  of	  those	  that	  motivate	  them.23	  	  These	  reasons	  are	  called	  normative,	  or	  
sometimes	  justifying,	  reasons.24	  	  When,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  Melli	  has	  a	  reason	  
for	  getting	  a	  job	  at	  the	  local	  market	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  job	  
there,	  we	  mean	  something	  like	  that	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  or	  good	  for	  her	  to	  get	  
the	  job.	  	  The	  reason	  Melli	  may	  have	  for	  getting	  the	  job	  is	  that	  she	  has	  dependents	  
that	  need	  her	  to	  provide	  for	  them,	  or	  perhaps	  she	  has	  goals	  that	  require	  she	  have	  a	  
job	  that	  she	  can	  walk	  to,	  and	  the	  market	  is	  the	  only	  place	  where	  this	  could	  work	  for	  
her.	  	  Some	  normative	  reasons	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Suppose	  Melli	  
acts	  so	  as	  to	  get	  the	  job	  at	  the	  market	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  she	  has	  dependents	  for	  
whom	  to	  provide.	  	  That	  is,	  this	  normative	  reason	  also	  has	  a	  role	  in	  what	  moves	  her	  
to	  act.	  	  Then,	  it	  is	  also	  Melli’s	  motivating	  reason.	  	  	  
When	  it	  is	  said	  that	  an	  agent	  A	  has	  a	  reason	  R	  to	  Φ	  or	  that	  A	  has	  R	  to	  Φ,	  these	  
expressions	  can	  signal	  the	  offering	  of	  normative	  reasons	  for	  A	  to	  Φ.	  	  	  Normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  defend	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  normative	  
reasons.	  	  Here	  I	  simply	  assume	  this	  claim	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  intuitiveness	  of	  the	  
cases.	  	  	  
24	  Here	  I	  follow	  Dancy	  (2000:	  chapter	  5).	  	  We	  think	  it	  is	  somewhat	  misleading	  to	  
claim	  that	  normative	  reasons	  are	  the	  same	  as	  justifying	  reasons.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  
some	  contexts	  motivating	  reasons	  can	  have	  a	  justificatory	  dimension.	  	  For	  example,	  
if	  we	  were	  find	  out	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  playing	  the	  guitar	  so	  loudly	  this	  early	  
morning	  is	  based	  on	  his	  false	  belief	  that	  nobody	  else	  was	  home,	  we	  would	  be	  
inclined	  to	  mitigate	  some	  of	  our	  scorn	  at	  him	  for	  waking	  us	  up	  at	  dawn.	  	  That	  is,	  his	  
reason	  for	  playing	  the	  guitar	  so	  early	  can	  be	  said,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  justify	  his	  doing	  
so.	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reasons	  need	  not	  be	  moral	  reasons.	  	  They	  need	  only	  good	  or	  even	  appropriate	  
reasons.25	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  it	  is	  said	  that	  A’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  R,	  we	  
express	  a	  motivating	  reason	  of	  A’s	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  expressions	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  that	  do	  not	  take	  this	  form.	  	  For	  example,	  sometimes	  it	  is	  said	  that	  
A	  Φ’s	  because	  R,	  or	  that	  A	  Φ’s	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  R.26	  	  In	  these	  other	  instances	  we	  
could	  say	  that	  the	  ‘because’	  and	  ‘ground’	  are	  intended	  as	  denoting	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  
‘reason’.	  	  Of	  course,	  ‘because’	  and	  ‘ground’	  have	  other	  senses	  than	  ‘reason’	  and	  so	  
could	  come	  to	  denote	  something	  other	  than	  ‘reason’.	  	  ‘Because’	  is	  often	  used	  to	  
express	  a	  purely	  causal	  relation,	  and	  ‘ground’	  is	  often	  used	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  	  I	  avoid	  
ambiguity	  by	  referring	  to	  ‘because’	  and	  ‘ground’	  as	  ‘becauseR’	  and	  ‘groundR’,	  
respectively,	  when	  intending	  them	  to	  denote	  ‘reason’.	  	  Otherwise,	  I	  mainly	  use	  the	  
expression	  ‘A	  Φ-­‐d	  for	  R’	  and	  its	  grammatical	  variants	  as	  the	  typical	  manner	  of	  
expressing	  A’s	  motivating	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  
Finally,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  one	  might	  hold	  psychologistic	  theory	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  hold	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  view	  of	  
normative	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  much	  less	  plausible,	  though,	  to	  hold	  a	  view	  whereby	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  and	  normative	  reasons	  are	  
psychologistic,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  logically	  impossible	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Finally,	  of	  course	  
one’s	  complete	  view	  of	  reasons	  might	  also	  be	  uniform.	  	  	  One	  might	  hold	  the	  view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  I	  will	  leave	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘appropriate’	  intuitive	  here.	  	  Nothing	  of	  substance	  will	  turn	  
on	  it.	  
26	  I	  leave	  out	  a	  common	  form	  of	  motivating	  reason-­‐explanation:	  	  A	  Φ-­‐s	  in	  order	  to	  Ψ.	  	  
I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  is	  a	  genuine	  reason-­‐giving	  form.	  	  I	  provide	  my	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  And	  in	  Chapter	  5	  I	  argue	  that	  purposive-­‐explanations	  are	  
not	  reason-­‐explanations,	  or	  at	  least	  are	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  that	  some	  
[Sehon	  (2005),	  Davis	  (2005)]	  take	  them	  to	  be.	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that	  all	  reasons	  simpliciter	  are	  anti-­‐psychologistic;	  others	  might	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  
all	  reasons	  simpliciter	  are	  psychologistic.	  	  The	  upshot	  here	  is	  simply	  that	  there	  are	  
many	  logically	  possible	  combinations	  of	  positions	  regarding	  the	  ontological	  nature	  
of	  reasons.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Psychologism	  &	  Anti-­Psychologism	  
	   In	  this	  section	  we	  will	  get	  clearer	  about	  the	  key	  positions	  in	  this	  project.	  	  Of	  
particular	  significance	  here	  will	  be	  identifying	  the	  virtues	  of	  psychologism	  and	  anti-­‐
psychologism.	  	  This	  will	  put	  us	  in	  position,	  in	  later	  chapters,	  to	  try	  to	  develop	  a	  
theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  has	  as	  many	  of	  the	  virtues	  as	  possible.	  
	  
2.2.1	  Psychologism	  	  
Psychologism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  our	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  are	  psychological	  states.	  	  
More	  specifically,	  I	  take	  it	  to	  be	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states.	  	  Suppose	  James	  goes	  to	  the	  restaurant	  for	  a	  reason.	  	  According	  
to	  some	  versions	  of	  psychologism,	  James’	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  restaurant	  can	  be	  
merely	  his	  psychological	  state	  of	  hunger.	  	  Moreover,	  hunger	  can	  be	  just	  one	  of	  
James’	  reasons	  for	  going	  to	  the	  restaurant.	  	  Another	  reason	  could	  be	  that	  he	  believes	  
that	  they	  serve	  good	  vegan	  food	  there.	  	  Other	  views	  claim	  that	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	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Φ-­‐ing	  involves	  a	  belief-­‐desire	  pair:	  	  agents	  want	  things,	  and	  they	  form	  means-­‐end	  
beliefs	  attempting	  to	  satisfy	  their	  desires.27	  	  	  
	   Donald	  Davidson’s	  1963	  “Actions,	  Reasons,	  and	  Causes”	  is	  the	  locus	  classicus	  
for	  psychologism.28	  	  Davidson	  writes:	  
	  
R	  is	  a	  primary	  reason	  why	  an	  agent	  performed	  the	  action	  A	  under	  the	  description	  d	  only	  if	  R	  
consists	  of	  a	  pro	  attitude	  of	  the	  agent	  towards	  actions	  with	  a	  certain	  property,	  and	  a	  belief	  
of	  the	  agent	  that	  A,	  under	  the	  description	  d,	  has	  that	  property.	  
	  
Here	  we	  see	  Davidson	  provides	  two	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  
‘primary	  reason’,	  which	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  explains	  agents’	  actions.29	  They	  are	  (a)	  
having	  a	  pro	  attitude,	  which	  is	  closely	  akin	  to	  a	  desire,	  about	  an	  action	  with	  a	  certain	  
property,	  and	  (b)	  having	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  action	  desired,	  under	  a	  particular	  
description,	  has	  the	  corresponding	  desired	  property.	  	  It	  might	  not	  ultimately	  be	  
warranted	  to	  claim	  that	  Davidson’s	  account	  commits	  him	  to	  psychologism	  regarding	  
motivating	  reasons	  as	  it	  has	  been	  defined	  here.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  fairly	  clear	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  In	  Chapter	  3	  below	  I	  offer	  an	  argument	  inspired	  by	  Alvarez	  (2010)	  and	  Dancy	  
(2000)	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  desires	  are	  not	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  This	  explains	  why	  I	  
almost	  always	  consider	  cases	  of	  involving	  belief.	  	  	  
28	  Davidson	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  contemporary	  locus	  classicus	  of	  psychologism.	  	  
Many	  believe	  David	  Hume	  to	  be	  the	  historical	  source	  of	  such	  the	  view.	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  
to	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  latter	  issue	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
29	  It	  may	  be	  dubious	  to	  claim	  that	  Davidson’s	  notion	  of	  a	  primary	  reason	  is	  
coextensive,	  or	  closely	  thereto,	  with	  the	  contemporary	  notion	  of	  a	  motivating	  
reason.	  	  One	  reason	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  claim	  is	  that	  to	  provide	  the	  reason	  that	  
motivated	  the	  agent	  seems	  also	  thereby	  to	  explain	  it,	  and	  Davidson’s	  notion	  of	  a	  
primary	  reason	  was	  clearly	  interested	  in	  explanation—or	  as	  he	  put	  it	  with	  
‘rationalization’.	  	  Something	  interesting	  may	  turn	  on	  this	  issue;	  for	  now	  I	  will	  
assume	  that	  nothing	  does.	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Davidson’s	  conditions	  go	  a	  way	  toward	  analyzing	  what	  a	  primary—or	  motivating—
reason	  is.	  	  It	  is	  also	  fairly	  clear	  that	  beliefs	  and	  desires,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  constitute	  
primary	  reasons,	  so	  it	  is	  easily	  seen	  how	  his	  view	  is	  readily	  associated	  with	  
psychologism.	  
	   Michael	  Smith	  is	  a	  current	  defender	  of	  psychologism.	  	  In	  his	  book,	  The	  Moral	  
Problem,	  Smith	  claims	  the	  following:	  
	  
By	  contrast	  with	  normative	  reasons,	  then,	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  truths	  of	  the	  form	  ‘It	  is	  
desirable	  or	  required	  that	  I	  Φ’,	  motivating	  reasons	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  psychological	  
states,	  states	  that	  play	  a	  certain	  explanatory	  role	  in	  producing	  action.”30	  	  (p.	  96:	  bold	  
added)	  
	  
Here	  we	  see	  Smith	  not	  only	  state	  his	  philosophical	  allegiance	  to	  psychologism,	  but	  
also	  claim	  that	  an	  interesting	  connection	  holds	  between	  motivating	  reasons,	  
psychological	  states,	  and	  the	  explanation	  of	  action.	  	  Motivating	  reasons	  are	  
connected	  by	  way	  of	  identity	  with	  psychological	  states,	  but	  which	  ones?	  	  This	  is	  
where	  explanation	  comes	  in.	  	  The	  psychological	  states	  that	  explain	  action	  are	  the	  
ones	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Prima	  facie,	  it	  seems	  right	  to	  claim	  
that	  identity	  holds	  between	  motivating	  reasons	  and	  explanatorily	  adequate	  
psychological	  states.	  	  If	  the	  motivating	  reason	  groundingR	  Deke’s	  moving	  to	  Illinois	  
is	  provided,	  then	  it	  seems	  right	  that	  his	  moving	  to	  Illinois	  has	  thereby	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Smith	  defends	  the	  view	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  in	  
chapter	  4	  of	  The	  Moral	  Problem.	  	  In	  chapter	  4,	  Smith	  takes	  Davidson	  to	  be	  expressing	  
a	  psychologistic	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  For	  unmistakable	  evidence	  of	  this,	  
see	  pp.	  92-­‐3.	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explained.	  	  Conversely,	  if	  Deke’s	  moving	  to	  Illinois	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
relevant	  psychological	  states	  he	  has	  (e.g.,	  his	  desire	  to	  be	  there	  with	  his	  family;	  his	  
belief	  that	  moving	  to	  Illinois	  will	  be	  the	  best	  way	  for	  him	  to	  be	  with	  his	  family),	  then	  
the	  motivating	  reasons	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  provided	  as	  well.	  	  Regardless	  of	  
whether	  one	  accepts	  the	  identity	  in	  question	  here,	  one	  can	  agree	  with	  Smith	  that	  
there	  exists	  a	  very	  tight	  relation	  between	  psychological	  states,	  explanation,	  and	  
motivation.	  	  
Psychologism	  has	  intuitive	  pull	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  First,	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  does	  what	  she	  does,	  so	  it	  
seems	  almost	  obvious	  that	  an	  agent’s	  psychology	  is	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  story	  
involved	  in	  her	  acting.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  seems	  necessary	  that	  agents	  be	  at	  least	  aware	  of	  
what	  they	  are	  acting	  for	  in	  order	  for	  their	  reason	  to	  be	  a	  motivating	  reason.	  	  If	  	  
Heather	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  (supposed)	  fact	  that	  she	  can	  fellowship	  with	  her	  friends,	  
then	  it	  seems	  impossible	  that	  her	  believing	  that	  she	  can	  fellowship	  with	  her	  friends	  
can	  serve	  as	  her	  motivating	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  church.	  	  There	  may	  be	  issues	  here	  
determining	  the	  level	  of	  awareness	  one	  must	  have	  of	  a	  consideration	  for	  it	  to	  serve	  
as	  a	  motivating	  reason,	  but	  suffice	  it	  to	  say,	  for	  now	  at	  least,	  that	  the	  awareness	  need	  
not	  be	  explicit,	  or	  occurrent,	  in	  the	  agent’s	  consciousness.	  	  Indeed	  Heather	  need	  only	  
be	  minimally	  aware	  of	  her	  belief	  regarding	  fellowshipping	  with	  her	  friends	  in	  order	  
for	  it	  to	  be	  a	  motivating	  reason	  for	  her.	  
	   Second,	  psychologism	  seems	  to	  get	  the	  cases	  where	  agents	  are	  motivated	  to	  
act	  by	  false	  beliefs	  right.	  	  For	  example,	  what	  seems	  to	  motivate	  Jack	  to	  apply	  to	  
medical	  school	  is	  his	  believing	  that	  his	  undergraduate	  science	  professors	  think	  of	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him	  as	  a	  good	  student.	  	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  Jack	  is	  mistaken	  about	  what	  his	  
professors	  think	  of	  him.	  	  Suppose	  they	  find	  him	  to	  be	  only	  an	  average	  undergraduate	  
student	  and	  have	  reservations	  about	  his	  attending	  medical	  school.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  
would	  appear	  that	  Jack	  applies	  to	  medical	  school	  for	  a	  (motivating)	  reason,	  but	  it	  
would	  appear	  that	  the	  content	  of	  his	  belief	  is	  false.	  	  Cases	  like	  these	  seem	  ordinary;	  
it	  is	  likely	  that	  we	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs	  all	  the	  time.	  	  The	  psychologistic	  
account	  of	  reasons	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  	  Jack’s	  motivating	  reason	  for	  
applying	  to	  medical	  school	  is,	  it	  seems,	  his	  believing	  that	  his	  undergraduate	  
professors	  think	  highly	  of	  his	  abilities	  and	  not	  merely	  the	  content	  of	  his	  false	  belief.	  
	   Third,	  psychologism	  also	  seems	  to	  get	  right	  the	  nature	  of	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  	  Like	  many	  forms	  of	  explanation,	  reason-­‐explanations	  seem	  to	  be	  
factive.31	  	  That	  is,	  p	  explains	  q	  only	  if	  p.	  	  In	  thinking	  about	  error	  cases	  again,	  we	  seem	  
able	  to	  provide	  reason-­‐explanations	  for	  actions	  agents	  perform	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  
beliefs.	  	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  these	  explanations,	  the	  explanans	  will	  have	  to	  be	  true.	  	  
However,	  if	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  is	  false,	  then	  the	  latter	  cannot	  be	  the	  explanans.	  	  
On	  the	  psychologistic	  theory	  this	  can	  be	  dealt	  with:	  	  the	  explanans	  cites	  as	  the	  
agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  his	  believing	  that	  p	  not	  merely	  p.	  	  The	  reason-­‐explanation	  
for	  Jack’s	  applying	  to	  medical	  school	  is	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  his	  professors	  think	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Some	  deny	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanations:	  	  see	  Dancy	  (2000),	  Davis	  (2005).	  	  
As	  will	  be	  seen	  below	  (Section	  2.3.2)	  and	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  assume	  that,	  all	  things	  
being	  equal,	  it	  is	  better	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  to	  be	  factive	  than	  non-­‐
factive.	  
	   23	  
highly	  of	  his	  academic	  abilities	  even	  though	  what	  he	  believes	  is	  false.	  	  Accordingly,	  
psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations	  will	  turn	  out	  factive.32	  
	   Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  intuitively,	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  things	  that	  
motivate	  us	  to	  act,	  and	  since	  motivations,	  including	  motivating	  reasons,	  are	  
necessarily	  connected	  to	  our	  psychologies,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  at	  least	  
part	  of	  what	  constitutes	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  our	  psychologies	  themselves.	  	  
Another	  way	  of	  expressing	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  our	  psychologies	  is	  that	  our	  
psychological	  states	  constitute,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  motivating	  reasons.	  
	  
Anti-­Psychologism	  2.2.2	  
Anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  deny	  that	  motivating	  
reasons	  consist,	  even	  in	  part,	  of	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  agents.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  
define	  anti-­‐psychologism	  as	  the	  thesis	  that	  no	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  
states.	  	  Typical	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  accounts	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  identify	  reasons	  
with	  either	  true	  propositions	  or	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  or	  facts.	  	  For	  example,	  
James’	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  restaurant	  is	  the	  fact,	  supposing	  it	  is	  a	  fact,	  that	  the	  
restaurant	  serves	  good	  vegan	  food.	  	  Less	  typical	  accounts	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism	  
might	  identify	  reasons	  with	  intentional	  objects,	  and	  depending	  on	  one’s	  view	  of	  
intentional	  objects,	  reasons	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  because	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  I	  have	  gone	  over	  some	  of	  these	  complex	  issues	  rather	  quickly	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  
intuitive	  features	  of	  the	  views	  down.	  The	  issues	  concerning	  actions	  groundedR	  by	  
false	  beliefs,	  the	  nature	  of	  reason	  explanation,	  the	  differences	  between	  motivations	  
and	  motivating	  reasons,	  etc.	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  much	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  sections	  
discussing	  theoretical	  problems	  with	  anti-­‐psychologism.	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are	  not	  entities	  of	  any	  kind.33	  	  So,	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  one	  
can	  have	  regarding	  the	  ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  
There	  has	  been	  somewhat	  of	  a	  movement	  against	  the	  Davidsonian	  
psychologistic	  view	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  in	  recent	  times,	  even	  though,	  as	  Jonathan	  
Dancy	  notes:	  “Psychologism	  has	  a	  large	  and	  enthusiastic	  following.”34	  Fellow	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  Maria	  Alvarez	  seconds	  Dancy’s	  claim:	  	  “…	  Davidson’s	  conception	  of	  
reasons,	  or	  something	  close	  to	  it,	  became	  the	  orthodoxy	  and	  remains	  so	  to	  this	  
day.”35	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Despite	  having	  to	  compete	  against	  orthodoxy,	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  view	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  also	  has	  some	  intuitive	  appeal.	  	  According	  to	  many	  of	  these	  
views,	  reasons	  are	  true	  propositions	  or	  facts	  or	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  
Accordingly,	  their	  views	  would	  usually	  have	  it	  that	  reasons	  have	  an	  abstract	  nature.	  	  
This	  is	  intuitive	  because	  reasons	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  repeatability	  that	  is	  
characteristic	  of	  abstract	  entities.	  e.g.,	  propositions,	  properties,	  relations,	  etc.	  	  
Assuming	  that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  use	  English	  provides	  us	  with	  some,	  albeit	  
defeasible,	  evidence	  for	  our	  metaphysics,	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  has	  some	  
support	  from	  how	  we	  use	  English.	  	  Suppose	  that	  Della’s	  son	  spots	  her	  out	  in	  the	  
garden	  covering	  their	  tomato	  plants,	  and	  so	  he	  asks	  her	  the	  reasons	  for	  her	  actions.	  	  
Suppose	  further	  that	  Della	  responds	  as	  follows,	  “Son,	  my	  reasons	  for	  covering	  the	  
tomato	  plants	  are	  that	  it	  will	  be	  very	  cold	  tonight,	  and	  tomato	  plants	  cannot	  survive	  
very	  cold	  weather.”	  	  Della’s	  motivating	  reasons	  in	  this	  case	  appear	  to	  be	  that	  it	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  those	  that	  think	  intentional	  objects	  have	  intentional	  
inexistence,	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  exist.	  	  See	  Sandis	  (forthcoming	  ms)	  and	  Crane	  (2001).	  
34	  Dancy	  (2000:	  99)	  
35	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  2)	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be	  very	  cold	  tonight	  and	  that	  tomato	  plants	  cannot	  survive	  very	  cold	  weather.	  	  These	  
reasons	  also	  appear	  to	  be	  repeatable.	  	  It	  seems	  possible	  that	  Agostino,	  who	  lives	  
nowhere	  near	  Della,	  could	  also	  be	  asked	  for	  his	  reasons	  for	  covering	  his	  tomato	  
plants	  by	  his	  (altogether)	  different	  son.	  	  Moreover,	  he	  could	  reply	  exactly	  as	  Della	  
did.	  	  He	  could	  even	  use	  the	  same	  words	  in	  the	  same	  way	  to	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  
as	  they	  were	  used	  and	  intended	  by	  Della.36	  
So	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  able	  to	  accommodate	  the	  intuitive	  claim	  that	  Della	  
and	  Agostino	  can	  act	  for	  the	  same	  reason.	  	  Psychologists	  are	  unable	  to	  get	  this	  right	  
because	  they	  argue	  that	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  
understood	  as	  instances	  of	  psychological	  states.	  	  They	  need	  the	  psychological	  states	  
to	  be	  non-­‐repeatable	  instances	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  have	  the	  causal	  roles	  they	  do	  in	  
motivating	  agents	  to	  act.	  	  Accordingly,	  psychologism	  fails	  to	  capture	  an	  intuitive	  idea	  
that	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  able	  to,	  namely,	  that	  agents	  can	  act	  for	  the	  same	  reasons.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2.3	  Problems	  with	  Anti-­Psychologism	  
There	  are	  several	  significant	  problems	  with	  some	  recent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
views.	  	  The	  problems	  are	  so	  significant	  that	  if	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  
theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons,	  it	  will	  need	  to	  have	  proper	  solutions	  to	  them.	  	  Before	  
sketching	  these	  problems	  it	  would	  be	  best	  to	  note	  that	  the	  problems	  sketched	  here	  
will	  be	  shown	  in	  reality	  to	  be	  clusters	  of	  problems	  because	  their	  potential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Agostino	  need	  not	  utter	  the	  same	  English	  sentence	  as	  Della	  in	  order	  to	  express	  the	  
same	  reason	  as	  her.	  	  I	  assume	  he	  does	  here	  just	  because	  it	  seems	  more	  obvious	  that	  
he	  expresses	  the	  same	  reason	  when	  he	  utters	  the	  same	  sentence,	  intending	  by	  his	  
sentence	  to	  express	  the	  same	  reason.	  	  Chapter	  5	  deals	  with	  issues	  that	  arise	  for	  
motivating	  reasons	  conceived	  of	  as	  propositions,	  which	  are	  related	  to	  issues	  in	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  language.	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solutions—including	  some	  of	  the	  solutions	  we	  examine	  by	  philosophers	  in	  this	  
section—lead	  to	  further	  problems.	  	  	  
The	  first	  problem	  is	  this.	  	  Suppose,	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake,	  motivating	  reasons	  
are	  facts.	  	  Suppose	  also	  that	  facts	  entail	  truth.37	  What,	  then,	  are	  we	  to	  say	  about	  
cases	  where	  the	  motivating	  reason	  for	  an	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  false,	  and	  so	  is	  no	  fact	  at	  
all?	  	  One	  option	  here	  is	  to	  say	  that	  agents	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  but	  it	  
seems	  that	  agents	  do	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  them.	  	  This	  is	  the	  No-­Reason	  Problem.	  	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  that	  goes	  this	  route	  needs	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  
is	  that	  the	  agents	  are	  acting	  for	  in	  such	  cases	  without	  what	  they	  are	  acting	  for	  being	  
a	  reason.	  	  Or	  they	  need	  to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  no	  reason	  in	  these	  
cases.38	  As	  we	  will	  see	  below	  in	  Section	  2.3.1,	  there	  are	  considerations	  involving	  
paradoxical	  reason-­‐explanations	  that	  might	  pressure	  anti-­‐psychologists	  into	  a	  
theory	  whereby	  they	  accept	  that	  agents	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  This	  
will	  add	  to	  the	  list	  of	  problems	  here.	  	  	  
A	  second,	  and	  closely	  related,	  problem	  concerns	  more	  directly	  the	  nature	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation	  itself.	  	  I	  assume	  that	  having	  a	  unified	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation	  is	  desirable,	  and	  is	  thus	  a	  virtue	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  It	  would	  be	  
desirable,	  then,	  to	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  in	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation	  is	  the	  same	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  agent’s	  action	  is	  grounded	  in	  
truth,	  or	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  something	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  As	  will	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Perhaps	  facts	  entail	  truth	  because	  they	  are	  reducible	  to	  true	  propositions.	  	  In	  any	  
case,	  it	  is	  Alvarez’s	  view	  that	  reasons,	  which	  are	  facts,	  are	  true	  propositions.	  	  See	  
Alvarez	  (2010).	  
38	  By	  the	  expression	  ‘no	  reason’	  is	  not	  implied	  ‘no	  good	  reason’.	  	  Sometimes	  in	  
ordinary	  speak	  we	  utter	  the	  former	  while	  meaning	  the	  latter.	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seen	  below	  (Section	  2.3.1.),	  some	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  claim	  that	  reason-­‐
explanations	  only	  sometimes	  cite	  agential	  reasons	  as	  explanantia	  of	  an	  agent’s	  
action,	  and	  that	  in	  error	  cases	  agential	  reasons	  are	  not	  cited	  as	  explanantia.	  	  I	  think	  
disjunctive	  theories	  like	  this	  are	  problematic	  not	  only	  because	  they	  lack	  theoretical	  
unity,	  but	  also	  (indeed	  more	  so)	  because	  they	  fail	  to	  get	  right	  a	  significant	  kind	  of	  
agential	  rationalizability	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  To	  anticipate,	  this	  rationalizability	  
essentially	  involves	  the	  explanatory	  role	  of	  the	  reasons	  to	  which	  an	  agent	  is	  
sensitive	  when	  acting.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  Rationalizability	  Problem.	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  if	  anti-­‐psychologists	  claim	  that	  agents’	  actions	  are	  	  
rationalizable	  in	  the	  significant	  sense	  mentioned	  just	  above	  in	  error	  cases,	  then	  
another	  potential	  problem	  arises	  with	  respect	  to	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  It	  would	  
appear	  as	  if	  reason-­‐explanations	  would	  be	  non-­‐factive.	  	  (See	  Section	  2.3.2	  for	  more	  
on	  this	  potential	  problem.)	  	  The	  first	  two	  problems	  (and	  the	  cluster	  of	  related	  
problems)	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Sections	  2.3.1	  and	  2.3.2.	  
The	  third	  problem	  is	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  necessarily	  related	  to	  
agents’	  psychologies,	  and	  the	  issue	  is	  whether	  anti-­‐psychologism	  can	  explain	  this	  
connection.	  	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  significant	  to	  explain	  this	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  theory	  with	  
the	  fewest	  number	  of	  relevantly	  unexplained	  phenomena	  as	  possible.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  
Psychology	  Problem.	  	  I	  examine	  this	  problem	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  2.3.3.	  
	  
2.3.1	  Anti-­Psychologism	  and	  Error	  Cases	  
Let	  us	  examine	  the	  following	  cases	  that	  will	  help	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  no-­‐reason	  
problem.	  Terrie	  keeps	  a	  vigilant	  eye	  on	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  because	  the	  neighbor	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sometimes	  neglects	  to	  water	  it.	  	  She	  regularly	  checks	  to	  see	  if	  the	  neighbor	  has	  
watered	  it,	  and	  after	  doing	  this	  for	  several	  years	  she	  knows	  that	  he	  almost	  always	  
waters	  the	  lawn	  in	  the	  morning	  between	  ten	  and	  eleven	  o’clock.	  	  One	  morning	  the	  
neighbor	  slept	  in	  and	  did	  not	  water	  at	  the	  usual	  time,	  so	  when	  Terrie	  did	  her	  usual	  
checking	  on	  her	  neighbor	  and	  found	  that	  he	  did	  not	  do	  it	  at	  the	  expected	  time	  she	  
rushed	  over	  to	  her	  neighbor’s	  house	  and	  watered	  the	  lawn	  for	  him.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
watering,	  the	  neighbor	  noticed	  Terrie	  in	  his	  front	  yard	  watering	  his	  lawn,	  so	  he	  
came	  out	  and	  asked	  her:	  “For	  what	  reason	  are	  you	  watering	  my	  lawn?”39	  Terrie	  
responded:	  “You	  did	  not	  water	  your	  lawn	  this	  morning!”	  	  As	  the	  story	  goes,	  Terrie’s	  
reason	  for	  watering	  the	  lawn	  nicely	  hooks	  up	  with	  the	  fact	  she	  offers,	  namely,	  that	  
the	  neighbor	  did	  not	  water	  it	  himself.	  	  
Now	  suppose	  that	  we	  alter	  the	  case	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  	  Let’s	  suppose	  that	  
the	  neighbor	  watered	  the	  lawn	  much	  earlier	  than	  usual	  (for	  whatever	  reason),	  and	  
when	  Terrie	  is	  being	  her	  vigilant	  lawn-­‐watering	  self	  she	  notices	  that	  he	  does	  not	  
come	  out	  to	  water	  the	  lawn	  as	  expected	  at	  the	  usual	  time.	  	  If	  we	  keep	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
case	  the	  same,	  Terrie	  runs	  out	  and	  waters	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  When	  the	  neighbor	  
asks	  her	  reason	  for	  doing	  what	  she	  is	  doing	  she	  responds	  the	  in	  same	  way:	  “You	  did	  
not	  water	  your	  lawn	  this	  morning!”	  	  At	  this	  time	  the	  neighbor	  corrects	  her,	  and	  tells	  
her:	  	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  I	  did	  not	  water	  my	  lawn	  this	  morning!”	  	  If	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  is	  true,	  and	  if	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  facts,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Utterances	  of	  this	  type	  are	  admittedly	  rare	  when	  requesting	  someone’s	  reasons.	  	  
That	  is,	  we	  usually	  do	  not	  ask	  people	  their	  reasons	  for	  acting	  by	  asking	  them	  ‘for	  
what	  reason	  did	  you	  do	  what	  you	  did?’	  	  Instead,	  we	  typically	  ask	  them	  why	  they	  did	  
what	  they	  did,	  which	  is	  vague	  to	  say	  that	  least.	  	  I	  want	  the	  cases	  I	  use	  to	  reflect	  the	  
agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  agent	  Φ-­‐s.	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in	  the	  altered	  case	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  could	  not	  be	  the	  
content	  of	  her	  belief	  because	  the	  content	  is	  false.40	  	  Moreover,	  something	  very	  
paradoxical	  would	  surface	  were	  Terrie,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  explain	  her	  action,	  to	  
juxtapose	  her	  alleged	  reason	  for	  watering	  the	  lawn	  with	  what	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case.	  	  It	  
would	  be	  something	  like	  this:	  “The	  reason	  for	  which	  I	  watered	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  
is	  that	  he	  did	  not	  water	  it,	  yet	  he	  did	  water	  it.”	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  potential	  confusion,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  the	  altered	  case	  in	  
the	  third	  person	  and	  in	  the	  present	  tense.	  	  Suppose	  Terrie	  tells	  me	  her	  reason	  for	  
watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn,	  and	  suppose	  also	  that	  the	  neighbor	  is	  actually	  
watering	  his	  lawn	  via	  a	  newly	  installed	  drip	  system	  that	  Terrie	  does	  not	  detect.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  paradox	  mentioned	  just	  above	  is	  more	  straightforward:	  	  Terrie’s	  reason	  
for	  watering	  the	  lawn	  is	  that	  her	  neighbor	  is	  not	  watering	  it,	  but	  he	  is	  watering	  it.	  	  
Error	  cases	  like	  these	  involving	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  as	  facts	  gives	  rise	  to	  another	  
kind	  of	  problem,	  namely,	  it	  leads	  to	  paradoxical	  reason-­‐explanations.41,42	  Call	  this	  
the	  Paradox	  Problem.	  
I	  need	  to	  dispel	  another	  potential	  confusion	  here	  by	  identifying	  a	  common	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  assumption,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  paradox	  problem.	  	  Anti-­‐
pychologists	  typically	  believe	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  In	  much	  of	  what	  follows	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  assume	  for	  simplicity	  that	  
facts	  are	  true	  propositions,	  and	  that	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  in	  question	  assumes	  the	  
same	  as	  well	  as	  holds.	  
41	  Alvarez	  likens	  this	  paradox	  to	  Moorean	  paradoxes	  regarding	  belief	  where	  
believers	  believe	  the	  following:	  	  ‘p,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  p’.	  	  Alvarez’s	  claim	  seems	  
right,	  though	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  likening.	  
42	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  reason-­‐explanation	  here	  provided	  by	  Terrie	  has	  her	  citing	  what	  
she	  took	  her	  reason	  to	  be	  and	  what	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  latter	  after	  
she	  realizes	  that	  she	  made	  a	  mistake	  is	  a	  contingent	  feature	  of	  the	  case.	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explanations.43,44	  Citing	  Terrie’s	  reason,	  by	  itself,	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  
explains	  her	  watering	  the	  lawn.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  agential	  beliefs	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐pychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations	  under	  discussion	  here.	  	  
That	  is,	  if	  Terrie	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  watered	  the	  lawn,	  she	  
would	  be	  speaking	  falsely	  if	  she	  claims	  that	  her	  reason	  is	  that	  she	  believed	  that	  the	  
neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it.	  	  That	  cannot	  be	  her	  reason	  because	  it	  is	  a	  psychological	  
state.	  	  Thus,	  the	  paradox	  results	  when	  we	  consider	  Terrie’s	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
reason	  and	  what	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case.	  	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  the	  Terrie	  case	  is	  make-­‐believe.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  make-­‐believe	  
that	  people	  actually	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs.	  	  But	  according	  to	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  who	  thinks	  reasons	  are	  facts	  or	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs,	  it	  cannot	  be	  
that	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  could	  be	  the	  content	  of	  a	  false	  belief	  or	  the	  state	  of	  
affairs	  related	  to	  such	  content.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  serves	  as	  the	  
motivating	  reason	  for	  an	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing,	  then	  when	  we	  take	  that	  content	  and	  
juxtapose	  it	  with	  what	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  content	  must	  represent	  what	  is	  the	  case.	  	  In	  
cases	  where	  agents	  Φ	  for	  something	  that	  is	  not	  a	  fact,	  then	  it	  simply	  could	  not	  be	  the	  
case	  that	  they	  have	  acted	  for	  a	  fact.	  	  The	  anti-­‐psychologist	  cannot	  resort	  to	  digging	  in	  
her	  heels	  and	  claiming	  that	  despite	  the	  paradox	  agents	  could	  act	  for	  false	  beliefs.	  	  If	  
the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  is	  serious	  that	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  are	  facts,	  then	  she	  cannot	  
consistently	  maintain	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  false	  beliefs.	  	  To	  put	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Dancy	  (2000),	  and	  Stout	  (2009)	  for	  recent	  examples	  of	  
adherents	  of	  this	  assumption.	  
44	  I	  examine	  this	  assumption	  in	  more	  detail,	  and	  I	  reject	  it	  in	  Chapter	  4	  below.	  	  I	  set	  it	  
aside	  for	  now.	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second	  error	  case	  above,	  Terrie	  case	  above,	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  cannot	  claim	  that	  
Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  neighbor	  is	  not	  
watering	  his	  lawn,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  the	  neighbor	  is	  watering	  his	  lawn.	  
The	  paradox	  problem	  therefore	  seems	  to	  help	  push	  anti-­‐psychologists	  into	  
denying	  that	  Terrie	  acts	  for	  reasons	  in	  such	  cases	  altogether.45	  We	  see	  that	  our	  
reason-­‐explanations	  (rationalizations)	  of	  Terrie’s	  behavior	  (in	  error	  cases)	  are	  
paradoxical.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  related,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  significant,	  reason	  
some	  anti-­‐psychologists	  deny	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  In	  error	  cases	  
we	  know	  that	  the	  propositional	  content	  of	  the	  agent’s	  belief	  is	  false.	  	  Thus,	  if	  one	  
were	  to	  claim	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  false	  propositions,	  one	  would	  seem	  to	  need	  
to	  claim	  that	  false	  propositions	  can	  explain	  agential	  behavior.	  	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  
Section	  2.3.2	  below,	  this	  is	  problematic.	  	  For	  now,	  though,	  the	  crucial	  issue	  here	  is	  
that	  one	  possible	  move	  anti-­‐psychologists	  can	  make	  in	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  
error	  cases	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  them.	  	  	  
However,	  this	  option,	  though	  better	  than	  countenancing	  paradox,	  has	  
untoward	  consequences.	  	  One	  untoward	  consequence	  would	  be	  that	  we	  act	  without	  
reasons	  far	  more	  than	  it	  would	  appear	  we	  do.	  	  Another	  even	  worse	  consequence	  is	  
that	  far	  too	  many	  of	  our	  actions	  would	  be	  incapable	  of	  a	  significant	  kind	  of	  
rationalization—rationalizations	  involving	  the	  reasons	  agents	  were	  sensitive	  to	  
when	  acting	  as	  they	  did.	  	  This	  is	  the	  rationalization	  problem	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  
2.3	  above.	  	  I	  will	  also	  call	  this	  the	  reason-­sensitive	  rationalization	  problem	  in	  order	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  This	  is	  Alvarez’s	  preferred	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  She	  favors	  expressing	  her	  
solution	  as	  entailing	  that	  in	  Terrie	  type	  cases	  agents	  act	  for	  apparent	  reasons.	  	  
Regardless	  of	  this	  manner	  of	  expression,	  the	  fact	  is	  that	  agents	  in	  these	  cases,	  
according	  to	  Alvarez,	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons.	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be	  clear	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  rationalization	  problem	  it	  is.	  	  (Just	  below	  I	  distinguish	  
between	  two	  kinds	  of	  rationalization.)	  
Now,	  assume	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  we	  sometimes	  act	  without	  there	  
being	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act.	  	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe	  argued	  that	  sometimes	  people	  
whistle	  without	  having	  a	  reason	  for	  whistling.46	  	  Alvarez	  writes	  of	  a	  spontaneous	  
cartwheeler.47	  	  Alfred	  Mele	  argues	  that	  sometimes	  people	  just	  want	  to	  sing	  a	  tune.48	  
The	  list	  of	  cases	  like	  these	  could	  go	  on	  and	  on,	  but	  their	  upshot	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  
that	  human	  action	  need	  not	  be	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  Suppose	  this	  is	  right.	  	  This	  would	  
still	  not	  undermine	  or	  explain	  away	  the	  intuition	  that	  in	  the	  Terrie	  case,	  she	  is	  acting	  
for	  a	  reason	  even	  though	  she	  falsely	  believes	  that	  her	  neighbor	  is	  not	  watering	  the	  
lawn.	  	  The	  cases	  of	  whistling	  and	  cartwheeling,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  do	  elicit	  the	  
intuition	  that	  they	  are	  not	  performed	  for	  reasons.	  	  I	  say	  more	  about	  this	  in	  what	  
immediately	  follows.	  
Each	  of	  the	  actions	  allegedly	  done	  for	  no	  reason	  cited	  in	  the	  previous	  
paragraph	  is	  an	  action	  where	  the	  agent	  is	  interested	  in	  expressing	  his	  internal	  state	  
in	  some	  kind	  of	  way.	  	  They	  are,	  as	  Mele	  would	  call	  them,	  wholly	  intrinsically	  
motivated	  actions.49	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  actions	  are	  much	  different	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  
actions	  that	  are	  performed	  by	  agents	  who	  are	  motivated	  to	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  
beliefs.	  	  The	  latter	  do	  not	  seem	  necessarily	  to	  be	  expressions	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  states	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  See	  Anscombe	  (1971).	  
47	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010).	  
48	  See	  Mele	  (2003).	  
49	  Ibid,	  (2003:	  73).	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  whether	  wholly	  intrinsically	  
motivated	  actions	  are	  performed	  without	  reasons.	  	  Rather,	  I	  commit	  myself	  to	  the	  
conditional	  that	  if	  there	  are	  actions	  that	  are	  performed	  for	  no	  reason,	  then	  some	  of	  
them	  are	  wholly	  intrinsically	  motivated	  actions.	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agents.50	  	  Moreover,	  in	  cases	  like	  Anscombe’s	  whistler	  we	  could	  readily	  imagine	  
asking	  the	  whistler	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  she	  whistles,	  and	  hearing	  this	  reply:	  “For	  
no	  reason	  at	  all.”	  	  Now	  imagine	  asking	  Terrie	  her	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  
lawn	  after	  she	  has	  been	  told	  that	  she	  was	  mistaken.	  	  If	  she	  replied,	  “For	  no	  reason	  at	  
all”,	  we	  would	  rightly	  be	  puzzled	  by	  her	  reply	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  her	  action	  is	  
very	  much	  unlike	  actions	  that	  are	  typically	  done	  without	  reasons,	  like	  
spontaneously	  whistling	  or	  cartwheeling	  or	  singing	  a	  tune.	  	  And	  what	  makes	  the	  
actions	  very	  dissimilar	  is	  that	  the	  Terrie	  case	  very	  much	  seems	  to	  involve	  action	  
performed	  for	  a	  reason.51	  	  Of	  course,	  we	  would	  not	  be	  puzzled	  if	  the	  context	  allowed	  
us	  to	  infer	  that	  Terrie’s	  reply	  was	  elliptical	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  she	  had	  no	  good	  reason	  
at	  all	  for	  doing	  what	  she	  did.	  	  In	  that	  case	  it	  would	  be	  true	  that	  she	  acted	  for	  no	  good	  
reason,	  but	  even	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  who	  insists	  that	  Terrie	  does	  act	  for	  reasons	  
can	  accept	  this.	  
This	  is	  significant	  because	  if	  it	  is	  right	  that	  agents	  who	  act	  motivated	  by	  false	  
beliefs	  act	  for	  no	  reason	  at	  all,	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  number	  of	  actions	  that	  
are	  done	  for	  no	  reason	  would	  be	  significantly	  higher	  than	  we	  think.	  	  This	  is	  partly	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  class	  of	  actions	  done	  for	  no	  reason	  has	  expanded	  to	  include	  
not	  only	  wholly	  intrinsically	  motivated	  actions.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  could	  turn	  out	  that	  we	  
rarely,	  if	  ever,	  act	  for	  reasons,	  depending	  on	  how	  many	  of	  our	  beliefs	  are	  true.	  	  We	  
might	  be	  able	  to	  ignore	  the	  last	  point,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  an	  untoward	  consequence	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  I	  am	  probably	  sneaking	  in	  content	  externalist	  assumptions	  here.	  
51	  It	  isn’t	  merely	  the	  linguistic	  evidence	  that	  I	  am	  appealing	  to	  here.	  	  The	  linguistic	  
evidence	  points	  to	  the	  oddity	  of	  Terrie	  (a	  fairly	  normal	  agent)	  watering	  her	  
neighbor’s	  lawn	  without	  reason	  when	  she	  holds	  false	  beliefs	  about	  the	  lawn	  that	  she	  
is	  watering.	  	  We’ll	  get	  to	  the	  articulation	  of	  this	  oddity	  below.	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option	  we	  are	  exploring	  that	  it	  could	  be	  committed	  to	  there	  being	  significantly	  more	  
actions	  that	  are	  done	  without	  reasons	  than	  we	  would	  have	  thought.	  
The	  anti-­‐psychologist	  might	  deny	  the	  assumption	  that	  agents	  who	  act	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  false	  beliefs	  are	  as	  dissimilar	  from	  agents	  who	  act	  based	  on	  wholly	  intrinsic	  
factors	  as	  the	  argument	  suggested.	  	  Agents	  who	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs	  act	  
for	  no	  reason,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  and	  so	  whatever	  is	  guiding	  these	  kinds	  of	  actions	  
must	  be	  wholly	  intrinsic.	  	  The	  effort,	  therefore,	  to	  show	  a	  significant	  disanalogy	  
between	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs	  and	  acting	  from	  wholly	  intrinsic	  factors,	  
fails,	  and	  this	  leaves	  open	  the	  viable	  explanation	  that	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  
beliefs	  is	  acting	  for	  no	  reason.	  	  This	  reply	  has	  some	  force	  to	  it,	  but	  the	  objection	  that	  
the	  view	  seems	  to	  multiply	  actions	  done	  for	  no	  reasons	  beyond	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  
the	  case	  would	  still	  hold.	  
The	  more	  significant	  problem	  with	  the	  option	  under	  discussion	  is	  that,	  as	  
anticipated,	  it	  seems	  incapable	  of	  providing	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  the	  
rationalization	  of	  many	  of	  our	  actions.	  	  Here	  is	  what	  Davidson	  writes	  about	  
rationalization:52	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  reason	  and	  an	  action	  when	  the	  reason	  explains	  the	  action	  by	  
giving	  the	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  doing	  what	  he	  did?	  	  We	  may	  call	  such	  explanations	  
rationalizations,	  and	  say	  that	  the	  reason	  rationalizes	  the	  action.	  …	  	  A	  reason	  rationalizes	  as	  
action	  only	  if	  it	  leads	  us	  to	  see	  something	  the	  agent	  saw,	  or	  thought	  he	  saw,	  in	  his	  action—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52‘Rationalization’,	  I	  assume,	  can	  be	  understood,	  minimally,	  in	  “thin	  and	  subjective	  
way”,	  according	  to	  Mele	  (2003:	  71).	  	  This	  is	  consonant	  with	  Davidson’s	  account	  of	  
rationalization	  (1963).	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some	  feature,	  consequence,	  or	  aspect	  of	  the	  action	  the	  agent	  wanted,	  desired,	  prized,	  held	  
dear,	  thought	  dutiful,	  beneficial,	  obligatory,	  or	  agreeable.	  	  We	  cannot	  explain	  why	  someone	  
did	  what	  he	  did	  simply	  by	  saying	  the	  particular	  action	  appealed	  to	  him;	  we	  must	  indicate	  
what	  it	  was	  about	  the	  action	  that	  appealed.53	  
	   	  
This	  passage	  reveals	  a	  prominent	  account	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  an	  action	  to	  be	  
rationalized.	  	  There	  seem	  are	  two	  necessary	  conditions	  laid	  out	  for	  an	  action	  being	  
rationalized.	  	  An	  action	  Φ	  is	  rationalized	  only	  if	  (i)	  the	  reason	  the	  agent	  had	  for	  Φ-­‐
ing	  is	  provided;	  (ii)	  the	  reason	  offered	  for	  the	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  provides	  insight	  into	  
what	  the	  agent	  found	  appealing	  about	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  While	  (ii)	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  explicit	  in	  
the	  passage	  above,	  condition	  (i)	  seems	  implicit.	  	  When	  we	  rationalize	  an	  agent’s	  
action	  we	  cite	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  the	  agent	  acted,	  which	  is	  condition	  (i).	  	  
Moreover,	  condition	  (ii)	  seems	  to	  imply	  condition	  (i).	  	  The	  reason	  cited	  in	  (ii)	  
reveals	  what	  the	  agent	  found	  appealing	  about	  acting	  as	  she	  does.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  agent	  here	  was	  sensitive	  to	  a	  reason,	  which	  is	  that	  feature	  of	  the	  action	  that	  the	  
agent	  found	  appealing	  such	  that	  she	  acted	  for	  that	  reason.	  	  	  
Alvarez’s	  account	  cannot	  satisfy	  either	  of	  these	  conditions.	  	  It	  cannot	  satisfy	  
(i)	  because	  there	  are	  no	  reasons	  for	  which	  the	  agent	  acts	  in	  the	  cases	  under	  
discussion.	  	  It	  is	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  (ii)	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.	  	  If	  Davidson’s	  
account	  is	  right,	  Alvarez’s	  view	  that	  we	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  when	  we	  act	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	  false	  belief	  seems	  committed	  to	  the	  further	  conclusion	  that	  in	  these	  cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Davidson	  (1963/1980:	  1)	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(which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  could	  be	  many)	  agents’	  actions	  are	  not	  properly	  
rationalizable.54	  	  
To	  make	  clear	  how	  this	  is	  so,	  consider	  the	  Terrie	  case	  again.	  	  Prima	  facie,	  it	  is	  
intuitively	  plausible	  that	  her	  action	  is	  rationalizable	  even	  though	  she	  acts	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	  false	  belief.	  	  That	  is,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  false	  that	  the	  neighbor	  did	  not	  water	  
his	  lawn,	  Terrie’s	  action	  is	  rationalizable—at	  least	  in	  some	  sense.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
see	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  
propositions.	  	  The	  view	  in	  question	  has	  it	  that	  in	  cases	  like	  these	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  
for	  acting.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  these	  cases	  there	  is	  no	  motivating	  reason	  for	  which	  the	  
actions	  were	  performed.	  	  The	  objection	  here	  is	  that	  this	  precludes	  properly	  
rationalizing	  these	  kinds	  of	  actions.55	  	  The	  basic	  thought	  behind	  this	  objection	  is	  
this:	  	  Terrie’s	  action	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  properly	  rationalizable	  if	  they	  are	  done	  
for	  no	  motivating	  reasons	  at	  all.	  
Alvarez	  has	  a	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  that	  is	  well	  worth	  examining.	  	  She	  argues	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  an	  agent’s	  acting	  for	  no	  reason	  implies	  that	  her	  actions	  are	  
not	  rationalizable.56	  	  She	  claims	  that	  this	  implication	  does	  not	  hold	  because	  there	  
are	  also	  reasons	  why	  an	  agent	  acts	  as	  she	  does	  in	  cases	  when	  she	  acts	  for	  no	  
reason.57	  	  So,	  Terrie	  may	  have	  acted	  for	  no	  reason	  when	  she	  watered	  her	  neighbor’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Of	  course,	  Alvarez	  denies	  Davidson’s	  theory	  of	  rationalization	  in	  error	  cases,	  but	  
she	  needs	  to	  preserve	  the	  rationalization	  of	  actions	  in	  error	  cases	  (2010:	  135).	  	  I	  
think	  that	  Alvarez’	  rejection	  of	  Davidson’s	  account	  is	  wrong	  for	  reasons	  considered	  
in	  this	  section.	  	  
55	  To	  be	  absolutely	  clear,	  if	  there	  are	  no	  reasons	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  Φ-­‐s,	  then	  there	  
are	  no	  motivating	  reasons	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  Φ-­‐s.	  
56	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  135ff).	  
57	  Alvarez	  calls	  reasons-­‐why	  ‘explanatory	  reasons’.	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lawn,	  but	  there	  was	  still	  a	  reason	  why	  she	  watered	  the	  lawn.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  
understand	  Alvarez’s	  reply	  to	  the	  rationalization	  worry	  as	  a	  revision,	  in	  error	  cases	  
at	  least,	  of	  Davidson’s	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  rationalization.	  	  We	  need	  simply	  
substitute	  the	  relation	  ‘reason	  for’	  with	  the	  ‘reason-­‐why’	  relation.	  	  In	  order	  for	  an	  
action	  to	  be	  rationalized	  (i*)	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  agent	  Φ’s	  is	  provided,	  and	  (ii*)	  the	  
reason	  why	  the	  agent	  Φ-­‐s	  provides	  insight	  into	  what	  the	  agent	  found	  appealing	  
about	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Will	  this	  do	  the	  trick?	  
We	  should	  get	  a	  bit	  clearer	  on	  this	  move	  before	  answering	  this	  question.	  	  
Alvarez	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  other	  reasons	  than	  just	  motivating	  and	  normative	  
reasons.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  reasons	  why	  an	  agent	  Φ’s.58	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  reason	  
why	  an	  agent	  Φ’s	  would	  be	  Tom’s	  sitting	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class	  because	  he	  is	  shy.59	  
Alvarez	  believes	  that	  Tom’s	  being	  shy	  is	  not	  his	  reason	  for	  sitting	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  
class,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  he	  does.	  	  That	  is,	  Tom	  is	  not	  considering	  his	  own	  
shyness	  when	  deliberating	  about	  what	  to	  do	  even	  though	  this	  psychological	  fact	  
about	  Tom	  is	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  his	  action.	  	  Therefore,	  Alvarez’s	  argument	  goes,	  
Tom’s	  sitting	  in	  back	  of	  the	  class	  is	  rationalizable	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  which	  
he	  is	  sitting	  there.60	  	  
Tom’s	  apparent	  reason,	  according	  to	  Alvarez,	  could	  be	  something	  akin	  to	  that	  
he	  will	  be	  less	  visible	  to	  the	  teacher	  by	  sitting	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class.	  	  Suppose	  Tom	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  To	  be	  clear,	  Alvarez	  rightly	  believes	  that	  sometimes	  our	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  will	  be	  
the	  reason	  why	  we	  Φ.	  
59	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  167-­‐168).	  
60	  Of	  course,	  we	  could	  make	  up	  reasons	  for	  Tom’s	  sitting	  in	  back	  of	  the	  class:	  	  he	  is	  
less	  likely	  to	  be	  seen	  there;	  he	  likes	  sitting	  near	  his	  friends	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class;	  
he	  is	  far-­‐sighted;	  etc.	  	  According	  to	  Alvarez	  each	  of	  these	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  
the	  reason	  why	  he	  sits	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class,	  namely,	  that	  he	  is	  shy.	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believes	  that	  by	  sitting	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class	  he	  will	  be	  less	  visible	  to	  the	  teacher,	  
but	  as	  it	  turns	  out	  the	  teacher	  instructs	  from	  the	  back	  of	  the	  class	  and	  would	  see	  
Tom	  up	  close,	  as	  it	  were.	  	  Tom	  intended	  to	  act	  for	  a	  reason,	  but	  he	  came	  up	  short	  
because	  it	  was	  based	  on	  a	  false	  belief.	  	  Alvarez	  would	  say	  that	  Tom	  acts	  for	  no	  
reason	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  there	  can	  still	  be	  a	  reason	  why	  he	  acts.	  	  Reasons-­‐why	  can	  
serve	  the	  role	  of	  rationalizer	  (perhaps	  in	  the	  way	  mentioned	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
previous	  paragraph)	  in	  cases	  where	  agents	  act	  for	  no	  reason	  at	  all,	  and	  this	  is	  
because	  in	  cases	  where	  agents	  act	  for	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  there	  can	  still	  be	  a	  reason	  why	  
they	  act	  as	  they	  do.	  	  Thus,	  when	  Terrie	  waters	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  
false	  belief,	  her	  action,	  according	  to	  Alvarez,	  is	  still	  rationalizable	  because	  there	  is	  a	  
reason	  why	  she	  did	  what	  she	  did.	  	  This	  reason	  why	  could	  be,	  say,	  her	  believing	  that	  
her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn,	  or	  some	  kind	  of	  explanation	  along	  these	  
lines.	  	  In	  fact,	  Alvarez	  seems	  to	  think	  that	  all	  psychological	  explanations	  like	  the	  one	  
just	  provided	  for	  Terrie	  are	  explanatory	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  answers	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  an	  action	  was	  performed.61	  	  
Alvarez’s	  account	  here	  preserves	  our	  ability	  to	  provide	  rational	  explanations	  
for	  why	  Terrie	  and	  Tom	  acted	  as	  they	  did	  even	  though	  they	  failed	  to	  have	  reasons	  
for	  doing	  what	  they	  did.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  her	  account	  has	  not	  
preserved	  what	  is	  needed	  for	  providing	  certain	  desired	  kinds	  of	  rationalizations	  for	  
the	  actions	  of	  Terrie	  and	  Tom.	  	  The	  kind	  of	  explanation	  we	  are	  given	  by	  Alvarez’s	  
account	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐explanation,	  and	  it	  does	  provide	  us	  with	  one	  important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Alvarez	  does	  not	  think	  that	  psychological	  explanations	  exhaust	  the	  class	  of	  
explanatory	  explanations.	  	  They	  are	  simply	  the	  only	  relevant	  ones	  in	  the	  discussion	  
here.	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kind	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  we	  often	  seek	  when	  
requesting	  an	  explanation	  of	  action.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  often	  seek	  to	  know	  what	  reasons	  
the	  agent	  was	  sensitive	  to	  when	  she	  acted	  as	  she	  did.	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  what	  
reasons	  she	  took	  herself	  to	  be	  acting	  for.	  	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  we	  seem	  not	  just	  
to	  want	  to	  know	  things	  like	  the	  agent’s	  psychological	  dispositions	  (e.g.,	  shyness,	  etc.)	  
or	  other	  features	  of	  her	  psychology,	  unless,	  of	  course,	  those	  features	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  
her	  agential	  reasons,	  or	  might	  otherwise	  make	  an	  action	  of	  her	  explicable.	  
Perhaps	  Alvarez	  could	  try	  to	  defend	  her	  view	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  fallibility	  of	  
agents	  regarding	  knowing	  their	  reasons.	  	  Agents	  might	  be	  wrong	  about	  what	  their	  
reason	  for	  acting	  is.	  	  This	  effort	  fails,	  at	  least	  initially,	  because	  it	  can	  be	  agreed	  that	  
agents	  are	  fallible	  regarding	  knowing	  their	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  The	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  
agents	  appear	  to	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases	  and	  so	  their	  actions	  should	  be	  
explainable	  using	  standard	  forms	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  Of	  course,	  agents	  can	  cite	  
the	  wrong	  reasons	  when	  they	  explain	  their	  actions,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  count	  against	  
the	  view	  that	  it	  seems	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  
Perhaps	  Alvarez	  could	  claim	  that	  agential	  fallibility	  in	  general	  lends	  
skepticism	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  agents	  know	  that	  they	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  I	  
think	  we	  can	  suppose	  that	  this	  is	  right.	  	  It	  might	  be	  true	  that	  agents	  can	  be	  wrong	  
about	  whether	  they	  acted	  for	  reasons.	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  still	  does	  not	  count	  against	  
the	  claim	  being	  made	  here.	  	  Even	  if	  agents	  are	  fallible	  regarding	  whether	  they	  are	  
acting	  for	  reasons,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  relevant	  to	  whether	  in	  general	  agents	  act	  for	  
reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  The	  argument	  offered	  for	  the	  latter	  claim	  is	  not	  based	  on	  
agential	  infallibility	  regarding	  knowing	  their	  reasons	  or	  whether	  they	  acted	  for	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reasons.	  	  Thus,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  these	  claims	  of	  agential	  fallibility	  that	  agents,	  
generally,	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  And	  this	  is	  because	  someone	  who	  
argues	  that	  agents	  do	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases	  can	  accept	  the	  fallibility.	  	  
In	  a	  sense,	  the	  suggestion	  here	  (pace	  Alvarez)	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  defense	  of	  
Davidson’s	  necessary	  condition	  (i)	  for	  the	  rationalization	  of	  agents’	  Φ-­‐ing.62	  	  Here’s	  
the	  basic	  idea	  behind	  this	  suggestion:	  	  providing	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  Φs	  is	  
necessary	  for	  properly	  rationalizing,	  in	  the	  manner	  indicated	  just	  above,	  her	  Φ-­‐ing	  
because	  it	  shows	  the	  reasons	  the	  agent	  was	  sensitive,	  or	  responsive,	  to	  when	  
behaving	  as	  she	  did.63	  	  Rowland	  Stout	  puts	  this	  point	  as	  follows	  (about	  a	  particular	  
agent):	  	  “Her	  will	  must	  be	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  such	  reasons	  and	  be	  sensitive	  to	  
them.”64	  	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  agents	  that	  Alvarez’s	  account	  of	  rationalization	  
does	  not	  satisfy.	  	  When	  we	  rationalize	  Terrie’s	  watering	  the	  lawn,	  we	  often	  do	  so	  by	  
offering	  more	  than	  just	  why	  she	  did	  what	  she	  did.	  	  We	  do	  not,	  for	  example,	  just	  cite	  
that	  she	  is	  psychologically	  peculiar	  about	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  We	  also	  offer	  the	  
consideration—the	  reason—she	  responded	  to	  in	  her	  behavior.	  	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  
Tom.	  	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  the	  rationalizations	  to	  which	  Davidson	  and	  Stout	  call	  
attention	  to	  say	  that	  Tom	  has	  certain	  shy	  psychological	  dispositions.	  	  We	  need	  to	  say	  
what	  it	  was	  that	  he	  rationally	  responded	  to	  when	  acting	  as	  he	  did.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  I	  am	  not	  defending	  Davidson’s	  psychologistic	  account	  
of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  I	  take	  it	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish,	  conceptually	  at	  least,	  
Davidson’s	  psychologistic	  account	  of	  rationalization	  from	  a	  broadly	  Davidsonian	  
account	  of	  rationalization	  as	  given	  by	  conditions	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  above.	  
63	  I	  leave	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘sensitive	  to	  reasons’	  intuitive.	  
64	  See	  Stout	  (2009:	  54).	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seems	  that	  we	  can	  do	  this	  in	  cases	  where	  Terrie	  and	  Tom	  are	  wrong	  about	  what	  
they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  defended	  here	  
need	  only	  focus	  in	  condition	  (i).	  	  I	  take	  no	  stand	  here	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  condition	  (ii)	  
because	  the	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  showing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  agent’s	  sensitivity	  to	  
reasons	  when	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  It	  may	  well	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  motivating	  
reasons	  are	  always	  seen	  in	  an	  appealing	  or	  favorable	  light	  from	  the	  agent’s	  vantage	  
point,	  but	  it	  makes	  little	  difference	  to	  the	  effort	  in	  this	  chapter	  whether	  the	  latter	  is	  
true.	  	  	  
I	  suggest	  that	  we	  distinguish	  between	  these	  distinct	  reason-­‐explanations	  (or	  
kinds	  of	  rationalization).	  	  Reason-­‐explanations	  that	  rationalize	  actions	  by	  way	  of	  
providing	  psychological	  dispositions	  or	  features	  of	  agents	  will	  be	  labeled	  
psychological	  reason-­explanations.	  	  Reason-­‐explanations	  that	  rationalize	  actions	  by	  
way	  of	  making	  reference	  to	  the	  reasons	  to	  which	  agents	  are	  sensitive	  and	  act	  for	  
when	  they	  act	  will	  be	  labeled,	  as	  anticipated	  just	  above,	  reason-­‐sensitive	  reason-­‐
explanations	  (or	  reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalizations).	  	  I	  follow	  both	  Davidson	  and	  
Stout	  in	  thinking	  that	  agent-­‐sensitive	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  significant	  forms	  of	  
reason-­‐explanations.	  	  The	  account	  here	  goes	  a	  bit	  further:	  	  even	  cases	  in	  which	  
agents	  act	  for	  false	  reasons	  can	  be	  rationalized	  by	  providing	  reason-­‐sensitive	  
reason-­‐explanations.65	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Davidson’s	  theory	  of	  reasons	  appears	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  here.	  	  However,	  
Stout	  (2009)	  ultimately	  denies	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  This	  might	  
be	  seen	  as	  an	  advantage	  for	  psychologism.	  	  Even	  in	  error	  cases	  agential	  reasons	  
would	  be	  things	  to	  which	  agents	  are	  sensitive	  when	  they	  act	  for	  them.	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On	  Alvarez’s	  account	  there	  are	  countless	  cases	  where	  an	  agent	  acts	  like	  
Terrie	  or	  Tom,	  but	  because	  they	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs,	  their	  actions	  cannot	  
be	  rationalized	  in	  the	  reason-­‐sensitive	  manner	  because	  there	  simply	  are	  no	  reasons	  
that	  the	  agent	  was	  sensitive	  or	  responsive	  to	  when	  they	  did	  as	  they	  did.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  
that	  the	  actions	  of	  Terrie	  and	  Tom	  are	  perfectly	  rationalizable	  in	  this	  manner.	  	  
Alvarez	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  what	  she	  calls	  ‘apparent	  reasons’	  because	  it	  would	  seem	  
that	  she	  is	  violating	  our	  understanding	  of	  an	  important	  kind	  of	  rationalization	  we	  
seek	  to	  provide.	  	  Rationalization	  involves	  being	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  an	  agent’s	  
behavior	  in	  light	  of	  the	  reasons	  the	  agent	  acted	  on	  and	  for,	  which	  are	  the	  reasons	  the	  
agent	  responded	  to	  in	  her	  deliberations	  and	  subsequent	  actions.	  	  To	  cite	  apparent	  
reasons	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  rationalize	  an	  action	  would	  be	  to	  provide	  an	  apparent	  
rationalization.	  
It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  normative	  assumptions	  are	  making	  their	  way	  into	  
the	  Davidsonian	  account	  of	  rationalization	  defended	  here.	  That	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  
original	  Davidsonian	  conditions	  outlined	  above,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  
rationalization	  requires	  identifying	  normative	  features	  underlying	  the	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Davidson’s	  conditions	  these	  features	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  found	  in	  
condition	  (ii)	  where	  reasons	  reveal	  the	  features	  of	  Φ-­‐ing	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  agent.	  	  
One	  might	  claim	  that	  Davidson’s	  account	  may	  well	  be	  right	  for	  a	  normative	  
conception	  of	  rationalization,	  which	  necessarily	  involves	  an	  account	  of	  acting	  for	  
reasons	  that	  one	  find	  one’s	  actions	  appealing.	  	  However,	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  agent’s	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  at	  issue	  (ii)	  need	  not	  hold.	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So,	  this	  objection	  misfires	  because	  all	  that	  seems	  required	  to	  show	  that	  there	  
are	  problems	  with	  Alvarez’s	  account	  of	  error	  cases	  is	  that	  it	  cannot	  adequately	  
satisfy	  (i).	  	  Even	  if	  condition	  (ii)	  has	  normative	  implications,	  it	  is	  far	  less	  clear	  that	  
(i)	  does.	  	  Condition	  (i)	  simply	  has	  it	  that	  an	  action	  is	  rationalized	  only	  if	  the	  agent’s	  
reason	  for	  acting	  is	  provided.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  this	  condition	  need	  not	  be	  understood	  
normatively.	  
It	  might	  be	  an	  option	  yet	  for	  anti-­‐psychologists	  to	  argue	  that	  propositions	  or	  
states	  of	  affairs	  simpliciter	  are	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  The	  idea	  here	  would	  be	  that	  
reasons	  can	  be	  either	  true	  or	  false	  propositions,	  or	  they	  could	  be	  obtaining	  or	  non-­‐
obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  In	  error	  cases	  like	  the	  one	  discussed	  above,	  Terrie’s	  
reason	  might	  be	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  neighbor	  watered	  the	  lawn.	  	  If	  the	  
proposition	  need	  not	  be	  true,	  then	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Terrie	  case	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  
resolved.	  	  However,	  before	  we	  can	  pursue	  this	  potential	  anti-­‐psychologist	  reply,	  we	  
should	  examine	  the	  kind	  of	  problem	  that	  it	  would	  bring	  about	  were	  it	  right.66	  	  We	  
will	  examine	  this	  potential	  problem	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  in	  Section	  2.3.2	  below.	  
In	  conclusion	  to	  this	  section,	  we	  would	  do	  well	  to	  summarize	  its	  results.	  	  We	  
have	  seen	  that	  if	  we	  suppose	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  true,	  then	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  
could	  look	  like	  this:	  	  Terrie	  watered	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  her	  
neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it	  yet.	  	  One	  such	  general	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  form	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation	  could	  be	  put	  thusly:	  	  for	  any	  agent	  A,	  reason	  p,	  and	  action	  Φ,	  A’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  We	  will	  examine	  this	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  line	  of	  reply	  in	  section	  2.3.2	  below	  and	  
even	  further	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  was	  that	  p.67	  	  Suppose	  it’s	  false	  that	  Terrie’s	  neighbor	  failed	  to	  
water	  his	  lawn.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  something	  paradoxical	  results,	  and	  so	  the	  paradox	  
problem	  presents	  itself:	  	  Terrie	  waters	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  her	  
neighbor	  had	  failed	  to	  water	  it,	  although	  he	  had	  not	  failed	  to	  water	  it.	  
	   We	  have	  seen	  one	  way	  out	  of	  the	  paradox	  by	  denying	  that	  Terrie	  has	  offered	  
a	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Alvarez	  can	  take	  this	  
line	  of	  reply.	  	  Terrie	  acts	  for	  an	  apparent	  reason,	  which	  is	  no	  reason	  at	  all.	  	  The	  
reason	  Terrie	  cites,	  namely,	  that	  her	  neighbor	  failed	  to	  water	  his	  lawn,	  only	  appears	  
to	  Terrie	  to	  be	  a	  reason.	  	  While	  this	  move	  solves	  the	  problem	  of	  paradox,	  it	  does	  so	  
only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  inheriting	  the	  no-­‐reason	  problem	  and	  the	  problem	  concerning	  
reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalization,	  i.e.,	  the	  rationalization	  problem.	  	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  psychologism	  seems	  able	  to	  account	  for	  error	  cases	  as	  
discussed	  above	  in	  Section	  2.2).	  	  Agents’	  psychological	  states	  would	  be	  the	  same	  
even	  if	  they	  were	  in	  error	  about	  what	  they	  believe.	  	  Accordingly,	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  
watering	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  she	  believed	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  watered	  the	  
lawn.	  	  Her	  reason	  essentially	  consists	  of	  the	  psychological	  state	  of	  believing	  that	  her	  
neighbor	  had	  watered	  the	  lawn.	  	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  we	  could	  rationalize	  Terrie’s	  
watering	  of	  the	  lawn	  in	  the	  reason-­‐sensitive	  manner	  it	  seems	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to.	  	  
Thus,	  it	  would	  appear,	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  debate,	  that	  psychologism	  already	  has	  one	  
clear	  advantage	  over	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  There	  are	  other	  equally	  good	  forms	  of	  reason-­‐explanation:	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  A	  
Φ-­‐d	  was	  that	  p;	  A	  Φ-­‐ed	  becauseR	  p,	  etc.	  	  Some	  countenance	  teleological	  forms	  like	  A	  
Φ-­‐ed	  in	  order	  to	  Ψ,	  where	  ‘Ψ’	  refers	  to	  an	  agent’s	  goal.	  	  In	  Chapter	  6	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  
teleological	  explanations	  are	  not	  genuine	  reason-­‐explanations,	  though	  they	  are	  
genuine	  explanations	  of	  a	  different	  sort,	  as	  they	  are	  purposive	  explanations.	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2.3.2	  Anti-­Psychologism	  and	  the	  Factivity	  Problem	  
	   A	  closely	  related	  problem	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  concerns	  what	  to	  say	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  as	  a	  result	  of	  error	  cases.	  	  Standard	  reason-­‐
explanations	  cite	  only	  agents’	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  If	  we	  suppose	  that	  agents	  have	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  motivating	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  then	  clearly	  they	  cannot	  be	  
facts	  or	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs—the	  propositions	  or	  states	  of	  affairs	  believed	  by	  
agents	  are	  either	  false	  or	  do	  not	  obtain.	  	  Thus,	  another	  way	  one	  could	  go	  here	  is	  to	  
claim	  that	  in	  error	  cases	  agential	  reasons	  are	  false	  propositions	  or	  non-­‐obtaining	  
states	  of	  affairs.	  	  But	  citing	  such	  falsities	  and	  non-­‐obtainings	  as	  reasons	  in	  reason-­‐
explanations	  would	  seem	  to	  violate	  their	  factivity,	  which	  is	  a	  serious	  cost	  as	  well.	  
A	  few	  preliminary	  remarks	  are	  in	  order	  before	  moving	  forward.	  	  First,	  to	  be	  
clear,	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  refers	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  explanantia	  must	  be	  
true	  in	  order	  to	  explain.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  is	  to	  explain	  at	  all	  that	  
which	  is	  offered	  as	  the	  explanation	  (explanantia)	  has	  got	  to	  be	  true.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  
commonly	  believed	  that	  many	  forms	  of	  explanation	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  factivity	  
principle	  that	  if	  p	  explains	  q,	  then	  p	  must	  be	  true.	  
Second,	  some	  philosophers	  have	  denied	  the	  factivity	  of	  explanation.	  	  In	  
particular,	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  including	  Bas	  van	  Fraassen	  and	  Nancy	  
Cartwright	  have	  argued	  that	  scientific	  explanations	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  true	  in	  order	  
to	  explain.68	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  assume	  that	  truth	  matters	  to	  reason-­‐explanations,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  See	  Cartwright	  (1980)	  and	  van	  Fraassen	  (1976).	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and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  I	  assume,	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  that	  a	  theory	  that	  
can	  preserve	  the	  factivity	  of	  explanation	  is	  better	  than	  a	  theory	  that	  does	  not.	  
This	  issue	  of	  factivity	  has	  led,	  in	  part,	  some	  anti-­‐psychologists	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  agents	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  If	  agential	  reasons	  were	  
false	  propositions,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  then	  explanations	  consisting	  of	  agential	  
reasons,	  as	  explanantia,	  would	  conflict	  with	  the	  factivity	  principle.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  
seems	  that	  the	  factivity	  problem	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  what	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  
the	  paradox	  problem.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  anti-­‐psychologists	  maintain	  that	  reason-­‐
explanations	  can	  be	  non-­‐factive,	  then	  they	  find	  themselves	  committed	  to	  
paradoxical	  reason-­‐explanation	  statements.	  	  The	  paradox	  results,	  we	  recall,	  when	  
the	  false	  explanans	  is	  conjoined	  to	  its	  true	  negation.	  	  So	  the	  factivity	  problem	  
appears	  to	  be	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  paradox	  problem—at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  solving	  the	  factivity	  problem	  would	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  paradox	  
problem.	  
Alvarez’s	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  preserves	  the	  
factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  by	  denying	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  
cases.	  	  If	  agential	  reasons	  are	  what	  explain	  (are	  explanantia)	  in	  reason-­‐explanations,	  
then	  it	  appears	  that	  Alvarez’s	  move	  is	  able	  to	  preserve	  the	  factivity	  principle.	  	  
However,	  there	  have	  been	  other	  kinds	  of	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  replies.	  	  	  	  
	   Jonathan	  Dancy’s	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  
factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  agent’s	  
reason	  must	  be	  true	  for	  the	  reason	  to	  explain	  the	  agent’s	  action.	  	  Thus,	  Terrie’s	  
watering	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  false	  reason	  that	  her	  neighbor	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had	  not	  watered	  the	  lawn	  earlier.	  	  Dancy’s	  solution	  to	  the	  factivity	  problem,	  
therefore,	  is	  to	  embrace	  the	  claim	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  can	  have	  false	  
explanantia.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy:	  
	  
First,	  it	  is	  not	  required	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  light	  that	  reasons-­‐explanations	  cast	  on	  
action	  that	  things	  should	  be	  as	  the	  agent	  supposed.	  	  Second,	  it	  seems	  perfectly	  possible	  to	  
continue	  at	  least	  in	  some	  forms	  of	  reasons-­‐explanation	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  contained	  clause,	  
thus:	  his	  reason	  for	  doing	  it	  was	  that	  p,	  a	  matter	  about	  which	  he	  was	  sadly	  mistaken.69	  
	  
Dancy	  makes	  at	  least	  two	  related	  claims	  here.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  reason-­‐explanation	  
does	  not	  require	  that	  reasons	  be	  true	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  cast	  “the	  sort	  of	  light”	  on	  
actions.	  	  I	  take	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  false	  reasons	  can	  explain	  agential	  behavior.	  	  The	  
second	  is	  that	  there	  are	  appositional	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  false	  contained	  clause	  
in	  reason-­‐explanation,	  which	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  offsetting	  the	  appearance	  of	  
contradiction.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  latter,	  Dancy	  suggests	  that	  after	  the	  reason	  is	  
cited,	  a	  clause	  revealing	  that	  the	  reason	  was	  merely	  as	  the	  agent	  supposed	  is	  
sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  the	  paradox	  is	  mere	  appearance.	  	  Another	  way	  this	  could	  be	  
done	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  reason,	  and	  follow	  it	  with	  “as	  the	  agent	  supposed”,	  or	  some	  
other	  appositional	  qualification.	  	  So,	  in	  Terrie’s	  case,	  we	  could	  claim	  that	  Terrie	  
watered	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  failed	  to,	  as	  she	  
had	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Dancy	  (2003:	  426-­‐7)	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   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Dancy	  does	  not	  think	  that	  the	  appositional	  
supposition	  clause	  is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  reason-­‐explanation,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  
necessary	  that	  agents	  suppose	  that	  p	  when	  they	  act	  for	  p.70	  	  Dancy	  agrees	  with	  the	  
latter	  necessary	  connection,	  and	  it	  is	  what	  leads	  him	  to	  his	  appositional	  account	  
here.	  	  Dancy	  argues	  that	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  
the	  agential	  supposition	  and	  her	  acting	  for	  the	  supposition	  that	  the	  supposition	  
itself	  is	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  On	  Dancy’s	  view,	  the	  
explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  are	  agential	  reasons	  only.71	  	  However,	  when	  the	  
true	  appositional	  clause	  is	  conjoined	  to	  reason-­‐explanations	  in	  error	  cases,	  it	  would	  
appear	  to	  get	  Dancy	  out	  of	  the	  paradox	  that	  results	  from	  violating	  the	  factivity	  
principle.	  
	   So	  it	  appears	  that	  Dancy	  has	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  paradox	  problem.	  	  Let	  us	  
assume	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  the	  account	  works.	  	  What	  about	  the	  general	  
problem	  of	  factivity,	  though?	  	  Dancy	  needs	  to	  deny	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐
explanations	  because	  he	  maintains	  both	  that	  only	  agential	  reasons	  feature	  as	  the	  
explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations,	  and	  that	  false	  reasons	  can	  explain.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  
error	  case	  false	  reasons	  explain.	  	  We	  might	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  paradoxes	  by	  citing	  
agential	  suppositions	  appositionally	  to	  the	  reason-­‐explanation,	  but	  strictly	  speaking	  
false	  reasons	  can	  explain	  actions.	  	  	  
One	  might	  find	  Dancy’s	  commitment	  to	  non-­‐factivity	  counterintuitive	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  explanations	  just	  are	  factive	  contexts.	  	  Paradigmatic	  kinds	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  This	  issue	  is	  related	  to	  the	  psychology	  problem	  discussed	  below	  (and	  in	  more	  
detail	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  
71	  See	  Dancy	  (2000).	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explanations	  are	  causal	  explanations,	  and	  other	  explanations	  from	  the	  physical	  
sciences,	  e.g.,	  those	  in	  which	  correlations	  between	  observed	  physical	  events	  are	  
cited.	  	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  should	  be	  considered	  on	  a	  par	  with	  
these	  kinds	  of	  explanations.	  	  In	  fact,	  psychologistic	  philosophers	  tend	  to	  argue	  that	  
reason-­‐explanations	  are	  especially	  on	  a	  par	  with	  causal	  explanations	  because	  the	  
former	  just	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  causal	  explanation.72	  	  Of	  course,	  psychologistic	  
philosophers	  also	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  worries	  regarding	  the	  factivity	  problem	  
because	  for	  them	  psychological	  states	  explain	  action,	  and	  even	  if,	  for	  example,	  
agents’	  beliefs	  are	  false,	  their	  reasons—their	  beliefs—still	  explain.	  
However,	  perhaps	  someone	  like	  Dancy	  could	  be	  a	  disjunctivist	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  explanation:	  	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  not	  factive,	  while	  other	  kinds	  of	  
explanations,	  including	  notably	  causal	  and	  scientific	  explanations,	  are	  factive.	  	  On	  
these	  matters,	  though,	  one	  might	  side	  with	  the	  thoughts	  of	  Constantine	  Sandis:	  
	  
If	  falsehoods	  were	  capable	  of	  providing	  real	  (one	  is	  tempted	  to	  say	  true)	  explanations	  we	  
would	  care	  a	  lot	  less	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  beliefs	  than	  we	  actually	  do.	  	  The	  debate	  between	  
creationists	  and	  evolutionists,	  for	  instance,	  would	  be	  inconsequential	  if	  we	  were	  happy	  to	  
grant	  genuine	  explanatory	  power	  to	  falsehoods.	  …	  My	  complaint,	  rather,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  
truism	  that	  to	  have	  a	  genuine	  explanation	  of	  anything	  the	  explanadum	  must	  in	  some	  sense,	  
however	  loose,	  result	  because	  of	  the	  explanans;	  and	  this	  can	  only	  happen	  in	  the	  latter	  is	  
actually	  the	  case.73	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  This	  is	  a	  view	  made	  popular	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  by	  Davidson	  (1963).	  
73	  Sandis	  (forthcoming:	  4).	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Here	  Sandis	  identifies	  part	  of	  what	  seems	  problematic	  with	  non-­‐factive	  
explanations.74	  	  We	  care	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  beliefs,	  and	  once	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  
provide	  explanatory	  power	  to	  falsehoods,	  then	  we	  open	  the	  door	  to	  allowing	  
falsehoods	  to	  provide	  explanations	  for	  opposing	  positions	  in	  many	  of	  our	  central	  
intellectual	  debates.	  	  One	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  cash	  value	  of	  this	  is	  to	  see	  that	  
giving	  up	  on	  factivity	  seems	  to	  strip	  us	  of	  a	  very	  powerful	  means	  of	  deciding	  
between	  competing	  theories.	  	  This	  standard	  means	  is	  truth.	  	  It	  is	  a	  truism,	  according	  
to	  Sandis,	  that	  only	  true	  propositions	  explain.	  	  If	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  depend	  on	  this,	  
then	  we	  are	  in	  a	  quagmire	  of	  muddle	  trying	  to	  arbitrate	  between	  the	  sides	  of	  
debates,	  e.g.,	  the	  quarrel	  between	  creationists	  and	  evolutionists.	  	  Likewise,	  non-­‐
factivity	  of	  this	  sort	  would	  seem	  likely	  to	  spill	  over	  into	  cases	  involving	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  
	   One	  initial	  reply	  here	  is	  that	  the	  case	  Sandis	  cites	  is	  a	  theoretical	  debate,	  and	  
Dancy,	  and	  any	  other	  non-­‐factivist	  about	  reason-­‐explanation,	  need	  not	  deny	  that	  
standard	  theoretical	  explanations	  are	  factive.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Dancy	  need	  not	  deny	  
that	  the	  explanations	  of	  the	  physical	  sciences	  or	  of	  metaphysics	  are	  factive.75	  	  One	  
can	  consistently	  remain	  a	  non-­‐factivist	  about	  reason-­‐explanations	  while	  remaining	  
factivist	  about	  theoretical	  explanations.	  	  Non-­‐factivists	  about	  reason-­‐explanations	  
might	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  that	  some	  practical	  explanations,	  which	  are	  generally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  I	  assume	  that	  Sandis	  has	  more	  than	  just	  causal	  explanations	  in	  mind	  in	  this	  
passage.	  	  Nothing	  he	  says	  in	  the	  passage	  even	  implies	  that	  it	  does,	  so	  it	  might	  be	  
somewhat	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  problem	  Sandis	  outlines	  here	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  
non-­‐factive	  explanations	  generally.	  	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  he	  only	  has	  in	  mind	  causal	  
explanations,	  the	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  to	  be	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  could	  be	  
viewed	  as	  a	  species	  of	  causal	  explanation.	  
75	  I	  do	  not	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  demarcating	  theoretical	  explanations	  from	  reason-­‐
explanations,	  assuming	  there	  is	  such	  a	  demarcation	  to	  be	  found.	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concerned	  with	  explaining	  action,	  are	  less	  attached	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  explanans	  of	  
the	  relevant	  explanations	  than	  are	  theoretical	  explanations.76	  	  I	  explain	  this	  claim.	  	  	  
Paradigm	  cases	  of	  theoretical	  explanation,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	  causal	  
explanations.	  	  Explanations	  of	  this	  kind	  include	  explaining	  the	  occurrence	  of	  B,	  
where	  B	  is	  typically	  understood	  as	  an	  event.	  	  We	  offer	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  B	  
when	  we	  provide	  the	  cause	  of	  B.	  	  Suppose	  A	  (typically	  also	  thought	  to	  be	  an	  event)	  is	  
the	  cause	  of	  B,	  then	  we	  explain	  B’s	  occurrence	  by	  citing	  the	  occurrence	  of	  A:	  	  A	  
causes	  B.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  true:	  	  A	  causes	  B	  only	  if	  A.	  	  Likewise,	  A	  explains	  B	  only	  if	  
A.	  	  It	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  proper	  explanations	  require	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  A	  be	  
cited	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  truth-­‐evaluable	  claim,	  p,	  such	  that	  if	  A	  occurs,	  then	  the	  
explanation	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  B	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  true.77	  Non-­‐factivists	  about	  
reason-­‐explanations,	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  practical	  explanation,	  seem	  committed	  to	  saying	  
that	  the	  truth	  of	  explanantia	  can	  be	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  soundness	  of	  explanation.	  	  
Explanations	  citing	  agential	  reasons	  that	  fail	  to	  obtain	  (or	  are	  false),	  but,	  it	  is	  
believed,	  still	  explain	  actions,	  are	  cases	  in	  point.	  	  This	  is	  what	  it	  might	  mean	  to	  claim	  
that	  truth	  is	  less	  attached	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  relevant	  explanantia	  of	  some	  kinds	  of	  
practical	  explanation.	  	  It	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  Dancy	  as	  well	  as	  other	  non-­‐factivists	  
regarding	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  committed	  to	  this	  result.	  
In	  general,	  I	  think	  disjunctivist	  theories	  should	  be	  avoided	  if	  at	  all	  possible,	  
and	  that	  non-­‐disjunctivist	  theories,	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  are	  to	  be	  preferred	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  One	  prominent	  function	  of	  practical	  explanation	  is	  the	  explanation	  of	  action.	  	  
Reason-­‐explanations	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  species	  of	  practical	  explanations.	  	  	  
77	  It	  might	  turn	  out	  that	  rigorous	  explanations	  of	  any	  kind	  require	  at	  least	  that	  
explanantia	  be	  expressed	  by	  complete	  sentences	  or	  propositions.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  A	  
would	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  proposition.	  	  See	  Peter	  Achinstein	  (1983:102)	  for	  
someone	  who	  holds	  this	  view	  regarding	  explanations.	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disjunctivist	  theories.78	  	  Nevertheless,	  by	  examining	  cases	  in	  which	  agents	  learn	  that	  
they	  have	  acted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  false	  belief	  we	  learn	  one	  thing	  wrong	  with	  the	  
version	  of	  disjunctivism	  on	  offer.	  	  Suppose	  Terrie	  finds	  out	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  
watered	  the	  lawn,	  and	  so	  when	  she	  seeks	  to	  provide	  her	  reason	  for	  watering	  the	  
lawn,	  fully	  aware	  that	  she	  was	  wrong,	  she	  might	  naturally	  claim	  that	  she	  believed	  
her	  neighbor	  had	  failed	  to	  water	  his	  lawn.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  this	  error	  case	  she	  might	  
naturally	  respond	  to	  a	  request	  for	  her	  reason	  for	  watering	  the	  lawn	  claim	  that	  she	  
had	  believed	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it.	  	  Not	  only	  might	  Terrie’s	  response	  
here	  push	  us	  toward	  a	  psychologist	  account	  of	  reasons,	  but	  it—and	  many	  cases	  just	  
like	  it	  in	  form—show	  us	  that	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  offer	  true	  explanantia	  when	  
offering	  explanations.	  	  This	  point	  comes	  out	  more	  clearly	  if	  we	  suppose	  that	  Terrie	  
had	  originally	  provided	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  explanation	  for	  her	  behavior.	  	  
However,	  when	  the	  neighbor	  explained	  to	  her	  that	  he	  had	  watered	  the	  lawn,	  she	  
restates	  her	  reason	  so	  as	  to	  make	  it	  true.	  	  Again,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  truth	  
seems	  to	  matter	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Sandis’	  claim	  in	  the	  above	  
passage	  seems	  to	  ring	  true,	  namely,	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  truism	  that	  only	  truths	  can	  
explain.	  
	   We	  should	  note	  that	  Alvarez	  has	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  interpretation	  
available	  of	  this	  error	  case	  involving	  Terrie.	  	  Alvarez	  could	  maintain,	  as	  we	  have	  
seen,	  that	  Terrie	  does	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  this	  case,	  so	  we	  cannot	  provide	  a	  
reason-­‐sensitive	  reason-­‐explanation	  for	  her	  behavior.	  	  Nevertheless,	  we	  can	  provide	  
a	  psychological	  explanation	  of	  it.	  	  In	  fact,	  Alvarez	  might	  take	  a	  case	  like	  this	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  this	  is	  a	  common	  theme	  in	  this	  project:	  	  disjunctivist	  theories	  are	  
avoided.	  
	   53	  
support	  her	  view	  of	  error	  cases.	  	  That	  is,	  she	  could	  argue	  that	  once	  Terrie	  realizes	  
that	  she	  was	  wrong	  about	  what	  she	  thought	  was	  the	  case	  that	  she	  naturally	  offers	  an	  
explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  her	  psychology	  instead	  of	  her	  reasons	  because	  she	  realized	  
that	  she	  did	  not	  act	  for	  a	  reason	  after	  all.	  
	   There	  is	  some	  initial	  plausibility	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning.	  	  However,	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  it	  seems	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases	  like	  the	  Terrie	  case,	  
anti-­‐psychologists	  should	  seek	  to	  account	  for	  that	  seeming	  rather	  than	  do	  away	  with	  
reasons	  in	  such	  cases.	  	  Dancy’s	  view	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases	  seems	  
correct,	  but	  what	  he	  struggles	  with	  is	  then	  accounting	  for	  the	  factivity	  of	  the	  
explanations	  involving	  reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalizations.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  
which	  problem	  is	  more	  substantial	  here,	  but	  they	  both	  count	  in	  a	  serious	  way	  
against	  these	  recent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  attempts.	  	  	  
	   The	  arguments	  in	  this	  section	  are	  not	  conclusive.	  	  	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
if	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  to	  be	  true,	  then	  it	  will	  have	  to	  have	  a	  proper	  response	  to	  the	  
factivity	  issues	  concerning	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Dancy’s	  response	  seems	  to	  fail.	  	  
We’ve	  seen	  Alvarez’s	  view,	  which	  has	  its	  serious	  problems.	  	  Indeed,	  they	  seem	  to	  
represent	  the	  two	  main	  ways	  anti-­‐psychologism	  could	  go	  with	  respect	  to	  dealing	  
with	  reason-­‐explanations	  and	  error	  cases:	  	  either	  deny	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  (in	  
error	  cases)	  and	  affirm	  factivity,	  or	  affirm	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  and	  deny	  factivity.	  
	   It	  seems	  that	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  explanations	  should	  adhere	  to	  the	  factivity	  
principle.	  	  Moreover,	  any	  theory	  of	  (motivating)	  reason-­‐explanations	  does	  better	  if	  it	  
can	  align	  itself	  with	  this	  claim.	  	  We	  have	  seen,	  in	  yet	  another	  way,	  that	  error	  cases	  
provide,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  James	  Lenman,	  “the	  biggest	  headache	  for	  anti-­‐
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psychologism”.79	  These	  cases	  would	  need	  a	  proper	  resolution	  before	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  can	  be	  accepted	  with	  any	  manner	  of	  confidence.	  
	   Again,	  psychologism	  does	  not	  have	  trouble	  with	  either	  of	  these	  issues.	  	  In	  
error	  cases	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons,	  and	  the	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  will	  
always	  adhere	  to	  the	  factivity	  principle.	  	  	  
	  
2.3.3	  Anti-­Psychologism	  and	  the	  Psychology	  Problem	  
	   It	  seems	  undeniably	  true	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  agents	  are	  at	  least	  
minimally	  aware	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  they	  Φ.	  	  Otherwise,	  how	  could	  these	  
reasons	  be	  motivating	  reasons?	  	  Here’s	  the	  claim	  that	  I	  am	  going	  to	  take	  to	  be	  true	  of	  
motivating	  reasons:	  
	  
B:	  	  If	  R	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  agent	  A	  Φ-­‐s,	  then	  necessarily	  R	  is	  related	  to	  A’s	  
psychology.	  
	  
The	  antecedent	  of	  B	  is	  clear	  enough,	  but	  the	  consequent	  needs	  some	  explication.	  	  
First,	  the	  psychological	  relation	  is	  probably	  at	  least	  the	  awareness	  relation,	  and	  in	  
some	  instances	  it	  will	  be	  some	  level	  of	  minimal	  awareness.	  	  This	  is	  true	  even	  though	  
the	  belief	  relation	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  common	  relation	  R	  has	  to	  an	  agent	  such	  that	  
R	  is	  an	  agential	  reason	  for	  A.	  	  Second,	  the	  sense	  of	  necessity	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  
metaphysical	  necessity.	  	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  every	  metaphysically	  possible	  world,	  
A	  has	  at	  least	  some	  level	  of	  minimal	  awareness	  of	  R	  if	  R	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  A	  Φ-­‐s.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Lenman	  (2009)	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The	  relation	  between	  R	  and	  A’s	  psychology	  is	  in	  many	  cases	  belief.	  	  However,	  
perhaps	  it	  need	  not	  be	  belief.	  	  An	  agent	  might	  act	  for	  R	  in	  cases	  where	  she	  only	  
believes	  that	  she	  believes	  R,	  but	  in	  fact	  she	  does	  not	  believe	  R.	  	  For	  example,	  Lara	  
might	  celebrate	  Christmas	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  belief	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  which	  the	  
holiday	  stands	  for.	  	  It	  could	  turn	  out,	  however,	  that	  Lara	  does	  not	  actually	  have	  the	  
first-­‐order	  beliefs	  about	  Christmas.	  	  So	  she	  celebrates	  Christmas	  without	  having	  the	  
beliefs	  she	  believed	  herself	  to	  possess	  regarding	  Christmas.	  	  	  Because	  of	  cases	  like	  
this	  I	  weaken	  the	  psychological	  relation	  to	  the	  more	  general	  “awareness”	  of	  R,	  
where	  awareness	  needs	  only	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  some	  minimal	  sense	  or	  other.80	  
	   The	  goal	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  show	  that	  anti-­‐psychologists	  have	  not	  yet	  
accounted	  properly	  for	  B.	  	  That	  is,	  anti-­‐psychologists	  have	  not	  yet	  resolved	  the	  
psychology	  problem.	  	  Moreover,	  since	  psychologistic	  accounts	  can	  account	  for	  B,	  
anti-­‐psychologists	  do	  well	  to	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  B.	  	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  proceed,	  let	  us	  have	  a	  look	  at	  what	  Maria	  Alvarez	  says	  about	  B:	  
	  
After	  all,	  it	  is	  obvious	  why	  my	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  reason	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  reason	  to	  
explain	  my	  action.	  …	  [U]nless	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  p,	  the	  fact	  that	  p	  cannot	  be	  the	  
reason	  that	  motivates	  me	  to	  act.	  	  And	  unless	  the	  fact	  that	  p	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  motivates	  me	  
to	  fail	  him	  [Alvarez’s	  example	  of	  a	  Φ-­‐ing],	  the	  fact	  that	  p	  cannot	  be	  a	  ‘reason	  why’	  which	  is	  
also	  a	  ‘reason	  for	  which’	  I	  acted.	  	  Hence,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  p	  to	  be	  the	  explanans	  of	  a	  
reason	  explanation,	  I	  must	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  p.	  	  But	  this	  does	  not	  compel	  us	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Others	  use	  the	  generic	  belief	  as	  the	  required	  relation	  between	  reasons	  and	  an	  
agent’s	  psychology.	  	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Setiya	  (2007),	  Dancy	  (2000).	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to	  conclude	  that	  what	  really	  explains	  my	  action	  [failing	  a	  student]	  is	  my	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  
fact	  that	  p.81	  
	  
Alvarez	  countenances	  the	  truth	  of	  B,	  or	  something	  close	  to	  B,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  
believe	  that	  it	  compels	  us	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  what	  explains	  an	  action	  done	  for	  a	  
reason	  is	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  p.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Alvarez’s	  line	  of	  argument	  here.	  	  
That	  is,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  B	  does	  not	  compel	  anyone	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  version	  of	  
psychologism,	  namely,	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  consist	  in	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact	  
the	  p.	  	  However,	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  explaining	  the	  truth	  of	  B,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  
modestly,	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  best	  explains	  the	  truth	  of	  B.	  	  In	  this	  passage	  Alvarez	  is	  
not	  attempting	  to	  explain	  B,	  but	  what	  she	  does	  is	  challenge	  the	  claim	  that	  accepting	  
B	  logically	  commits	  one	  to	  psychologism.	  	  What	  is	  important	  to	  take	  from	  this	  is	  two	  
points:	  	  (c)	  Alvarez	  accepts	  B,	  and	  (d)	  Alvarez	  rightly	  argues	  that	  accepting	  B	  does	  
not	  commit	  one	  to	  psychologism.	  	  	  
	   Perhaps	  Alvarez	  has	  provided	  a	  strong	  initial	  anti-­‐psychologist	  response	  to	  B.	  
However,	  one	  might	  want	  something	  more	  from	  the	  anti-­‐pscyhologist	  than	  what	  she	  
has	  provided.	  	  Noted	  anti-­‐psychologist	  Dancy	  shows	  the	  significance	  of	  explaining	  B	  
in	  the	  following	  passage:	  
	  
How	  should	  we	  explain	  the	  fact	  that,	  where	  the	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  acting	  is	  that	  p,	  the	  agent	  
must	  believe	  that	  p,	  if	  not	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  acting	  is	  ‘really’	  that	  he	  
believes	  that	  p?82	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Ibid,	  p.	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Dancy’s	  subsequent	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  
believing	  that	  p	  serves	  as	  an	  enabling	  condition:	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  consideration	  that	  is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  an	  explanation,	  and	  a	  
consideration	  that	  is	  required	  for	  an	  explanation	  to	  go	  through,	  but	  which	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  part	  
of	  that	  explanation.	  	  I	  call	  the	  latter	  ‘enabling	  conditions’.	  	  For	  instance,	  that	  England	  is	  not	  
sinking	  beneath	  the	  waves	  today	  is	  a	  consideration	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  which	  what	  explains	  
my	  actions	  would	  be	  incapable	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  But	  that	  does	  nothing	  to	  show	  that	  England’s	  
not	  submerging	  today	  is	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  I	  do	  what	  I	  do.83	  
	  
His	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  enabling	  conditions,	  which	  are	  necessary	  conditions,	  do	  not	  
have	  a	  role	  in	  explanations.	  	  Dancy’s	  example	  of	  an	  enabling	  condition	  for	  his	  Φ-­‐ing	  
is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  has	  not	  engulfed	  England.	  	  Intuitively,	  were	  we	  to	  
explain	  Dancy’s	  Φ-­‐ing,	  we	  would	  not	  cite	  this	  enabling	  condition	  for	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  We	  
are	  to	  infer	  from	  this	  that	  agential	  psychologies,	  as	  enabling	  conditions,	  likewise	  do	  
not	  have	  a	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  If	  we	  consider	  Dancy’s	  answer	  has	  some	  
intuitive	  plausibility,	  and	  his	  notion	  of	  an	  enabling	  condition,	  in	  particular,	  seems	  
potentially	  promising.	  	  I	  wonder,	  though,	  whether	  an	  example	  involving	  a	  more	  
proximal	  necessary	  condition	  would	  elicit	  the	  same	  intuition	  here.	  
Suppose	  Jason	  is	  practicing	  reciting	  a	  poem	  prior	  his	  friend’s	  wedding	  
because	  he	  is	  to	  read	  it	  aloud	  at	  the	  wedding.	  	  We	  could	  say	  that	  Jason’s	  practicing	  is	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  2000,	  p.	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  Ibid,	  p.	  127	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a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  his	  reciting	  the	  poem	  when	  the	  time	  comes.	  	  And,	  it	  seems	  
plausible	  that	  the	  practicing	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  recitation	  at	  the	  
wedding.	  	  Thus,	  the	  explanation	  for	  Jason’s	  reciting	  the	  poem	  at	  the	  wedding	  need	  
not	  involve	  his	  practicing	  as	  a	  proper	  part.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  argument	  continues,	  the	  
necessary	  condition	  here	  (practicing	  reciting	  a	  poem),	  like	  belief	  or	  awareness	  of	  a	  
reason,	  need	  not	  feature	  in	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  of	  Jason’s	  behavior	  because	  they	  
are	  not	  thereby	  proper	  parts	  of	  the	  reason	  he	  had	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  
It	  seems	  that	  even	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  more	  proximal	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
Jason’s	  recitation	  need	  not	  be	  part	  of	  his	  reason-­‐explanation	  for	  the	  recitation.	  	  
Dancy’s	  claim	  about	  agential	  psychologies	  being	  enabling	  conditions	  is	  not	  
threatened	  by	  this	  case.	  	  	  
According	  to	  Dancy,	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  reason-­‐explanations	  need	  only	  cite	  
agential	  reasons	  because	  those	  are	  the	  proximally	  relevant	  conditions	  of	  agents’	  
(reason-­‐sensitive)	  rationalizable	  behaviors.	  	  Features	  of	  agential	  psychologies,	  then,	  
are	  not	  proximal	  enough	  to	  serve	  as	  proper	  parts	  of	  reason-­‐explanations,	  even	  
though	  they	  are	  necessary	  for	  agents’	  actions.	  	  We	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  issue	  
below.	  	  First,	  let’s	  briefly	  examine	  an	  objection	  to	  Dancy’s	  theory	  of	  the	  necessary	  
connection	  stated	  in	  B.	  	  	  
Wayne	  Davis	  argues	  that	  Dancy’s	  reply	  fails	  to	  explain	  B.84	  	  Davis	  argues	  that	  
Dancy’s	  appeal	  to	  enabling	  conditions	  just	  amounts	  to	  claiming	  that	  psychological	  
features	  of	  agents	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  S’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Thus,	  if	  being	  aware	  of	  R	  is	  
an	  enabling	  condition	  for	  R	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  an	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing,	  being	  aware	  of	  R	  just	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is	  a	  necessary	  condition.	  	  But	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  	  If	  this	  
is	  right,	  then	  Dancy,	  or	  a	  Dancy-­‐inspired	  view,	  would	  need	  to	  flesh	  out,	  or	  add	  to,	  the	  
notion	  of	  an	  enabling	  condition	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  amounts	  to	  more	  than	  simply	  a	  
necessary	  condition.	  
The	  question	  here	  is	  whether	  Dancy’s	  theory	  can	  offer	  more	  than	  a	  
restatement	  of	  what	  was	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  	  This	  will	  involve	  the	  task	  of	  taking	  
a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  enabling	  condition	  to	  see	  whether	  it	  is	  guilty	  of	  
being	  merely	  a	  restatement	  of	  what	  is	  in	  need	  to	  explanation.	  	  We	  will	  take	  up	  this	  
task	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  Until	  then,	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  something	  
unsatisfactory	  about	  Dancy’s	  view.	  	  Intuitively,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  great	  
difference	  between	  a	  condition	  for	  an	  agent’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  like	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  not	  
engulfing	  England	  and	  a	  condition	  like	  relevant	  features	  of	  one’s	  psychology.	  	  	  
Thus	  it	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  two	  prominent	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  accounts	  have	  
not	  said	  enough	  to	  resolve	  the	  psychology	  problem.	  	  Alvarez	  simply	  denies	  that	  
countenancing	  B	  logically	  commits	  one	  to	  psychologism,	  and	  Dancy	  claims	  that	  
accepting	  B	  amounts	  to	  accepting	  that	  agential	  psychologies	  are	  enabling	  conditions.	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  that,	  intuitively,	  what	  Dancy	  has	  in	  mind	  for	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  
Φ-­‐ing	  seems	  much	  too	  unlike	  agents’	  psychologies,	  which	  are	  also	  necessary	  for	  
their	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy,	  if	  agential	  psychologies	  are	  enabling	  conditions,	  
then	  they	  are	  on	  a	  par	  with	  facts	  like	  the	  Atlantic	  not	  engulfing	  England.	  	  Moreover,	  
it	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  psychological	  conditions	  do	  not	  feature	  in	  reason-­‐
explanations—even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  part	  of	  agential	  reasons.	  	  Enabling	  conditions	  
seem	  too	  removed	  from	  agents’	  Φ-­‐ing	  to	  be	  considered	  relevant	  when	  explaining	  
	   60	  
their	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Thus,	  it	  appears	  that	  Dancy’s	  account	  has	  yet	  to	  resolve	  the	  psychology	  
problem—at	  least	  as	  it	  is	  stated	  here.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  psychologism	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  
necessary	  connection	  of	  agential	  reasons	  and	  their	  psychologies.	  	  The	  explanation	  is	  
that	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  consists	  in	  part	  of	  features	  of	  the	  agent’s	  psychology.	  	  It	  
appears	  again	  as	  if	  psychologism	  has	  the	  upper	  hand	  on	  anti-­‐psychologism	  because	  
it	  can	  solve	  yet	  another	  problem	  that	  anti-­‐psychologists	  struggles	  with.	  	  The	  
psychology	  problem	  may	  not	  be	  as	  pressing	  as	  the	  first	  two	  error	  case	  problems	  for	  
anti-­‐psychologism,	  but	  it	  does	  require	  a	  solution.	  	  Psychologism’s	  theoretical	  virtues	  
of	  being	  able	  to	  get	  the	  right	  results	  in	  error	  cases	  and	  being	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  
necessary	  connection	  to	  agents’	  psychologies	  has	  been	  anticipated	  in	  section	  2.2.1	  
above,	  and	  after	  elaborating	  on	  the	  problems	  for	  anti-­‐pscyhologism,	  the	  virtues	  of	  
psychologism	  seem	  even	  greater.	  
	  
Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  2	  
	   Of	  course,	  anti-­‐psychologism	  has	  its	  virtues.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.2.2	  
above,	  it	  can	  account	  for	  the	  apparent	  repeatability	  of	  reasons	  and	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  
reasons	  provide	  rational	  guidance	  due	  to	  their	  apparent	  propositional	  nature.	  	  At	  
this	  stage,	  however,	  it	  seems	  that	  psychologism	  has	  more	  of	  the	  virtues	  than	  anti-­‐
psychologism.	  	  But	  we	  need	  not	  be	  too	  quick	  here	  in	  establishing	  conclusions	  
without	  a	  proper	  examination	  of	  psychologism.	  	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  examine	  
objections	  to	  psychologism.	  	  We	  will	  undertake	  a	  critical	  discussion	  of	  psychologism	  
is	  Chapter	  3.	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   Before	  turning	  to	  this	  project,	  we	  would	  do	  well	  to	  summarize	  the	  general	  
results	  from	  this	  chapter.	  
	   We	  began	  by	  examining	  the	  two	  main	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  regarding	  the	  
ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  looked	  at	  the	  virtues	  of	  
psychologism	  and	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  Then	  we	  spent	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  
detailing	  the	  main	  problems	  facing	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  
looked	  at	  how	  error	  cases	  provided	  the	  most	  serious	  problems.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  theories	  need	  either	  to	  claim	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  no	  reasons	  in	  such	  
cases,	  or	  they	  need	  to	  embrace	  the	  non-­‐factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  If	  one	  
accepts	  the	  first	  disjunct,	  one	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  no-­‐reason	  and	  reason-­‐sensitive	  
rationalization	  problems.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  one	  countenances	  the	  second	  
disjunct,	  one	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  factivity	  and	  paradox	  problems.	  	  We	  also	  briefly	  
examined	  the	  psychology	  problem,	  which	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  all	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
theories.	  
	   Looking	  ahead	  to	  the	  next	  few	  chapters,	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  that	  
psychologism	  has	  its	  share	  of	  problems.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  problems	  will	  be	  so	  severe	  that	  
it	  will	  be	  best	  to	  abandon	  it	  as	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  In	  Chapters	  
4-­‐6	  the	  goal	  will	  be	  to	  see	  if	  anti-­‐psychologism	  can	  respond	  adequately	  to	  the	  many	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Chapter	  3	  
The	  Ontology	  of	  Motivating	  Reasons	  





	   As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  psychologism	  is	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  serious	  
problems	  anti-­‐psychologism	  faces.	  	  Since	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  
states,	  agents	  always	  act	  for	  reasons,	  even	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  This	  also	  means	  that	  
actions	  are	  always	  reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalizable.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  ontology	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  explains	  the	  necessity	  of	  agential	  reasons	  to	  their	  
psychologies—the	  necessity	  holds	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  reasons	  and	  
psychological	  states.	  	  As	  things	  stand	  now	  psychologism	  is	  the	  preferred	  view	  of	  
motivating	  reasons.	  
	   	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  consider	  three	  arguments	  from	  the	  literature	  against	  
psychologism.	  	  I	  show	  that	  only	  one	  of	  them	  provides	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  
psychologism.	  
	   	  
3.1	  Psychologism:	  	  Pure	  Cognitivism	  Assumption	  
	   I	  by	  and	  large	  assume	  a	  pure	  cognitivist	  account	  of	  psychologism	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  	  Pure	  cognitivist	  accounts	  claim	  that	  our	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  only	  
beliefs.	  	  This	  contrasts	  with	  standard	  psychologistic	  theories,	  which	  maintain	  that	  
reasons	  are	  belief-­‐desire	  pairs.85	  	  There	  are	  some	  considerations	  that	  might	  help	  
make	  this	  assumption	  benign.	  	  Jonathan	  Dancy	  argues	  that	  the	  kinds	  of	  (non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  See	  Davidson	  (1963).	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cognitive)	  desires	  that	  could	  be	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  themselves	  had	  for	  
reasons.86	  (I	  think	  that	  this	  claim	  is	  only	  often	  true.)	  	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  reasons	  
for	  which	  we	  have	  these	  desires	  often	  serve	  as	  our	  motivating	  reasons,	  the	  desires	  
themselves	  do	  not	  add	  reasons	  for	  our	  acting.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  Connor	  desires	  
to	  go	  golfing.	  	  Connor’s	  reason	  for	  desiring	  to	  golf	  is	  that	  practicing	  it	  will	  make	  him	  
a	  better	  golfer.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy,	  Connor’s	  desire	  becomes	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  
Connor	  goes	  golfing,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  good	  argument	  to	  think	  that	  the	  desire,	  by	  itself,	  
provides	  an	  additional	  reason	  for	  Connor	  to	  go	  golfing.	  	  Of	  course,	  Dancy	  claims	  that	  
the	  desire	  provides	  motivation	  for	  Connor,	  and	  that	  it	  provides	  content	  for	  his	  goals,	  
but	  it	  need	  not	  thereby	  also	  be	  a	  motivating	  reason	  for	  him.87	  
	   I	  disagree	  with	  Dancy	  that	  all	  desires	  are	  had	  for	  reasons.	  	  There	  are	  tough	  
cases	  where	  agents	  act	  becauseR	  they	  “just	  want	  to”	  without	  there	  being	  any	  further	  
reason	  for	  their	  desiring	  as	  they	  do.88	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  if	  psychologism	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  
is	  very	  tempting	  to	  say	  that	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  these	  agents	  Φ	  are	  their	  desires.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  cases	  where	  agents	  truly	  have	  no	  further	  reason	  for	  their	  
desires,	  meaning	  that	  there	  is	  no	  further	  consideration	  in	  light	  of	  which	  they	  Φ,	  or	  
there	  is	  nothing	  for	  them	  that	  speaks	  further	  in	  favor	  of	  their	  Φ-­‐ing,	  then	  perhaps	  it	  
should	  be	  concluded	  that	  these	  agents	  do	  not	  Φ	  for	  reasons.	  	  This	  conclusion	  would	  
not	  be	  as	  extreme	  as	  it	  may	  appear	  to	  be.	  	  Consider	  the	  kinds	  of	  actions	  we	  would	  
have	  in	  mind	  here.	  	  Angela	  whistles	  just	  because	  she	  wanted	  to.	  	  Toan	  jumps	  up	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  See	  Dancy	  (2000:	  Chapter	  2).	  	  
87	  In	  Chapter	  6	  below	  I	  discuss	  in	  a	  bit	  more	  detail	  the	  role	  of	  desires	  in	  the	  economy	  
of	  action.	  	  	  
88	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010),	  Mele	  (2003),	  and	  Sehon	  (2005)	  for	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  
issue.	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down	  because	  he	  wanted	  to.	  	  I	  sing	  a	  lyric	  from	  a	  song	  purely	  from	  desire,	  nothing	  
else.	  	  One	  need	  not	  commit	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  action	  is	  done	  for	  reasons	  in	  order	  to	  
defend	  a	  view	  that	  has	  it	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  true	  that	  it	  is.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  cases	  above	  
at	  least	  provide	  a	  prima	  facie	  challenge	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  our	  action	  is	  done	  for	  
reasons.	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  much	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  here	  to	  decide	  this	  issue,	  but	  I	  
will	  not	  take	  it	  up	  here.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  main	  argument	  of	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  rest	  on	  
this	  cognitivist	  assumption	  except	  primarily	  for	  making	  the	  exposition	  simpler.	  	  
Moreover,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  psychologism	  fails	  even	  if	  
this	  assumption	  is	  false.	  	  If	  the	  argument	  offered	  is	  strong	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  pure	  
cognitivist	  accounts	  of	  psychologism	  are	  false,	  then	  it	  will	  likewise	  be	  strong	  enough	  
to	  show	  that	  non-­‐cognitivist	  versions	  are	  false	  too.	  
Let	  us	  turn	  to	  the	  arguments	  against	  psychologism.	  	  	  
	  
3.2	  Cousin	  Arguments	  Against	  Psychologism	  	  
	  Consider	  the	  following	  case	  by	  Maria	  Alvarez:	  
	  
Suppose	  that	  I	  give	  my	  cousin	  some	  money	  because	  I	  believe	  what	  he	  tells	  me,	  namely,	  that	  
he	  needs	  it	  to	  pay	  his	  rent.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  what	  motivates	  me	  to	  give	  him	  the	  money	  is	  
that	  he	  needs	  it:	  	  it	  is	  that	  that	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  make	  the	  action	  of	  giving	  him	  money	  right	  or	  
appropriate	  and	  not	  my	  believing	  that	  he	  needs	  it.	  	  For,	  if	  my	  reason	  had	  been	  my	  believing	  
that	  he	  needs	  the	  money,	  then,	  when	  deciding	  whether	  to	  give	  him	  the	  money,	  my	  concern	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would	  be	  with	  how	  things	  are	  with	  me,	  in	  particular,	  with	  my	  own	  state	  of	  mind,	  rather	  than	  
with	  how	  things	  are	  with	  my	  cousin,	  in	  particular,	  with	  his	  financial	  situation.89	  
	  
	  
Alvarez’s	  case	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  what	  my	  reason	  is	  for	  loaning	  my	  cousin	  
money:	  	  is	  it	  his	  financial	  situation,	  or	  is	  it	  my	  believing	  what	  I	  do	  about	  his	  financial	  
situation?	  	  If	  the	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  is	  my	  believing,	  as	  is	  consonant	  with	  psychologism,	  
then	  it	  makes	  the	  reason	  my	  psychological	  state	  of	  believing	  what	  I	  do	  about	  my	  
cousin.90	  	  The	  latter,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  cannot	  be	  right	  because	  it	  is	  my	  cousin’s	  
financial	  situation	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  my	  loaning	  him	  money,	  not	  the	  state	  
of	  my	  psychology.	  	  Just	  below	  is	  my	  formulation	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  I	  state	  the	  
argument	  in	  the	  third	  person	  (by	  using	  Jones	  and	  his	  cousin	  as	  examples)	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  potentially	  unnecessary	  complications	  by	  involving	  the	  first	  person.	  
	  
Cousin	  in	  Financial	  Need	  Argument	  
1. If	  psychologism	  is	  true,	  then	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  his	  
believing	  that	  he	  is	  in	  financial	  need.91	  
2. Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  that	  he	  is	  in	  financial	  need,	  not	  Jones’	  
believing	  that	  he	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  
	  
3.	  	  Therefore,	  psychologism	  is	  false.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  131)	  
90	  Alvarez	  leaves	  the	  argument	  at	  an	  intuitive	  level.	  	  I	  hope	  to	  articulate	  her	  insight	  
and	  see	  whether	  it	  can	  succeed	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  psychologism.	  
91	  Alvarez’s	  case	  also	  assumes	  a	  cognitivist	  psychologismn	  would	  be	  the	  right	  one	  
were	  it	  true.	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   Premise	  1	  seems	  uncontroversial,	  assuming	  that	  reasons	  are	  beliefs,	  because	  
it	  is	  merely	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  psychologistic	  position.	  	  Premise	  2	  is	  the	  
controversial	  premise	  here.	  	  Alvarez	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  intuitive	  that	  what	  motivates	  
Jones	  to	  help	  his	  cousin	  is	  the	  financial	  situation	  his	  cousin	  is	  in,	  not	  Jones’	  believing	  
what	  he	  does	  about	  his	  cousin’s	  financial	  situation.	  	  So	  according	  to	  Alvarez,	  the	  key	  
is	  to	  think	  about	  what	  we	  think	  Jones	  is	  motivated	  by	  when	  he	  helps	  his	  cousin—
either	  some	  feature	  of	  Jones’s	  psychology	  or	  some	  features	  of	  his	  cousin’s	  financial	  
situation.	  	  If	  we	  think	  that	  it	  is	  some	  feature	  of	  Jones’	  psychology,	  then	  his	  reason	  
could	  well	  be	  his	  believing	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  
we	  think	  that	  it	  is	  some	  feature	  his	  cousin’s	  financial	  situation,	  then	  the	  reason	  is	  
that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  	  	  	  	  
Let’s	  suppose	  that	  many	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  is,	  as	  Alvarez	  
believes,	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  	  I	  think	  the	  psychologist	  can	  explain	  
away	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  intuition	  here.	  	  She	  can	  claim	  that	  Alvarez’s	  case	  has	  an	  
explicit	  normative	  dimension	  to	  it,	  which	  makes	  us	  think	  of	  the	  reason	  as	  a	  
normative	  reason.	  	  This	  might	  explain	  why	  the	  reader	  has	  the	  intuition	  that	  Jones’	  
reason	  is	  not	  psychological.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	  the	  case	  is	  that	  a	  
family	  member	  is	  in	  need,	  which	  the	  reader	  might	  associate	  with	  having	  obligations	  
to	  help	  that	  family	  member.	  	  Thus	  the	  reason	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  in	  the	  case	  is	  the	  
normative	  reason	  that	  Jones’	  cousin	  is	  in	  need,	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  Jones	  to	  
help	  his	  cousin.	  	  The	  psychologist	  reminds	  us	  that	  Alvarez’	  claim	  is	  about	  motivating	  
reasons.	  	  According	  to	  Alvarez,	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  that	  he	  is	  in	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financial	  need.	  	  The	  psychologist	  digs	  in	  her	  heels	  claiming	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  
helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  his	  believing	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  	  The	  
psychologist	  can	  agree	  that	  Jones	  has	  a	  normative	  reason	  to	  help	  his	  cousin	  that	  is	  
non-­‐psychological,	  but	  if	  Jones	  is	  motivated	  by	  to	  act	  for	  that	  reason,	  the	  his	  reason	  
for	  acting	  must	  be	  the	  state	  of	  his	  believing	  that	  normative	  content.92	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  
Jones’	  believing	  the	  content	  that	  he	  does	  that	  serves	  as	  his	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  
cousin.	  	  So,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  conceded	  that	  many	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  is	  
not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  cousin	  case,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  this	  is	  because	  people	  are	  
focusing	  on	  Jones’	  motivating	  reason.	  
To	  test	  this	  move	  against	  Alvarez	  we	  can	  consider	  a	  case	  that	  lacks	  normative	  
considerations.93	  	  Suppose	  Janie	  is	  invited	  to	  go	  to	  the	  beach,	  and	  so	  she	  goes.	  	  
Suppose	  further	  that	  Janie	  does	  not	  particularly	  like	  going	  to	  the	  beach,	  but	  that	  she	  
believes	  that	  her	  brother,	  who	  was	  not	  invited,	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  she	  goes.	  	  Let’s	  
assume	  that	  Janie’s	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  beach	  is	  that	  her	  
brother	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  she	  goes.	  	  The	  competing	  psychologistic	  reason	  is	  Janie’s	  
believing	  that	  her	  brother	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  she	  goes.	  	  Thus,	  what	  motivates	  Janie	  is	  
either	  some	  feature	  of	  her	  brother’s	  emotional	  state,	  or	  it	  is	  some	  feature	  of	  her	  
believing	  something	  about	  her	  brother’s	  emotional	  state.	  	  Supposing	  Janie’s	  belief	  is	  
true,	  the	  question	  now	  is:	  	  is	  it	  intuitively	  clear	  that	  Janie’s	  motivating	  reason	  is	  that	  
her	  brother	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  she	  goes	  rather	  than	  her	  believing	  that	  he	  will	  be	  
jealous	  if	  she	  goes?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  In	  Section	  3.3	  below	  I	  discuss	  the	  psychologistic	  option	  of	  normative	  reasons	  
being	  the	  contents	  of	  psychological	  states	  when	  agents	  act	  for	  normative	  reasons.	  
93	  Here	  Alvarez	  and	  I	  likely	  disagree	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons.	  	  Alvarez	  believes	  
that	  reasons	  have	  an	  ineliminable	  normative	  dimension,	  which	  I	  disagree	  with.	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I	  don’t	  think	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  intuition	  here	  is	  strongly	  in	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
favor	  even	  if	  we	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  in	  its	  favor.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  the	  intuitions	  
in	  cases	  where	  we	  avoid	  building	  normative	  considerations	  into	  them	  are	  going	  to	  
depend	  at	  least	  somewhat	  on	  whether	  one	  has	  psychologistic	  or	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
intuitions.	  	  We	  could	  readily	  imagine	  a	  psychologistic	  philosopher	  claim	  that	  she	  has	  
the	  intuition	  that	  Janie’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  beach	  is	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  her	  
brother	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  she	  goes.	  	  I	  think	  the	  key	  thing	  to	  take	  from	  this	  is	  that	  even	  
if	  there	  still	  is	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  advantage	  in	  this	  test	  case	  regarding	  intuitions,	  
it	  is	  certainly	  not	  an	  overwhelming	  advantage.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  of	  an	  
advantage	  to	  discredit	  psychologism.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  because	  if	  we	  were	  
to	  alter	  the	  Janie	  case	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  false	  that	  her	  brother	  will	  be	  jealous	  if	  
she	  goes	  to	  the	  beach,	  our	  intuitions	  now	  might	  seem	  to	  shift	  drastically	  toward	  
Janie’s	  reason	  being	  a	  psychologistic	  reason.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  revised	  Janie	  case	  also	  
lacks	  the	  normativity	  of	  the	  Jones	  case	  above,	  so	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  could	  well	  serve	  as	  a	  
potential	  test	  case.	  
In	  further	  support	  of	  this	  move	  to	  explain	  away	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
intuition	  of	  the	  Jones	  case,	  consider	  cases	  where	  it	  might	  seem	  initially	  intuitive	  that	  
Joshua’s	  reason	  is	  a	  psychological	  state.	  	  Suppose	  Joshua	  goes	  to	  the	  park,	  and	  we	  
want	  to	  know	  his	  reason	  for	  going.	  	  Joshua	  claims	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  kick	  his	  soccer	  
ball	  around.94	  	  Intuitively,	  it	  seems	  that	  his	  wanting	  to	  kick	  his	  soccer	  ball	  around	  is	  
his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  park.	  	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  think	  that	  Joshua’s	  
reason	  here	  is	  a	  psychological	  state?	  	  It	  doesn’t	  seem	  that	  we	  should.	  	  Anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Set	  aside	  my	  cognitivist	  assumption	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  case.	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psychologists	  can	  make	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  move	  here	  against	  the	  psychologist	  as	  the	  
psychologist	  does	  above.	  	  She	  can	  explain	  away	  the	  intuition	  by	  claiming	  that	  we	  are	  
focusing	  our	  attention	  on	  a	  motivating	  feature	  of	  Joshua’s	  action,	  which	  is	  not	  his	  
reason,	  and	  this	  explains	  why	  we	  are	  quick	  to	  form	  the	  intuition	  that	  Joshua’s	  reason	  
for	  going	  to	  the	  park	  is	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  kick	  his	  soccer	  ball	  around.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  can	  claim	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  things	  that	  motivate	  agents	  from	  
things	  that	  are	  motivating	  reasons	  for	  agents.95	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Joshua’s	  desire	  to	  kick	  
the	  soccer	  ball	  around	  motivates	  him	  to	  act,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  this	  that	  his	  
desire	  is	  also	  a	  motivating	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  act.	  
The	  upshot	  here	  is	  that	  we	  can	  have	  also	  have	  psychologistic	  intuitions	  about	  
reasons	  for	  different	  cases	  that	  are	  sufficiently	  like	  the	  cousin	  case	  above,	  but	  this	  is	  
not	  strong	  enough	  to	  support	  the	  denial	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  Both	  the	  psychologist	  
and	  the	  anti-­‐psychologist	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  away	  many	  of	  the	  intuitions	  
that	  challenge	  their	  views.	  	  Still,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  that	  are	  too	  strong	  to	  explain	  
away,	  but	  the	  intuition	  elicited	  from	  the	  Jones	  case,	  assuming	  it	  is	  anti-­‐
psychologistic,	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  one	  of	  them.	  
It	  seems	  thus	  far	  that	  the	  psychologist	  is	  on	  solid	  ground	  in	  her	  replies	  to	  the	  
cousin	  argument.	  	  However,	  Alvarez	  provides	  further	  support	  for	  her	  cousin	  
argument	  against	  psychologism	  here	  by	  altering	  the	  cousin	  case.96	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  See	  Alvares	  (2010)	  for	  a	  good	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue.	  
96	  Again,	  Alvarez	  for	  the	  most	  part	  seems	  to	  leave	  her	  arguments	  at	  an	  intuitive	  
level.	  	  I	  develop	  it	  a	  bit	  more	  and	  show	  that	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  significant	  
challenge	  to	  psychologism.	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…	  Suppose	  that	  he	  had	  deceived	  me	  and	  he	  didn’t	  really	  need	  the	  money.	  	  Discovering	  that	  
he	  had	  deceived	  me	  would	  be	  discovering,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  I	  had	  been	  motivated	  to	  
give	  him	  the	  money	  by	  something	  that	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  	  But	  what	  I	  would	  discover	  not	  to	  
have	  been	  the	  case	  would	  be	  that	  he	  needed	  the	  money	  and	  not	  that	  I	  believed	  he	  did—for	  
that	  was	  the	  case:	  	  I	  did	  indeed	  believe	  he	  needed	  it	  …	  So	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  
a	  motivating	  reason	  is,	  typically,	  what	  the	  agent	  believes	  and	  not	  his	  believing	  it.97	  
	  
	  We	  can	  take	  Alvarez’s	  case	  to	  be	  defending	  the	  claim	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  
his	  cousin	  is	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need,	  which	  is	  premise	  2	  above.	  	  In	  this	  
new	  case	  Jones’	  cousin	  deceives	  him	  about	  his	  financial	  situation.98	  	  He	  is	  not	  in	  
financial	  need	  after	  all.	  	  Jones	  would	  come	  to	  discover	  that	  his	  reason	  for	  loaning	  his	  
cousin	  money	  is	  not	  the	  case.99	  	  However,	  this	  would	  not	  be	  right	  if	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  
loaning	  his	  cousin	  money	  was	  his	  believing	  that	  my	  cousin	  was	  in	  financial	  need.	  	  
Supposing	  Jones	  to	  have	  a	  psychologistic	  reason	  in	  this	  case,	  he	  would	  not	  discover	  
that	  his	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  case	  because	  the	  reason	  is	  his	  believing	  certain	  things	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  132)	  
98	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  132).	  	  Alvarez	  ultimately	  goes	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  she	  does	  not	  think	  
that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  In	  presenting	  Alvarez’s	  case,	  it	  would	  
therefore	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  in	  these	  deception-­‐error	  cases	  that	  agents’	  
apparent	  reasons	  turn	  out	  not	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  agents	  act	  for	  (real)	  
reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  including	  the	  deception	  cases	  Alvarez	  has	  in	  mind.	  	  I	  present	  
the	  case	  and	  the	  argument	  with	  the	  assumption	  of	  my	  view	  in	  mind.	  	  If	  this	  
assumption	  is	  rejected,	  then	  one	  could	  easily	  replace	  my	  use	  of	  ‘reasons’	  with	  
‘apparent	  reasons’.	  	  	  
99	  I	  use	  Alvarez’	  terminology	  here	  by	  using	  the	  expression	  ‘is	  the	  not	  the	  case’.	  	  This	  
is	  probably	  not	  neutral	  terminology,	  but	  I	  want	  to	  stick	  close	  to	  Alvarez’s	  argument.	  	  
If	  the	  terminology	  is	  too	  biased,	  then	  substitute	  it	  for	  whatever	  neutral	  terminology	  
seems	  fit.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  reason	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  ‘wrong’.	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about	  my	  cousin’s	  financial	  situation,	  and	  his	  believings	  are	  the	  case.100	  Here’s	  my	  
formulation	  of	  the	  argument:	  
	  
Deceiving	  Cousin	  Argument	  	  
4. If	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  not	  the	  case	  when	  his	  cousin	  
deceives	  him,	  then	  his	  reason	  is	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need,	  not	  his	  
believing	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.	  
5. Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  deceiving	  cousin	  is	  not	  the	  case	  when	  his	  cousin	  
deceives	  him.	  
	  
6. Therefore,	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  his	  cousin	  is	  that	  he	  is	  in	  financial	  need,	  
not	  his	  believing	  that	  his	  cousin	  is	  in	  financial	  need.101	  
	  
Psychologists	  can	  accept	  premise	  4	  because	  psychological	  states	  as	  agential	  
reasons	  are	  always	  going	  to	  be	  the	  case	  when	  agents	  act	  for	  them.	  	  Alvarez’s	  case	  of	  
the	  deceiving	  cousin	  is	  supposed	  to	  elicit	  the	  intuition	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  
case,	  which	  supports	  premise	  5.	  	  Can	  the	  psychologist	  deny	  premise	  5,	  though?	  	  I	  
think	  they	  can,	  by	  denying	  that	  the	  intuition	  in	  the	  deceiving	  cousin	  case	  is	  that	  
Jones’	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  They	  can	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  true	  that	  something	  is	  not	  the	  
case	  in	  the	  error	  case,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  Jones’	  reason.	  	  Rather,	  the	  propositional	  content	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  132).	  
101	  It’s	  important	  to	  note	  that	  at	  this	  point	  in	  Alvarez	  (2010)	  she	  has	  not	  yet	  argued	  
that	  agents	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  Thus,	  she	  is	  not	  trying	  to	  elicit	  an	  
intuition	  that	  psychologists	  cannot	  account	  for	  agents	  not	  acting	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  
case	  here.	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of	  Jones’	  belief	  about	  his	  cousin	  is	  false.	  	  So,	  they	  could	  claim	  that	  Alvarez	  is	  correct	  
to	  claim	  that	  something	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  error	  cases,	  but	  she	  is	  wrong	  that	  what	  is	  
not	  the	  case	  is	  the	  agent’s	  reason.	  
This	  psychologistic	  move	  seems	  plausible	  because	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  
intuition	  here	  really	  favors	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  error	  cases	  we	  have	  the	  
(correct)	  intuition	  that	  something	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
intuition	  is	  that	  the	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  So	  long	  as	  the	  psychologist	  can	  account	  
for	  the	  intuition	  that	  something	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  her	  theory	  is	  doing	  fine	  on	  this	  score.	  	  	  
Moreover,	  even	  if	  the	  intuition	  of	  the	  deceiving	  cousin	  case	  favors	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  over	  psychologism	  (which	  might	  be	  dubious),	  the	  overall	  theoretical	  
benefits	  of	  psychologism	  in	  dealing	  with	  error	  cases	  and	  the	  psychology	  problem	  
seem	  to	  outweigh	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  intuition	  here.	  	  That	  is,	  because	  
psychologistic	  theories	  are	  able	  to	  avoid	  all	  the	  major	  error	  case	  problems	  of	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  it	  would	  still	  be	  preferred,	  all	  things	  being	  
equal,	  if	  the	  intuition	  in	  the	  deceiving	  cousin	  case	  favored	  anti-­‐psychologism.102	  
	   I	  think	  these	  psychologistic	  responses	  work.	  	  It	  seems	  right	  for	  psychologists	  
to	  claim	  that	  the	  intuition	  elicited	  deception	  cases	  is	  that	  what	  the	  agent	  believes	  is	  
false.	  	  On	  this	  matter	  both	  psychologists	  and	  anti-­‐psychologists	  can	  agree.	  	  But,	  the	  
psychologist	  can	  deny	  that	  this	  agreement	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  intuition	  is	  
thereby	  that	  the	  agent’s	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  
the	  intuition	  elicited	  is	  in	  favor	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  support	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Of	  course,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  psychologism	  is	  false	  (later	  in	  this	  chapter)	  and	  
that	  anti-­‐psychologism	  can	  overcome	  all	  the	  challenges	  that	  currently	  still	  favor	  
psychologism	  (Chapters	  4	  and	  6).	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offered	  for	  premise	  2	  above	  is	  dubious	  at	  best,	  and	  that	  Alvarez’s	  argument	  against	  
psychologism	  here	  is	  likewise	  dubious.	  	  
	   In	  conclusion	  to	  this	  section,	  I	  sense	  that	  the	  arguments	  Alvarez	  offers,	  which	  
I	  developed	  further	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  are	  more	  like	  statements	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  view.	  	  Anti-­‐psychologists	  need	  to	  say	  that	  Jones’	  reason	  for	  helping	  
his	  cousin	  is	  a	  fact,	  say,	  about	  his	  cousin’s	  financial	  situation;	  and	  when	  Jones	  is	  
deceived,	  they	  need	  to	  say	  that	  his	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  But	  nothing	  about	  the	  
cases	  compels	  the	  psychologist	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  intuitions	  are	  anti-­‐psychologistic.	  	  	  	  
The	  intuitions	  Alvarez	  thinks	  we	  have	  about	  the	  cases	  are	  certainly	  not	  decidedly	  
anti-­‐psychologistic.	  	  And	  even	  if	  they	  were,	  they	  would	  not	  thereby	  seem	  to	  be	  
sufficiently	  robust	  to	  be	  decisive	  against	  psychologism.	  	  	  
	  	  
3.3	  The	  Normativity	  Argument	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  consider	  a	  version	  of	  an	  argument	  against	  psychologism	  that	  
has	  been	  developed	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  the	  literature.103	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  
argument	  has	  been	  developed	  sufficiently	  or	  been	  considered	  in	  enough	  detail	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Both	  Dancy	  (2001:	  chapter	  5)	  and	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  chapter	  1)	  offer	  similar	  
arguments	  as	  the	  one	  offered	  here.	  	  Dancy’s	  argument	  focuses	  on	  the	  general	  
capability	  of	  normative	  reasons	  to	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  thing,	  ontologically	  speaking,	  to	  be	  
a	  motivating	  reason.	  	  Alvarez	  focuses	  on	  motivating	  reasons	  also	  being	  normative	  
reasons	  in	  some	  contexts,	  which	  has	  the	  ontological	  consequence	  that	  motivating	  
reasons	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  Alvarez	  does	  not	  adequately	  deal	  with	  
potential	  psychologistic	  challenges	  to	  the	  argument.	  	  (This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  
criticism;	  her	  project	  is	  somewhat	  different	  than	  mine.)	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Dancy’s	  
argument	  rules	  out	  a	  psychologistic	  reply	  that	  maintains	  that	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  
identified	  with	  psychological	  states	  and	  their	  contents.	  	  He	  does	  so	  on	  the	  grounds	  
that	  doing	  so	  is	  “conceptual	  cookery”.	  	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  why	  the	  psychologistic	  
philosopher	  cannot	  try	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  include	  the	  contents	  of	  
psychological	  states,	  and	  Dancy’s	  claim	  here	  has	  not	  convinced	  me	  that	  they	  cannot.	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regarding	  how	  psychologists	  might	  respond	  to	  it.	  	  The	  argument	  as	  I	  present	  it	  
begins	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  no	  normative	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states.	  	  If	  this	  
is	  right,	  then	  because	  some	  normative	  reasons	  are	  motivating	  reasons,	  some	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  The	  conclusion	  that	  psychologism	  
is	  false	  follows	  because	  it	  will	  be	  false	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states.	  
Here	  is	  my	  formulation	  of	  the	  argument:	  
	  
Normativity	  Argument	  Against	  Psychologism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  7.	  	  	  No	  normative	  reasons	  are	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  
8. Some	  normative	  reasons	  are	  motivating	  reasons	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
9.	  	  	  Therefore,	  psychologism	  is	  false.	  
	  
Premise	  7	  
Both	  sides	  of	  the	  psychologism/anti-­‐psychologism	  debate	  can	  agree	  on	  
premise	  7,	  but	  they	  need	  not	  do	  so.104	  Even	  though	  one	  of	  my	  targets	  in	  this	  section	  
is	  someone	  who	  can	  accept	  premise	  7,	  I	  say	  something	  in	  defense	  of	  premise	  7	  
against	  those	  who	  might	  disagree	  with	  it.105	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  For	  example,	  even	  Michael	  Smith	  (1998),	  who	  is	  a	  psychologist	  about	  motivating	  
reasons,	  would	  accept	  premise	  7.	  	  Indeed	  he	  seems	  to	  argue	  that	  all	  normative	  
reasons	  are	  facts.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  claim,	  though	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  weaker	  claim	  here.	  	  
Even	  internalists	  about	  normative	  reasons	  such	  as	  Bernard	  Williams	  (1995)	  can	  
accept	  premise	  7.	  
105	  See	  Smith	  (1998).	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Intuitively,	  many	  normative	  reasons,	  i.e.,	  reasons	  agents	  have	  to	  Φ,	  good	  
reasons,	  and	  even	  appropriate	  reasons,	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  This	  provides	  
some	  initial	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  no	  normative	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  
states.	  	  (From	  here	  on	  out	  I	  will	  often	  refer	  to	  normative	  reasons	  as	  ‘good	  reasons’.)	  	  
The	  psychological	  states	  (by	  themselves)	  of	  an	  agent	  who	  acts	  are	  at	  least	  often	  not	  
good	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  for	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.106	  	  The	  following	  examples	  are	  intended	  to	  
support	  this	  claim.	  	  Suppose	  Francie	  believes	  that	  the	  teacher	  is	  mean.	  	  Francie	  
merely	  believing	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  her	  to	  skip	  class.	  	  After	  
all,	  Francie	  could	  be	  wrong	  about	  the	  teacher.	  	  Likewise,	  Neely’s	  believing	  that	  Sam	  
doesn’t	  want	  to	  hang	  out	  is	  not	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  him	  not	  to	  ask	  Sam	  to	  hang	  out.	  	  
Again,	  Neely	  could	  be	  wrong	  about	  Sam.	  	  Moreover,	  even	  in	  cases	  when	  agents’	  
beliefs	  are	  right,	  intuitively,	  it	  is	  not	  their	  believing	  what	  they	  do	  that	  makes	  a	  
reason	  a	  good	  one.	  	  Suppose	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  will	  win	  the	  lottery,	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  true.	  	  
It	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  my	  believing	  that	  I	  will	  win	  the	  lottery	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  me	  
to	  purchase	  a	  lottery	  ticket.	  	  There	  are	  countless	  examples	  where	  beliefs	  are	  true	  but	  
suffice	  for	  showing	  that	  good	  reasons	  are	  not	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  
who	  acts:	  	  Rodney	  believes	  that	  FDR	  served	  four	  terms	  as	  president,	  but	  merely	  his	  
believing	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  answer	  the	  exam	  question	  
about	  the	  number	  of	  terms	  FDR	  served	  as	  president;	  Rachel	  believes	  that	  using	  
DeMorgan’s	  will	  help	  her	  complete	  the	  proof,	  but	  (even	  supposing	  she	  is	  right)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Perhaps	  psychological	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  justificatory	  dimension	  in	  that	  sometime	  
we	  mitigate	  responsibility	  when	  we	  learn	  the	  state	  someone	  is	  in.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  
might	  think	  that	  Simon	  is	  less	  responsible	  for	  ignoring	  his	  cat’s	  cries	  for	  affection	  
when	  we	  learn	  that	  he	  has	  been	  struggling	  with	  sadness.	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merely	  her	  believing	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  her	  to	  use	  it	  in	  the	  final	  
step	  of	  the	  proof.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  each	  of	  the	  above	  examples	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  good	  
reasons	  are	  what	  the	  agents	  believe,	  supposing	  what	  they	  believe	  is	  true.	  
	   There	  is	  a	  straightforward	  Leibniz’s	  Law	  type	  of	  argument	  that	  seems	  
sufficient	  to	  motivate	  the	  claim	  that	  no	  good	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states.	  	  Good	  
reasons	  can	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  	  However,	  
psychological	  states	  cannot	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  	  
Therefore,	  good	  reasons	  are	  not	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  	  
Support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  good	  reasons	  can	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  
agent	  who	  acts	  can	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  list	  of	  examples	  provided	  in	  the	  previous	  
paragraph.	  	  Other	  kinds	  of	  cases,	  though,	  are	  cases	  where	  agents	  have	  good	  reasons	  
to	  act	  even	  though	  they	  are	  unaware	  of	  them.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  I	  have	  a	  good	  reason	  
to	  protect	  my	  young	  child	  from	  getting	  hit	  by	  the	  door,	  but	  I	  have	  become	  distracted,	  
and	  thus	  unaware,	  that	  my	  child	  is	  about	  to	  get	  hit	  by	  a	  door.	  	  Or,	  I	  am	  unaware	  that	  
I	  have	  a	  serious	  physical	  health	  condition.	  	  Still,	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  seek	  medical	  
attention.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  just	  like	  them,	  it	  appears	  that	  agents	  
have	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  that	  are	  independent	  of	  their	  psychologies.107	  
	   These	  examples	  involving	  unawareness	  perhaps	  most	  clearly	  show	  that	  the	  
independence	  of	  the	  psychologies	  of	  the	  person	  who	  acts	  from	  the	  good	  reason.	  	  But	  
the	  independence	  need	  not	  be	  unawareness.	  	  In	  the	  examples	  provided	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107The	  literature	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  normative	  reasons	  and	  whether	  (and	  how)	  they	  
relate	  to	  agents’	  psychologies	  is	  significant.	  	  I	  cannot	  take	  up	  the	  issue	  here.	  	  Rather,	  
I	  hope	  to	  settle	  on	  claims	  that	  are	  as	  independent	  as	  possible	  regarding	  the	  status	  of	  
what	  are	  called	  internal	  reasons.	  	  See	  Setiya	  &	  Paakkunainen	  (2012)	  for	  a	  recent	  
collection	  of	  essays	  on	  the	  internalism	  debate	  regarding	  normative	  reasons.	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paragraphs	  above,	  even	  though	  the	  reasons	  were	  in	  fact	  related	  to	  the	  agent’s	  
psychology,	  they	  were	  still	  such	  that	  they	  would	  have	  been	  good	  reasons	  even	  if	  
they	  hadn’t	  been	  believed.	  	  That	  FDR	  served	  four	  terms	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  answer	  
the	  relevant	  question	  about	  FDR’s	  presidency	  regardless	  of	  Rodney’s	  believing	  it.	  	  
Similarly,	  that	  DeMorgan’s	  will	  complete	  the	  proof	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  Rachel	  even	  
if	  she	  had	  lacked	  the	  belief	  about	  DeMorgan’s.	  
	   Finally,	  we	  know	  that	  the	  psychological	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts	  cannot	  
be	  independent	  of	  their	  psychological	  states.	  	  Thus,	  I	  think	  we	  have	  at	  least	  a	  very	  
strong	  prima	  facie	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  premise	  7.	  	  We	  can	  say	  more	  though.	  	  	  
If	  we	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  nature	  of	  normative	  reasons	  and	  the	  connection	  they	  
have	  to	  normativity	  we	  will	  be	  in	  an	  even	  better	  position	  to	  see	  that	  normative	  
reasons	  are	  independent	  of	  the	  psychologies	  of	  agents	  who	  act.	  	  Here	  is	  an	  
instructive	  passage	  by	  noted	  psychologist	  about	  normative	  reasons,	  Michael	  Smith,	  
regarding	  normative	  reasons:	  
	  
To	  say	  that	  someone	  has	  a	  normative	  reason	  to	  Φ	  is	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  some	  normative	  
requirement	  that	  she	  Φ’s,	  and	  this	  to	  say	  that	  her	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  justified	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
the	  normative	  system	  that	  generates	  that	  requirement.	  	  As	  I	  see	  it	  …	  normative	  reasons	  are	  
thus	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  truths:	  	  that	  is,	  propositions	  of	  the	  general	  form	  ‘A’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  
desirable	  or	  required’.108	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  Smith	  (1998:	  95)	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Smith	  helps	  us	  keep	  in	  mind	  what	  a	  normative	  reason	  is.	  	  It	  is	  a	  true	  proposition	  
expressing	  a	  reason	  that	  specifies	  a	  normative	  requirement	  or	  desirability	  condition	  
from	  some	  normative	  system	  or	  other.109	  	  The	  system	  need	  not	  be	  moral.	  	  It	  could	  be	  
prudential,	  rational,	  or	  some	  other	  normative	  system.	  	  As	  Smith	  states	  it,	  normative	  
reasons	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  require	  relations	  to	  agents’	  psychologies	  because	  they	  are	  
true	  propositions	  of	  the	  general	  form	  ‘A’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  desirable	  or	  required’.	  	  The	  
account	  here	  interprets	  Smith’s	  general	  claim	  as	  ‘A	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  Φ	  because	  Φ-­‐ing	  
is	  desirable	  for	  or	  required	  of	  A’.	  	  A	  few	  examples	  of	  normative	  reasons:	  	  Suppose	  it	  
is	  required	  of	  me	  that	  I	  protect	  my	  child	  from	  danger	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  ability.	  	  Then	  
I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  protect	  my	  child	  that	  is	  specified	  in	  the	  requirement.	  	  Suppose	  I	  
have	  a	  serious	  health	  condition.	  	  I	  would	  have	  at	  least	  a	  prudential	  reason	  to	  seek	  
medical	  attention.	  	  If	  I	  enjoy	  reading	  books	  by	  a	  certain	  author	  who	  has	  just	  came	  
out	  with	  a	  new	  book,	  then	  it	  is	  desirable	  that	  I	  purchase	  it—I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  
purchase	  the	  author’s	  new	  book.	  	  	  
It	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  Smith’s	  account	  of	  normative	  reasons	  that	  I	  
have	  a	  reason	  to	  Φ	  even	  if	  I	  am	  unaware	  that	  I	  have	  it.	  	  Suppose	  I	  am	  unaware	  of	  my	  
serious	  health	  condition.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  even	  though	  I	  am	  unaware	  of	  the	  serious	  
health	  condition,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  desirable	  for	  me	  to	  seek	  medical	  attention.	  	  The	  reason	  
I	  have	  here	  might	  be	  something	  like	  the	  claim	  that	  serious	  health	  conditions	  can	  lead	  
to	  qualitatively	  inferior	  life	  expectancies.	  	  If	  I	  were	  to	  come	  to	  know	  that	  I	  had	  the	  
medical	  condition	  in	  an	  advanced	  stage,	  we	  could	  readily	  imagine	  my	  making	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  normative	  reasons	  are	  true	  propositions	  here	  just	  because	  
Smith	  does.	  	  If	  another	  abstract	  thing	  is	  preferred	  here,	  feel	  free	  to	  insert	  that	  
instead.	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of	  the	  following	  claims:	  	  “It	  would	  have	  been	  desirable	  for	  me	  to	  have	  sought	  
medical	  attention	  before	  I	  was	  aware	  that	  I	  had	  this	  condition,”	  and	  “It	  would	  have	  
been	  good	  for	  me	  to	  have	  sought	  medical	  attention	  before	  I	  was	  aware	  that	  I	  had	  
this	  condition.”	  	  The	  thought	  here	  is	  that	  things	  can	  be	  normatively	  desirable	  or	  
good	  for	  me	  without	  my	  being	  aware	  that	  they	  are,	  and	  insofar	  as	  this	  is	  possible	  we	  
seem	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  say	  that	  we	  can	  therefore	  have	  reasons	  to	  do	  things	  even	  
if	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  relevant	  facts	  for	  which	  the	  latter	  are	  reasons.	  
	   We	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  just	  because	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  seek	  medical	  
attention	  need	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  am	  thereby	  obligated	  in	  any	  sense	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  this	  
case,	  it	  is	  just	  that	  it	  is	  prudentially	  desirable	  that	  I	  do	  seek	  the	  attention	  given	  the	  
fact	  that	  I	  have	  a	  serious	  medical	  condition.	  	  I	  am	  not	  even	  prudentially	  required	  to	  
seek	  medical	  attention	  as	  the	  case	  has	  been	  stated.	  	  Since	  I	  am	  completely	  unaware	  
of	  my	  health	  condition,	  I	  cannot	  be	  obligated	  to	  seek	  medical	  care.110	  	  However,	  it	  
can	  still	  be	  desirable	  for	  me	  to	  do	  so,	  e.g.,	  that	  it	  would	  be	  good	  for	  my	  quality	  of	  life	  
and	  me	  to	  get	  the	  care	  needed	  before	  the	  condition	  worsens.	  
	   Consider	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  case	  that	  involves	  less-­‐pressing	  interests	  than	  the	  
case	  involving	  a	  serious	  medical	  condition.	  	  Brad	  is	  a	  huge	  Yankees	  fan,	  and	  they	  are	  
playing	  in	  the	  World	  Series	  tonight.	  	  Brad	  does	  not	  have	  a	  television	  of	  his	  own,	  he	  
does	  not	  like	  to	  go	  to	  pubs	  to	  watch	  games,	  and	  he	  does	  not	  have	  the	  means	  to	  pay	  
for	  mlb.tv’s	  online	  access	  to	  the	  World	  Series.	  	  Unbeknownst	  to	  Brad,	  his	  good	  friend	  
Thad	  is	  having	  a	  World	  Series	  gathering	  at	  his	  house	  tonight.	  	  Brad	  is	  available	  to	  go	  
to	  the	  gathering,	  and	  Thad	  is	  going	  to	  invite	  him	  some	  time	  later	  in	  the	  day.	  	  It	  seems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  I	  am	  assuming	  a	  deontic	  principle	  according	  to	  which	  one	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  
aware	  of	  one’s	  obligation	  for	  it	  to	  be	  binding.	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that	  Brad	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  Thad’s	  gathering	  even	  though	  at	  the	  time	  we	  are	  
considering	  he	  is	  completely	  unaware	  of	  the	  reason.	  	  It	  would	  be	  good	  	  (in	  some	  
sense)	  for	  Brad	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gathering	  given	  his	  interests	  as	  a	  Yankees	  fan,	  and	  in	  this	  
sense	  it	  is	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  go—he	  has	  a	  prudentially	  desirable	  reason	  
to	  go	  to	  the	  gathering.	  
	   One	  way	  that	  we	  can	  bring	  out	  that	  Brad	  has	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  Thad’s	  despite	  
his	  unawareness	  is	  to	  consider	  Vlad.111	  Vlad	  is	  also	  Thad’s	  good	  friend,	  but	  Vlad	  does	  
not	  like	  baseball	  in	  the	  least.	  	  He	  also	  finds	  going	  to	  World	  Series	  parties	  boring,	  so	  
he	  never	  accepts	  invitations	  to	  attend	  them.	  	  Vlad,	  just	  like	  Brad,	  does	  not	  know	  that	  
Thad	  is	  going	  to	  invite	  him	  to	  the	  gathering	  later,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  being	  a	  
Yankees	  World	  Series	  game	  on	  tonight	  is	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  for	  Vlad	  to	  attend	  Thad’s	  
party,	  before	  or	  after	  Thad’s	  invitation.	  	  In	  this	  case	  both	  Brad	  and	  Vlad	  are	  both	  
equally	  unaware	  of	  the	  gathering.	  	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  false	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  
gathering	  thereby	  equally	  provides	  no	  reason	  for	  both	  Brad	  and	  Vlad	  prior	  to	  their	  
knowing	  about	  it.	  	  Rather,	  it	  seems	  that	  Brad	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  go	  and	  that	  Vlad	  does	  
not	  even	  though	  both	  are	  as	  of	  yet	  unaware	  of	  it.	  	  Given	  Brad’s	  interests,	  it	  would	  be	  
desirable	  for	  him	  to	  attend	  Thad’s	  World	  Series	  party.	  
	   Moreover,	  even	  the	  cases	  of	  Rodney	  and	  Rachel	  above,	  if	  altered	  slightly,	  
seem	  to	  show	  that	  the	  normative	  reasons	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  independent	  of	  their	  
psychologies.	  	  That	  is,	  even	  if	  Rodney	  had	  a	  false	  belief	  about	  the	  number	  of	  terms	  
FDR	  served	  as	  president	  we	  would	  think	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  FDR	  served	  four	  terms	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  This	  case	  is	  like	  one	  by	  Mark	  Schroeder	  (2008:	  59)	  involving	  Ronnie	  and	  Bradley.	  	  
Unbeknownst	  to	  both	  Ronnie	  and	  Bradley	  there	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  dance	  party	  hosted	  
by	  a	  mutual	  friend.	  	  Ronnie	  likes	  to	  dance,	  but	  Bradley	  dislikes	  dancing.	  	  Schroeder	  
argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  Ronnie	  but	  not	  Bradley	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  go	  the	  party.	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president	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  answer	  a	  question	  about	  the	  number	  of	  terms	  
FDR	  served	  as	  president	  with	  the	  number	  four.	  	  Likewise,	  even	  if	  Rachel	  falsely	  
thinks	  she	  can	  complete	  the	  proof	  with	  hypothetical	  syllogism,	  she	  has	  a	  good	  
reason	  to	  complete	  it	  by	  using	  DeMorgan’s	  because	  it,	  by	  hypothesis,	  will	  complete	  
the	  proof.	  	  Thus,	  Rodney	  and	  Rachel	  have	  these	  good	  reasons	  to	  act,	  but	  they	  are	  
clearly	  in	  some	  sense	  independent	  of	  their	  psychologies.	  	  We	  think	  this	  because	  
even	  if	  Rodney	  and	  Rachel	  don’t	  believe	  the	  normative	  reasons,	  or	  aren’t	  otherwise	  
aware	  of	  them,	  that	  the	  reasons	  are	  still	  normative	  reasons.	  
As	  stated	  above,	  psychologists	  can	  accept	  premise	  7	  as	  well	  as	  the	  above	  
defense	  of	  it.	  	  But	  suppose	  they	  were	  to	  reject	  the	  claim	  that	  no	  normative	  reasons	  
are	  psychological.	  	  On	  what	  grounds	  could	  they	  do	  this?	  	  One	  way	  that	  they	  could	  do	  
this	  is	  to	  adopt	  an	  internalist	  theory	  of	  normative	  reasons	  whereby,	  roughly,	  
normative	  reasons,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  reasons	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  Φ,	  must	  be	  related	  to	  an	  
agent’s	  psychology.112	  	  
Cases	  supporting	  the	  existence	  of	  necessary	  connections	  between	  normative	  
reasons	  and	  agents’	  psychologies	  are	  ones	  where	  agents	  have	  obligations	  resulting	  
from	  the	  relevant	  normative	  system.	  	  In	  these	  cases	  agents	  need	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  
aware	  of	  their	  obligations.	  	  If	  Billy	  is	  obligated	  to	  look	  after	  his	  friend’s	  dog	  over	  the	  
weekend,	  then	  Billy	  must	  we	  aware	  that	  the	  obligation	  is	  binding,	  e.g.,	  that	  he	  
promised	  his	  neighbor	  that	  he	  would	  look	  after	  the	  dog	  while	  the	  neighbor	  is	  away.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  See	  Williams	  (1980).	  	  There	  is	  a	  complicated	  debate	  surrounding	  what	  
internalism	  is	  and	  its	  consequences	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons	  that	  I	  cannot	  enter	  into	  
here.	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Everyone	  can	  agree	  that	  in	  these	  cases	  the	  normative	  reasons—the	  obligations—are	  
necessarily	  related	  to	  agents’	  psychologies.	  	  	  
One	  initial	  issue	  here	  is	  to	  what	  this	  necessary	  connection	  amounts.	  	  One	  
anti-­‐psychologist,	  Jonathan	  Dancy,	  has	  provided	  a	  plausible	  understanding	  of	  this	  
connection.	  	  He	  has	  argued	  that	  we	  could	  interpret	  this	  internalist	  constraint	  on	  
normative	  reasons	  merely	  as	  a	  necessary	  relation	  between	  a	  normative	  reason	  and	  
our	  being	  motivated	  by	  that	  reason.113	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  claim	  that	  both	  
psychologists	  and	  anti-­‐psychologists	  could	  accept	  without	  countenancing	  the	  
identity	  of	  normative	  reasons	  as	  psychological	  states.	  	  Psychologists	  need	  the	  
psychological	  relation	  (or	  the	  state	  itself)	  to	  be	  constitutive	  of	  the	  normative	  reason.	  	  
That	  is,	  the	  normative	  reason	  consists,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  of	  the	  relation	  some	  state	  of	  
affairs,	  fact,	  or	  content	  has	  to	  the	  agent’s	  psychology.	  	  Only	  then	  would	  it	  also	  
become	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  agent	  to	  Φ.	  	  But	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  for	  it	  to	  be	  the	  
case	  that	  the	  psychological	  relations	  constitute	  the	  reasons	  agents	  have	  to	  Φ	  in	  
obligatory	  contexts.	  	  	  	  	  
	   While	  it	  is	  no	  doubt	  true	  that	  some	  normative	  reasons	  have	  necessary	  
relations	  to	  agents’	  psychologies	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  obligations,	  it	  is	  extremely	  dubious	  
that	  all	  such	  reasons	  are	  so	  related.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  support	  of	  the	  argument	  above	  for	  
the	  independence	  of	  normative	  reasons	  from	  psychologies,	  we	  have	  seen	  several	  
examples	  in	  which	  agents	  have	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  but	  the	  reasons	  are	  not	  even	  related	  to	  
the	  agents’	  psychologies.	  	  All	  of	  these	  cases	  seemed	  to	  involve	  reasons	  the	  agent	  had	  
based	  on	  desirability	  conditions,	  i.e.,	  what	  the	  agents	  would	  find	  normatively	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  (2000:	  chapter	  1)	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desirable	  given	  their	  interests.	  	  Finally,	  even	  if	  it	  were	  conceded	  that	  normative	  
reasons	  are	  necessarily	  related	  to	  psychologies,	  as	  some	  seem	  to	  be	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
obligation,	  this	  would	  not	  show	  that	  normative	  reasons	  are	  psychological.	  
	   A	  second	  way	  in	  which	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  at	  least	  some	  normative	  
reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  is	  to	  cite	  examples	  where	  it	  appears	  that	  a	  
normative	  reason	  is	  the	  psychological	  state	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  acts.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  
might	  seem	  that	  my	  (painful)	  toothache	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  me	  to	  take	  the	  aspirin.114	  	  
Cases	  like	  this	  might	  initially	  appear	  to	  show	  that	  my	  psychological	  state—the	  
particular	  pain	  I	  am	  in—is	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  me	  (to	  take	  the	  aspirin);	  however,	  
I	  contend	  that	  the	  psychological	  state	  itself	  is	  not	  the	  normative	  reason	  and	  that	  the	  
normative	  reason	  here	  should	  be	  understood	  as,	  for	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  I	  
have	  a	  toothache,	  or	  my	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  pain	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  toothache.	  
	   	  
Premise	  8	  
This	  premise	  has	  it	  that	  some	  good	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  are	  also	  reasons	  for	  which	  
we	  Φ.	  	  If	  psychologists	  were	  to	  deny	  premise	  8,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  claim	  that	  no	  
normative	  reasons	  are	  also	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  This	  commits	  them	  to	  denying	  the	  
claim	  that	  we	  act	  for	  good	  reasons,	  which	  appears	  counterintuitive	  to	  say	  the	  
least.115	  	  Let’s	  consider	  a	  case	  that	  seems	  to	  show	  that	  some	  good	  reasons	  are	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  This	  example	  is	  an	  adaptation	  of	  an	  example	  given	  to	  my	  by	  Ben	  Bradley.	  
115	  If	  normative	  reasons	  are	  never	  also	  motivating	  reasons,	  then	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  
that	  we	  never	  act	  for	  good	  reasons.	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motivating	  reasons.116	  Johan	  is	  writing	  a	  dissertation	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  emotions	  
at	  Syracuse	  University.	  	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  Johan’s	  dissertation	  advisor	  Michael	  Stocker	  
is	  slated	  to	  teach	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  emotions	  next	  semester.	  	  It	  seems	  
that	  the	  fact	  that	  Stocker	  is	  teaching	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  emotions	  at	  SU	  
in	  the	  fall	  is	  at	  least	  an	  initial	  reason	  Johan	  has	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  the	  seminar.	  	  Now,	  it	  
seems	  perfectly	  possible	  that	  the	  (supposed)	  fact	  about	  Stocker	  is	  not	  initially	  a	  
motivating	  reason	  for	  Johan	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  the	  former’s	  seminar.	  	  For	  instance,	  Johan	  
might	  be	  unaware	  of	  the	  seminar’s	  offering.	  	  Still,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  normative	  reason	  
for	  him	  to	  take	  the	  seminar.	  	  It	  is	  a	  reason	  insofar	  as	  it	  in	  some	  sense	  desirable	  or	  
good	  for	  Johan	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  it.	  	  Now	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  could	  easily	  alter	  the	  case	  just	  a	  
bit.	  	  Suppose	  Johan	  becomes	  aware	  of	  the	  seminar	  offering	  and	  decides	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  it.	  	  
It	  seems	  perfectly	  possible	  that	  the	  normative	  reason	  Johan	  had	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  the	  
seminar	  became	  his	  motivating	  reason	  once	  he	  became	  aware	  of	  it	  and	  acted	  for	  it.	  	  
If	  this	  is	  right,	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  be,	  some	  normative	  reasons	  are	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  case	  highlights	  something	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  quite	  
commonplace,	  namely,	  that	  Johan	  simply	  acted	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  	  The	  case	  is	  
intended	  to	  provide	  an	  example	  of	  an	  action	  that	  we	  see	  performed	  regularly	  in	  
everyday	  life.	  	  	  
The	  Johan	  case	  seems	  to	  cohere	  with	  standard	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  
reasons	  because	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons	  is	  uniform	  across	  contexts.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  
normative	  reasons	  are	  facts,	  then	  in	  some	  contexts	  facts	  are	  normative	  reasons	  and	  
in	  motivating	  contexts	  these	  very	  same	  facts	  are	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  According	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  The	  case	  will	  show	  the	  possibility	  of	  acting	  for	  good	  reasons,	  but	  because	  of	  its	  
everydayness	  I	  will	  take	  it	  to	  also	  show	  that	  we	  actually	  act	  for	  good	  reasons.	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the	  anti-­‐psychologist,	  the	  Johan	  case	  and	  the	  following	  cases	  seem	  perfectly	  
commonplace:	  	  suppose	  Della’s	  unaware	  of	  the	  upcoming	  shift	  toward	  colder	  
weather,	  and	  her	  son	  calls	  her	  to	  tell	  her	  that	  she	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  cover	  the	  tomato	  
plants.	  	  The	  normative	  reason	  given	  to	  Della	  in	  this	  case	  is	  that	  tomato	  plants	  cannot	  
survive	  very	  cold	  weather.	  	  Suppose	  now,	  in	  a	  motivating	  context,	  Della	  is	  seen	  out	  
in	  her	  garden	  covering	  the	  tomato	  plants,	  and	  then	  later	  she	  is	  asked	  the	  reason	  for	  
which	  she	  covered	  them.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  it	  is	  her	  curious,	  explanation-­‐seeking	  
son	  that	  asks	  her	  for	  her	  reason.	  	  And	  suppose	  yet	  again	  that	  she	  responds	  by	  telling	  
him:	  “Son,	  my	  reason	  for	  covering	  the	  tomato	  plants	  is	  that	  tomato	  plants	  can’t	  
survive	  the	  very	  cold	  weather.”	  	  The	  conclusion	  here	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  intuitive	  that	  
the	  very	  same	  reason	  Della	  offered	  her	  son	  for	  covering	  the	  tomato	  plants	  could	  
have	  been	  a	  normative	  (good)	  reason	  for	  her	  to	  do	  so.	  	  The	  context	  changed,	  but	  the	  
reason	  did	  not.	  	  
Some	  anti-­‐psychologists	  argue	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  stock	  of	  reasons	  (facts,	  say)	  and	  
whether	  the	  reason	  is	  normative	  or	  motivating	  or	  both	  depends	  merely	  on	  the	  
context	  of	  its	  use,	  as	  seen	  just	  above	  in	  the	  Della	  case.117	  Others	  argue	  that	  what	  
matters	  is	  that	  normative	  and	  motivating	  reasons	  be	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  things	  such	  
that,	  generally,	  the	  context	  of	  use	  determines	  whether	  the	  reason	  is	  normative	  or	  
motivating	  or	  both.118	  Regardless	  of	  which	  view	  is	  right,	  if	  indeed	  one	  of	  these	  is,	  we	  
can	  consider	  the	  Johan	  case	  in	  light	  of	  a	  more	  generic	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  In	  that	  
case,	  Johan	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  Stocker’s	  seminar	  prior	  to	  it	  becoming	  a	  reason	  
for	  him	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  the	  seminar.	  	  And	  once	  he	  becomes	  aware	  of	  the	  reason,	  it	  then	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  Alvarez	  (2010)	  
118	  Dancy	  (2000)	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becomes	  a	  motivating	  reason—it	  became	  his	  reason	  for	  sitting	  in	  on	  Stocker’s	  
seminar.	  	  The	  typical	  anti-­‐psychologist	  maintains	  that	  the	  reason	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  
cases.	  	  Supposing	  facts	  just	  are	  true	  propositions,	  then,	  Johan’s	  reason	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  
Stocker’s	  seminar	  is	  the	  true	  proposition	  that	  Stocker	  is	  teaching	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  emotions	  at	  SU.	  	  And,	  this	  very	  same	  reason	  is	  Johan’s	  reason	  for	  
sitting	  in	  on	  the	  seminar.	  	  	  
It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  it	  is	  intuitively	  plausible	  that	  good	  reasons	  are	  
often	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  intuitive	  plausibility	  of	  the	  Johan	  
case	  can	  be	  explained,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  take	  ourselves	  sometimes	  to	  
perform	  actions	  just	  like	  Johan’s.	  	  We	  have	  a	  normative	  reason	  to	  do	  something,	  and	  
then	  we	  act	  on	  that	  very	  same	  reason;	  that	  is,	  we	  sometimes	  act	  for	  good	  reasons	  
that	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  
However,	  psychologists	  might	  be	  able	  to	  reject	  premise	  8	  while	  providing	  
some	  account	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  act	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  might	  be	  able	  to	  
deny	  that	  such	  normative	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act,	  yet	  find	  a	  way	  to	  
countenance	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  act	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  psychologist	  
might	  provide	  a	  psychologistic	  analysis	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  act	  for	  a	  normative	  
reason.	  	  The	  analysis	  might	  go	  as	  follows:	  	  An	  agent	  S	  acts	  for	  a	  normative	  reason	  N	  
just	  in	  case	  S	  acts	  for	  reason	  M,	  where	  M	  is	  a	  psychological	  state	  and	  N	  is	  the	  content	  
of	  M.119	  Accordingly,	  Johan	  acts	  for	  a	  normative	  reason	  just	  in	  case	  he	  acts	  for	  the	  
reason	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  Stocker	  is	  teaching	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  This	  is	  what	  Dancy	  seems	  to	  reject	  in	  the	  psychologist’s	  account.	  	  He	  claims	  that	  
normative	  reasons	  cannot	  be	  propositional	  contents	  because	  the	  latter	  are	  “too	  thin	  
and	  insubstantial”.	  	  Accordingly,	  normative	  reasons	  are	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  I	  discuss	  
this	  issue	  more	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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emotions	  at	  SU	  in	  the	  fall,	  and	  the	  content	  of	  Johan’s	  psychological	  state	  is	  the	  
normative	  content	  that	  Stocker	  is	  teaching	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  emotions	  
at	  SU	  in	  the	  fall.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis,	  
the	  reason	  Johan	  acts	  for	  is	  his	  psychological	  state,	  but	  the	  content	  of	  the	  state	  is	  
identical	  to	  the	  good	  reason	  the	  agent	  has	  to	  act.	  	  Thus,	  the	  normative	  reason	  is	  not	  
the	  reason	  for	  which	  we	  act,	  but	  it	  has	  a	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action	  nonetheless.	  	  
It	  provides	  whatever	  role	  the	  content	  of	  psychological	  states	  have	  in	  action.	  	  And	  
when	  the	  content	  is	  true,	  in	  normative	  circumstances,	  the	  content	  has	  a	  role	  such	  
that	  the	  psychologist	  can	  claim	  that	  good	  reasons	  are	  our	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  
Therefore,	  premise	  8	  can	  therefore	  be	  denied,	  but	  some	  sense	  of	  acting	  for	  good	  
reasons	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  nonetheless.	  
There	  are	  three	  problems	  with	  this	  psychologistic	  analysis.	  	  The	  first	  problem	  
is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  capture	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  	  According	  to	  
their	  analysis	  agents	  are	  said	  to	  act	  for	  good	  reasons	  when	  the	  content	  of	  the	  agent’s	  
psychological	  state	  is	  a	  normative	  reason.	  	  But	  why	  should	  we	  accept	  this	  analysis?	  	  
It	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  capture	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  	  As	  the	  Johan	  case	  
elicits,	  he	  acts	  for	  the	  good	  reason	  itself	  not	  for	  a	  motivating	  reason,	  which	  has	  as	  its	  
content	  a	  normative	  reason.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  really	  that	  the	  normative	  reason	  is	  
not	  at	  all	  acted	  for	  in	  the	  case;	  the	  psychological	  state	  is	  what	  is	  acted	  for.	  
Additionally,	  the	  analysis	  seems	  to	  fail	  in	  the	  other	  ordinary	  cases	  discussed	  
above.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  Rachel	  believes	  that	  applying	  DeMorgan’s	  to	  the	  last	  step	  
of	  the	  proof	  will	  complete	  it,	  according	  to	  psychologists	  she	  acts	  for	  the	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psychological	  state	  of	  believing	  what	  she	  does.	  	  Now,	  according	  to	  their	  analysis	  
Rachel	  acts	  for	  the	  normative	  reason	  here	  because	  it	  is	  the	  content	  of	  her	  
psychological	  state.	  	  But	  we	  thought	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  psychologistic	  theory,	  she	  
acted	  for	  her	  believing	  what	  she	  does	  about	  DeMorgan’s	  and	  the	  proof,	  not	  for	  the	  
content	  of	  what	  she	  believes	  about	  DeMorgan’s	  and	  the	  proof.	  
The	  psychologist	  might	  reply	  to	  this	  first	  problem	  by	  claiming	  that	  they	  have	  
provided	  an	  analysis	  of	  agents’	  acting	  for	  good	  reasons	  on	  psychologistic	  grounds.	  	  
Thus,	  this	  first	  challenge	  here	  to	  their	  analysis	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  unfair.	  	  This	  charge	  of	  
unfairness	  is	  not	  convincing.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  analysis	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  
capture	  an	  agent	  acting	  for	  a	  good	  reason,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  according	  to	  
psychologistic	  theories	  agents	  can	  only	  act	  for	  reasons	  when	  they	  are	  psychological	  
states.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  right	  that	  they	  can	  simply	  help	  themselves	  to	  the	  
claim	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  good	  reasons	  when	  good	  reasons	  are	  contents	  of	  agents’	  
motivating	  reasons.	  	  How	  are	  they	  acting	  for	  good	  reasons	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  
psychological	  states	  having	  certain	  contents?	  	  After	  all,	  psychologists	  claim	  that	  
agents	  act	  for	  the	  state	  of	  believing	  what	  they	  do,	  not	  for	  what	  they	  believe.	  	  Thus,	  it	  
seems	  misleading	  for	  psychologistic	  theories	  to	  claim	  that	  agents	  can	  act	  for	  good	  
reasons.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  core	  of	  this	  first	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  analysis	  has	  the	  
appearance	  of	  being	  ad	  hoc.	  
We	  see	  a	  second	  problem	  by	  considering	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  It	  
follows	  from	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis	  that	  every	  time	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  
reason	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  present.	  	  There	  is	  the	  normative	  reason,	  which	  serves	  
as	  the	  content	  of	  the	  agent’s	  psychological	  state.	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  new	  reason	  that	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forms	  once	  the	  normative	  reason	  becomes	  the	  content	  of	  the	  agent’s	  psychological	  
state.	  	  This	  new	  reason	  is	  the	  motivating	  reason.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  
psychologism	  has	  to	  posit	  two	  reasons	  instead	  of	  one	  when	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  
reason.	  	  Intuitively,	  when	  Johan	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  reason	  there	  is	  only	  one	  reason	  
present.	  	  Thus,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  another	  cost,	  which	  may	  not	  be	  too	  significant,	  but	  it	  
is	  a	  cost	  nonetheless.	  
Suppose	  the	  psychologist	  attempts	  escaping	  this	  consequence	  that	  two	  
reasons	  are	  present	  every	  time	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  	  The	  psychologist	  
could	  try	  to	  claim	  that	  when	  the	  motivating	  reason	  forms	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
normative	  reason’s	  psychological	  relation	  to	  an	  agent’s	  psychology	  that	  the	  
normative	  reason	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  reason.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  argued,	  that	  there	  really	  
are	  not	  two	  reasons	  every	  time	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  reason,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  
reasons	  that	  have	  other	  reasons	  as	  contents.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  making	  
sense	  of	  a	  normative	  reason	  losing	  its	  ontological	  status	  as	  a	  reason.	  	  In	  particular,	  
how	  could	  a	  normative	  reason	  fail	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  merely	  in	  virtue	  of	  coming	  to	  have	  
an	  extrinsic	  relation	  to	  an	  agent’s	  psychology?	  
The	  issue	  here	  is	  not	  whether	  things	  can	  undergo	  a	  change	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  
extrinsic	  relations.	  	  Of	  course	  they	  can.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  issue	  is	  also	  not	  that	  things	  
cannot	  be	  what	  they	  are	  in	  virtue	  of	  extrinsic	  relations.	  	  Money	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  
the	  latter.	  	  Rather,	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  how	  a	  normative	  reason	  loses	  its	  status	  as	  a	  
reason	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  be	  believed	  by	  an	  agent.	  	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  we	  already	  
think	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  is	  a	  reason	  depends	  on	  its	  relation	  to	  agents,	  
including	  their	  psychologies.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  we	  recall	  that	  going	  to	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Thad’s	  gathering,	  which	  involved	  watching	  the	  World	  Series	  featuring	  the	  Yankees	  
was	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  Brad	  but	  not	  for	  Vlad.120	  It	  is	  concluded	  from	  this	  that	  
normative	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  for	  some	  and	  not	  reasons	  for	  others,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  
virtue	  of	  the	  extrinsic	  relations	  to	  Brad	  and	  Vlad	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  reason	  is	  a	  
reason	  at	  all.	  	  	  
This	  argument	  fails.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  normative	  reason	  in	  the	  case	  
described	  is	  a	  reason	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  extrinsic	  relations	  (to	  Brad)	  though	  not	  a	  reason	  
in	  virtue	  of	  its	  lacking	  extrinsic	  relations	  (to	  Vlad).	  	  What	  is	  true	  is	  that	  the	  reason	  is	  
not	  a	  reason	  for	  Vlad	  even	  though	  it	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  Brad.	  	  But	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  
the	  reason	  in	  question	  remaining	  a	  reason	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  reason	  for	  Vlad.	  	  Indeed,	  
even	  Vlad	  can	  identify	  it	  as	  a	  reason.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  not	  a	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  go	  to	  Thad’s	  
gathering.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  invalid	  to	  argue	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  
reasons	  for	  some	  to	  Φ	  but	  not	  for	  others	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  things	  that	  are	  
not	  reasons	  for	  others	  to	  Φ	  are	  not	  thereby	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  for	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  
a	  reason	  for	  some	  but	  not	  others	  and	  quite	  another	  thing	  for	  something	  to	  be	  a	  
reason	  at	  all	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  and	  not	  a	  reason	  at	  all	  in	  relation	  to	  others.	  	  Thus,	  
those	  who	  claim	  that	  extrinsic	  relations	  determine	  a	  reason’s	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  
need	  a	  different	  argument	  than	  the	  one	  offered	  so	  far.	  
The	  psychologist	  might	  reply	  here	  claiming	  that	  normative	  reasons	  just	  are	  
reasons	  that	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  agents’	  psychologies.	  	  That	  is,	  there	  are	  no	  such	  
things	  as	  normative	  reasons	  simpliciter.	  	  Normative	  reasons,	  they	  might	  argue,	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  The	  use	  of	  the	  ‘reason	  for’	  in	  this	  case	  specifies	  a	  normative	  reason	  just	  as	  the	  
case	  above	  (Section	  3.2)	  specifies.	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all	  reasons	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  Φ,	  or	  reasons	  an	  agent	  has	  to	  Φ,	  so	  that	  normative	  
reasons	  require	  relations	  to	  agents	  in	  order	  to	  be	  reasons	  at	  all.	  	  One	  response	  to	  
this	  is	  that	  some	  normative	  reasons	  seem	  to	  hold	  universally	  for	  agents	  so	  that	  the	  
relation	  to	  agents	  is	  superfluous.	  	  Examples	  of	  these	  might	  include	  certain	  moral	  
reasons.	  	  Some	  moral	  reasons	  might	  be	  reasons	  for	  everyone,	  so	  it	  would	  seem	  true	  
to	  say	  that	  some	  moral	  reasons	  are	  true	  simpliciter.	  	  The	  psychologist	  could	  counter-­‐
reply	  by	  claiming	  that	  these	  moral	  cases	  are	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rule.	  	  There	  are	  
countless	  other	  normative	  reasons	  that	  seem	  only	  to	  be	  reasons	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  
reasons	  for	  someone.	  	  There	  is	  some	  intuitive	  pull	  to	  this	  counter-­‐reply.	  
Accordingly,	  let’s	  assume	  for	  argument’s	  sake	  that	  the	  psychologist	  is	  right	  
about	  normative	  reasons.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  relevant	  normative	  reasons	  are	  only	  the	  ones	  
that	  are	  extrinsically	  related	  to	  agents.	  	  That	  is,	  a	  normative	  reason	  will	  be	  a	  reason	  
R	  for	  agent	  S	  to	  Φ	  only	  if	  R	  has	  an	  extrinsic	  relation	  to	  S.	  	  What	  now	  seems	  
problematic	  is	  that	  psychologists	  need	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  normative	  reason	  typically	  
becomes	  a	  reason	  for	  someone	  when	  it	  is	  extrinsically	  related	  to	  him.	  	  Why,	  then,	  in	  
cases	  of	  acting	  for	  normative	  reasons,	  on	  the	  psychologistic	  defense	  we	  are	  
considering	  here,	  is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  the	  normative	  reason	  loses	  its	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  
for	  the	  agent	  to	  Φ	  when	  he	  comes	  to	  believe	  it	  and	  that	  belief	  is	  his	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing?	  	  
Shouldn’t	  the	  normative	  reason	  itself	  become	  a	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  Φ	  in	  this	  case?	  	  
Recall	  the	  dialectic	  here.	  	  Psychologists	  are	  attempting	  to	  defend	  the	  claim	  
that	  when	  normative	  reasons	  are	  the	  things	  for	  which	  agents	  act	  for	  they	  lose	  their	  
status	  as	  reasons.	  	  The	  defense	  we	  are	  considering	  here	  on	  their	  behalf	  is	  that	  
whether	  or	  not	  something	  is	  a	  reason	  depends	  on	  its	  extrinsic	  relations	  to	  agents;	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thus	  it	  is	  not	  a	  problem,	  as	  was	  claimed	  by	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  objection	  here,	  for	  
things	  to	  gain	  or	  lose	  their	  status	  as	  reasons.	  	  The	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  counter-­‐
objection	  here	  is	  that	  even	  if	  the	  latter	  claim	  is	  true,	  it	  has	  the	  odd	  consequence	  that	  
something	  can	  lose	  its	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  in	  virtue	  of	  an	  extrinsic	  relation	  to	  an	  
agent.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  extrinsic	  relation	  is	  the	  relation	  the	  normative	  reason	  has	  to	  
an	  agent	  such	  that	  the	  agent	  believes	  it	  and	  decides	  to	  act	  for	  it.	  	  The	  psychologistic	  
claim	  here	  is	  that	  this	  extrinsic	  relation	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  normative	  reason	  no	  
longer	  a	  reason.	  	  Indeed,	  what	  would	  be	  even	  more	  peculiar	  is	  that	  normative	  
reasons	  could	  come	  to	  be	  believed	  by	  S	  and	  remain	  normative	  reasons,	  but	  once	  
they	  become	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  S	  Φ’s,	  they	  lose	  their	  status	  as	  reasons.	  	  This	  
shows	  further	  that	  a	  normative	  reason	  can	  gain	  extrinsic	  relations—this	  time	  to	  an	  
agent’s	  psychology	  via	  belief—and	  remain	  a	  normative	  reason.	  	  The	  psychologist,	  
though,	  claims	  that	  once	  a	  normative	  reason	  is	  that	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  acts,	  it	  loses	  
its	  status	  as	  a	  reason.	  	  This	  would	  be	  odd	  indeed.	  	  And	  this	  oddness	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  
result	  of	  their	  being	  no	  independent	  or	  principled	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  a	  
normative	  reason	  can	  lose	  its	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  acted	  for.	  	  	  	  
The	  issues	  that	  confront	  us	  here	  can	  be	  put	  more	  concretely.	  	  Suppose	  Thad	  
invites	  Brad	  to	  the	  World	  Series	  gathering,	  and	  Brad	  accepts	  and	  then	  goes	  to	  the	  
party.	  	  Normally,	  we	  assume	  that	  Brad	  acts	  for	  the	  normative	  reason	  that	  his	  friend	  
is	  hosting	  a	  gathering	  to	  watch	  the	  Yankees	  in	  the	  World	  Series.	  	  However,	  we	  have	  
been	  trying	  to	  accommodate	  the	  psychologist’s	  continued	  efforts	  to	  account	  for	  
acting	  for	  a	  good	  reason	  while	  avoiding	  the	  objection	  that	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  
present	  each	  time	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  consider	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whether	  the	  normative	  reason	  can	  lose	  its	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  once	  Brad	  acts	  for	  the	  
psychological	  state	  that	  has	  it	  as	  its	  content.	  	  The	  difficulty	  this	  poses	  for	  the	  
psychologist	  is	  this:	  	  what	  could	  it	  be	  about	  becoming	  the	  belief	  that	  Brad	  acts	  for	  
that	  could	  possibly	  make	  a	  normative	  reason	  no	  longer	  a	  reason	  at	  all?	  	  It	  appears	  
that	  it	  should	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Brads’	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  Thad’s	  gathering	  becomes	  a	  
reason	  once	  it	  is	  related	  to	  his	  interests	  in	  the	  appropriate	  way.	  	  But,	  if	  the	  
psychologistic	  line	  considered	  here	  is	  right,	  once	  Brad	  comes	  to	  act	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  
has	  the	  content	  of	  the	  normative	  reason,	  the	  normative	  reason	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  reason	  
at	  all.	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  why	  this	  happened.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  normative	  reason	  gained	  
an	  extrinsic	  relation	  to	  Brad.	  	  It	  was	  related	  to	  his	  interests,	  and	  to	  his	  psychology	  
prior	  to	  his	  coming	  to	  act	  for	  it.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  thereby	  remained	  a	  reason	  
for	  him	  to	  go	  to	  Thad’s	  gathering	  even	  after	  Brad	  came	  to	  act	  for	  it.	  	  To	  claim	  
otherwise	  seems	  to	  be	  another	  ad	  hoc	  move	  to	  salvage	  a	  theory.	  	  I	  think	  the	  effort	  
here	  to	  avoid	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  present	  in	  the	  Johan	  case	  fails.	  
There	  is	  a	  third	  problem	  with	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis.	  	  This	  cost	  is	  
probably	  the	  most	  serious	  and	  is	  related	  to	  issues	  concerning	  theoretical	  unity	  and	  
simplicity.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis	  entails	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  
is	  less	  unified	  than	  a	  theory	  maintaining	  that	  reasons	  are	  one	  kind	  of	  thing.	  	  By	  
claiming	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  and	  normative	  reasons	  are	  
not,	  they	  have	  a	  disjunctive	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  of	  two	  reasons	  
discussed	  above	  is	  really	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  bigger	  problem.	  	  The	  analysis	  has	  to	  
maintain	  that	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  present	  every	  time	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  good	  
	   94	  
reasons	  because	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis	  is	  itself	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  disjunctivist	  
theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  	  
A	  more	  unified	  theory	  of	  reasons	  will	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  disjunctivism.	  	  The	  
Johan	  case	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  we	  should	  aim	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons	  in	  which	  motivating	  reasons	  and	  normative	  reasons	  are	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
thing.	  	  As	  theorists	  we	  seek	  to	  develop	  theories	  that	  are	  more	  unified	  and	  therefore	  
less	  disjunctive.	  	  We	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  of	  theories	  that	  they	  unify	  the	  
phenomena	  in	  question	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  And	  we	  assume	  this	  because	  the	  
theories	  then	  have	  the	  property	  of	  being	  theoretically	  simple.	  	  Here	  I	  assume	  the	  
same	  with	  respect	  to	  reasons.	  	  A	  more	  unified,	  simple	  theory	  of	  reasons	  is	  to	  be	  
preferred.	  	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis	  is	  that	  it	  presupposes	  
a	  disjunctive	  theory	  of	  reasons	  from	  the	  start.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  better	  to	  avoid	  disjunctive	  
theories	  unless	  it	  is	  impossible.	  
Of	  course,	  an	  anti-­‐disjunctive	  theory	  of	  reasons	  has	  not	  been	  developed	  here.	  	  
We	  are	  still	  unsure	  whether	  such	  a	  theory	  can	  succeed,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  that	  
psychologism	  has	  as	  unified	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  as	  possible.	  	  What	  we	  need	  to	  
decide	  this	  is	  a	  complete	  anti-­‐disjunctivist	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  I	  
take	  this	  up	  in	  Chapters	  4-­‐6	  below	  and	  will	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  then	  to	  decide	  it.	  	  The	  
Johan	  cases,	  and	  cases	  just	  like	  it,	  provide	  us	  with	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  case	  
where	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  acting	  is	  also	  his	  normative	  reason	  to	  act,	  and	  his	  
normative	  reason	  is	  not	  a	  psychological	  state.	  	  Thus,	  in	  Chapters	  4-­‐6	  I	  seek	  to	  
develop	  that	  unified	  theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  Johan	  intuition.	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There	  is	  still	  the	  first	  serious	  cost	  against	  the	  analysis.	  	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  get	  
right	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  This,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  disjunctivist	  
worry	  here,	  should	  suffice	  for	  now	  as	  objections	  to	  the	  psychologistic	  analysis	  of	  
acting	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  Again,	  we	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  second	  objection	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  Chapter	  6.	  
	  
Back	  to	  Premise	  7	  
	   I	  come	  back	  to	  premise	  7	  briefly	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  another	  possible	  
psychologistic	  objection	  to	  it	  in	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  just	  seen	  with	  denying	  premise	  
8.	  	  Suppose	  the	  psychologist	  insists	  that	  when	  we	  act	  for	  good	  reasons	  our	  good	  
reasons	  become	  psychological	  states.	  Psychologists	  might	  claim	  that	  the	  normative	  
reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  when	  they	  become	  motivating	  reasons.	  Thus,	  they	  
hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  preserve	  the	  truth	  of	  premise	  8	  that	  sometimes	  we	  act	  for	  good	  
reasons.	  
This	  response	  is	  deeply	  problematic	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  thinking	  carefully	  
about	  the	  Johan	  case.	  	  Johan	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  normative	  reason	  to	  attend	  Stocker’s	  
seminar	  prior	  to	  its	  becoming	  a	  motivating	  reason	  for	  him.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  our	  
defense	  of	  premise	  7	  above,	  normative	  reasons	  seem	  to	  be	  truths	  having	  
independent	  existence	  from	  agents’	  psychologies.	  	  Psychologists	  wish	  to	  maintain	  
here	  that	  these	  truths	  become	  psychological	  states	  when	  they	  are	  also	  the	  reasons	  
for	  which	  we	  act.	  	  If	  this	  psychologistic	  move	  were	  correct,	  then	  when	  Johan	  acted	  
for	  the	  reason	  he	  did,	  his	  reason	  would	  have	  ontologically	  transformed	  from	  a	  true	  
proposition	  into	  a	  motivating	  reason	  consisting	  of	  a	  psychological	  state.	  	  That	  is,	  the	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motivating	  reason	  Johan	  has	  to	  sit	  in	  on	  Stocker’s	  seminar	  becomes	  a	  psychological	  
state.	  	  And	  this	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  true	  even	  though	  Johan	  already	  had	  a	  normative	  
reason—something	  non-­‐psychological—to	  sit	  in	  on	  Stocker’s	  seminar.	  	  The	  
normative	  reason	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  to	  undergo	  a	  transformation	  of	  ontological	  
kind,	  which	  would	  be	  incredible.	  	  In	  order	  to	  see	  why	  this	  transformation	  involves	  a	  
transformation	  of	  ontological	  kind	  we	  would	  do	  well	  to	  say	  what	  ontological	  kinds	  
are.	  
An	  ontological	  kind	  is	  an	  ontological	  category.	  	  For	  example,	  some	  claim	  that	  
the	  most	  fundamental	  (most	  general)	  ontological	  category	  is	  being.	  	  Moreover,	  they	  
claim	  that	  being	  divides	  into	  universal	  and	  particular	  things	  as	  the	  second	  most	  
fundamental	  kinds	  of	  things.	  	  Still	  further,	  some	  claim	  that	  universal	  things	  are	  
abstract	  things,	  and	  that	  particular	  things	  are	  concrete	  things.	  	  Among	  the	  abstract	  
things	  might	  belong	  such	  things	  are	  propositions,	  properties,	  relations,	  facts,	  states	  
of	  affairs.	  	  Among	  the	  concrete	  things	  there	  might	  belong	  organisms,	  tropes,	  minds,	  
and	  psychological	  states.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  are	  simply	  examples	  of	  
what	  might	  fall	  under	  the	  categories.	  	  As	  could	  be	  imagined,	  ontologists	  differ	  on	  
how	  to	  carve	  up	  the	  categories.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  basic	  idea	  to	  get	  from	  this	  is	  that	  
psychological	  states,	  whatever	  kind	  they	  belong	  to,	  seem	  to	  be	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  
propositions,	  states	  of	  affairs,	  etc.	  	  The	  key	  most	  notably	  involves	  the	  fact	  that	  
psychological	  states	  are	  concrete	  things,	  whereas	  true	  propositions	  are	  abstract	  
things.121	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Recall	  (Chapter	  2)	  that	  psychologists	  think	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  themselves	  
have	  causal	  powers,	  which	  motivate	  agents	  to	  act.	  	  This	  is	  why	  the	  psychological	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It	  seems	  incredible,	  then,	  that	  the	  motivating	  reason	  would	  come	  to	  be	  
something	  ontologically	  different	  than	  what	  it	  was	  before	  it	  was	  a	  motivating	  
reason.	  	  This	  seems	  incredible	  because	  nothing	  seems	  able	  to	  transform	  
ontologically	  from	  abstract	  things	  to	  concrete	  things.	  	  If	  normative	  reasons	  are	  
abstract	  objects,	  and	  psychological	  states	  are	  concrete	  objects,	  then	  in	  order	  for	  
normative	  reasons	  to	  become	  motivating	  reasons,	  abstract	  objects	  would	  have	  to	  
transform	  ontologically	  into	  concrete	  objects.	  	  Thus,	  given	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  strong	  
arguments	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  normative	  reasons	  are	  psychology-­‐independent	  
truths,	  we	  also	  see	  that	  if	  psychologists	  wish	  to	  deny	  premise	  7	  by	  claiming	  that	  
normative	  reasons	  become	  psychological	  states,	  they	  are	  committed	  to	  an	  incredible	  
ontological	  claim:	  	  normative	  reasons	  as	  abstract	  things	  become	  psychological	  
states,	  which	  are	  concrete	  things.	  	  This	  move	  is	  therefore	  implausible.	  
Before	  moving	  on,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  move	  is	  implausible	  
because	  of	  the	  severe	  ontological	  costs	  in	  incurs.	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  
Normativity	  Argument	  it	  is	  true	  that	  normative	  reasons	  become	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
We	  saw	  this	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Johan	  case.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  this	  does	  becoming	  does	  
not	  require	  any	  ontological	  transformation	  whatsoever.	  	  Anti-­‐psychologists	  who	  
claim	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  true	  propositions	  have	  no	  problem	  explaining,	  at	  a	  general	  
level,	  how	  it	  is	  that	  a	  normative	  reason	  as	  a	  true	  proposition	  becomes	  a	  motivating	  
reason,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  normative	  and	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  of	  the	  same	  
ontological	  kind.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
states	  psychologists	  are	  interested	  in	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  concrete	  instances	  
and	  not	  abstract	  types.	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Conclusion	  &	  More	  Anti-­Disjunctivism	  
The	  conclusion	  follows	  from	  the	  premises	  because	  psychologism	  is	  the	  thesis	  
that	  all	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states.	  	  Since	  some	  motivating	  reasons	  
are	  not	  psychological	  states	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  normative	  reasons,	  then	  psychologism	  
is	  false.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  show	  that	  anti-­‐psychologism,	  as	  I	  define	  it,	  is	  
therefore	  true.	  	  I	  explain.	  
I	  define	  anti-­‐psychologism	  as	  the	  thesis	  that	  no	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  argument	  against	  psychologism	  above	  is	  
consistent	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  whereby	  some	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states	  and	  others	  are	  not	  psychological	  states.	  	  This	  theory	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  would	  be	  disjunctive.	  	  One	  way	  this	  disjunctivist	  view	  could	  go,	  
in	  rough	  outline,	  is	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are,	  for	  example,	  true	  propositions	  when	  
agents	  Φ	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  true	  beliefs,	  and	  in	  error	  cases	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  
psychological	  states.122	  
I	  think	  disjunctivist	  theories	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  avoided	  for	  
considerations	  already	  stated.	  	  The	  disjunctivism	  is	  exclusive	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
motivating	  reasons	  here,	  but	  it	  counts	  just	  the	  same	  against	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  If	  
disjunctivism	  regarding	  motivating	  reasons	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons	  is	  less	  unified	  than	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  where	  reasons	  are	  all	  of	  the	  same	  
kind.	  	  If	  these	  considerations	  are	  right,	  then	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  
correct	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  See	  Jennifer	  Hornsby	  (2007)	  for	  a	  disjunctivist	  account	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Of	  
course,	  her	  view	  is	  much	  more	  refined	  than	  the	  view	  I	  merely	  sketched	  here.	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Still,	  I	  need	  to	  argue	  that	  anti-­‐psychologism	  can	  overcome	  the	  challenges	  we	  
presented	  against	  it	  in	  Chapter	  2	  before	  we	  can	  proceed	  with	  confidence	  in	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  as	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
	  
3.4	  Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  3	  
Given	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  normativity	  argument	  above	  against	  psychologism,	  
and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  theoretical	  unity	  objections	  against	  all	  manner	  of	  theoretical	  
disjunctivisms,	  it	  seems	  worthwhile	  to	  re-­‐examine	  anti-­‐psychologism	  with	  an	  eye	  
toward	  seeking	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  haunting	  it.	  	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  see	  
if	  anti-­‐psychologism	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  prevail	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  













	   100	  
Chapter	  4	  
The	  Ontology	  of	  Motivating	  Reasons	  




	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  show	  that	  anti-­‐psychologism	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  resolve	  the	  
outstanding	  problems	  if	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  understood	  as	  propositions.123	  	  Call	  
this	  view	  Propositional	  Anti-­Psychologism	  [Propositionalism	  for	  short].	  	  According	  to	  
propositionalism	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  the	  proposition	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  
reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  view	  are	  that	  in	  non-­‐error	  cases	  the	  
propositions	  will	  be	  true;	  however,	  in	  error	  cases	  they	  will	  be	  false.	  	  According	  to	  
the	  latter	  claim,	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  acting	  can	  be	  a	  false	  proposition.	  	  This	  might	  
seem	  problematic,	  but	  once	  a	  proper	  examination	  and	  reconsidering	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation	  has	  taken	  place,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  problems	  regarding	  error	  cases	  
dissolve.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  primary	  obstacles	  to	  anti-­‐psychologism	  are	  related	  to	  
standard	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  accounts	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  	  	  
The	  plan	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  as	  follows.	  	  In	  Section	  4.1	  I	  briefly	  set	  up	  how	  
propositionalism	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems	  with	  anti-­‐psychologism	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  Then	  in	  section	  4.2	  I	  examine	  current	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
assumptions	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  showing	  
how	  they	  are	  wrong.	  	  Next,	  In	  Section	  4.3	  I	  will	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Another	  route	  to	  try	  is	  whether	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  It	  might	  
turn	  out	  that	  both	  propositions	  and	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  able	  to	  do	  the	  theoretical	  
work	  needed	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism.	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explanations,	  which	  when	  combined	  with	  propositionalism	  will	  put	  us	  in	  a	  position	  
to	  avoid	  the	  serious	  challenges	  to	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  
Then	  in	  Section	  4.4	  I	  show	  how	  anti-­‐psychologists	  can	  improve	  upon	  Dancy’s	  
account	  of	  what	  the	  necessary	  connection	  is	  between	  motivating	  reasons	  and	  
agents’	  psychologies	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  B.	  	  B,	  we	  recall,	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  an	  agent	  
Φ’s	  for	  reason	  R,	  then	  necessarily,	  R	  is	  related	  to	  an	  agent’s	  psychology.	  	  The	  
psychology	  problem	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  solution.	  
	  
4.1	  Propositional	  Anti-­Psychologism,	  Reason-­Explanation,	  and	  Error	  Cases	  
	   If	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  then	  even	  in	  error	  cases	  agents	  have	  
reasons	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  we	  would	  have	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  no-­‐
reason	  problem,	  which	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  accounting	  for	  how	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  
in	  error	  cases	  given	  the	  truth	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  This	  would	  be	  significant	  
because	  when	  we	  examined	  Alvarez’s	  view	  in	  Chapter	  2	  denying	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  
reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  we	  saw	  that	  it	  clashed	  with	  our	  intuitions	  that	  agents	  do	  act	  
for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  Recall	  the	  Terrie	  case	  from	  Chapter	  2.	  	  When	  she	  waters	  
her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  for	  a	  reason	  based	  on	  a	  false	  belief,	  it	  seemed	  that	  she	  
nonetheless	  acted	  for	  a	  reason.	  We	  also	  saw	  that	  because	  of	  this	  Alvarez’s	  view	  
failed	  to	  account	  properly	  for	  a	  significant	  dimension	  of	  rationalization	  concerned	  
with	  the	  reasons	  to	  which	  agents	  were	  sensitive	  when	  they	  act.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  
seems	  that	  referencing	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  agents	  act	  is	  central	  to	  the	  
rationalization	  of	  actions.	  	  We	  called	  this	  ‘reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalization’,	  and	  the	  
problem	  here	  related	  to	  it	  the	  ‘rationalization	  problem’.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  if	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motivating	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  and	  if	  the	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  
developed	  here	  is	  right,	  then	  the	  no-­‐reason	  and	  rationalization	  problems	  can	  be	  
solved.124	  	  
	   In	  order,	  though,	  for	  propositionalism	  to	  be	  used	  to	  solve	  the	  no-­‐reason	  and	  
rationalization	  error	  case	  problems	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  it	  must	  first	  resolve	  two	  
other	  related	  error	  case	  problems.	  	  The	  first	  problem	  has	  it	  that	  if	  agents	  Φ	  for	  false	  
reasons,	  then	  their	  Φ-­‐ing	  would	  be	  explained	  by	  something	  false.	  	  This	  conflicts	  with	  
a	  standard	  view	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  According	  to	  this	  problem,	  reason-­‐
explanations	  seem	  unable	  to	  be	  factive	  because	  the	  latter	  typically	  involve	  reference	  
to	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  an	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  were	  a	  false	  
proposition,	  then	  the	  explanation	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  false	  explanans.	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  considering	  the	  Terrie	  case	  again,	  it	  appears	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  
watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  the	  false	  claim	  that	  her	  neighbor	  is	  not	  watering	  it.	  	  
Thus,	  when	  we	  provide	  a	  typical	  reason-­‐explanation	  we	  state	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason	  
for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  he	  is	  not	  watering	  it.	  	  However,	  the	  
explanans	  of	  this	  explanation	  is	  that	  he	  is	  not	  watering	  it.	  	  Now,	  if	  a	  false	  reason	  
were	  able	  to	  explain	  Terrie’s	  action,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  
are	  non-­‐factive.	  
The	  second	  problem	  here	  is	  the	  paradox	  problem	  that	  results	  from	  claiming	  
that	  agential	  reasons	  can	  be	  false	  propositions.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  As	  will	  be	  developed	  in	  this	  section,	  Constantine	  Sandis	  rejects	  the	  claim	  that	  
reasons	  explain	  action.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  preserve	  that	  reasons	  
still	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  
primarily	  the	  agent’s	  belief	  that	  explains	  her	  action.	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seem	  to	  result	  in	  paradox	  because	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  
could	  be	  the	  false	  reason	  that	  he	  is	  not	  watering	  it	  when	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  he	  is.	  	  We	  
would	  end	  up	  with	  the	  following	  paradoxical	  claim:	  	  Terrie	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  
lawn	  becauseR	  he	  did	  not	  water	  it,	  but	  he	  is	  watering	  it.	  	  In	  Chapter	  2	  we	  saw	  that	  
considerations	  like	  these,	  in	  part,	  led	  some	  anti-­‐psychologists,	  e.g.,	  Alvarez,	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  we	  do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  when	  doing	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  beliefs.	  	  
We	  also	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  2	  that	  Dancy	  was	  willing	  to	  accept	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  
are	  non-­‐factive	  and	  the	  results	  that	  follow	  from	  their	  non-­‐factivity.	  	  I	  think	  it	  best	  to	  
avoid	  Dancy’s	  move.	  	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  no-­‐reason	  and	  rationalizaton	  
problems	  we	  need	  to	  solve	  the	  factivity	  and	  paradox	  problems.	  	  Propositionalism	  
countenances	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  can	  be	  false	  propositions,	  but	  unless	  we	  can	  
show	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  can	  avoid	  the	  factivity	  and	  paradox	  problems,	  we	  do	  
not	  have	  good	  enough	  reason	  to	  accept	  it.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  factivity	  and	  paradox	  problems	  we	  will	  need	  to	  
examine	  and	  ultimately	  rethink	  the	  nature	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.125	  In	  what	  
immediately	  follows,	  I	  examine	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  reason-­‐explanations,	  
which	  will	  uncover	  assumptions	  about	  them	  that	  by	  and	  large	  have	  been	  taken	  for	  
granted.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  how	  these	  assumptions	  have	  led	  to	  the	  factivity	  and	  
paradox	  problems,	  which	  have	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  the	  no-­‐reason	  and	  rationalization	  
problems	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism.	  	  If	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐
explanations	  are	  factive	  and	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  paradox,	  then	  we	  will	  have	  provided	  
support	  for	  the	  propositonalist	  claims	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  I	  will	  show	  that	  solving	  the	  factivity	  problem	  leads	  to	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  paradox	  
problem.	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in	  turn	  provides	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  actions	  in	  error	  cases	  can	  be	  rationalized	  
in	  a	  reason-­‐sensitive	  manner.	  
In	  the	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  developed	  below	  I	  argue	  that	  their	  
structure	  must	  feature	  agential	  reasons	  in	  light	  of	  their	  relations	  to	  agents.	  	  That	  is,	  
unless	  the	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  capture	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  
reason	  is	  related	  to	  agents,	  it	  has	  not	  adequately	  explained	  an	  agents’	  actions.	  	  This	  
is	  because	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons,	  and	  for	  reasons	  to	  be	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  the	  
reason	  must	  be	  related	  to	  agents.	  	  To	  anticipate,	  the	  relationship	  will	  be	  a	  
psychological	  one—agents	  must	  be	  properly	  related	  psychologically	  to	  their	  reasons	  
in	  order	  to	  act	  for	  them.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  psychological	  relations	  are	  an	  
essential	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  It	  will	  also	  be	  shown	  how	  this	  form	  of	  
explanation	  need	  not	  commit	  one	  to	  a	  psychologistic	  account	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
Reason-­‐explanations	  need	  only	  feature	  agents’	  reasons	  for	  acting	  in	  order	  to	  be	  the	  
relevant	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  agents’	  actions	  
in	  light	  of	  their	  reasons,	  reason-­‐explanations	  must	  do	  more	  than	  cite	  agential	  
reasons.	  	  This	  is	  because	  reasons,	  by	  themselves,	  and	  contrary	  to	  common	  
philosophical	  opinion,	  do	  not	  explain	  action.	  	  	  
	  
4.2	  Reason-­explanation	  as	  Action-­explanation	  
	   Reason-­‐explanations	  are	  forms	  of	  action-­‐explanation.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation	  is	  to	  explain	  an	  agent’s	  behavior	  in	  light	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  she	  
behaves.	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  when	  agents	  behave	  in	  light	  of	  reasons	  that	  we	  say	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that	  they	  have	  acted	  or	  have	  exercised	  their	  agency.126	  Here	  are	  a	  few	  standard	  
examples	  that	  express	  reason-­‐explanations	  as	  they	  are	  found	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  
as	  we	  might	  typically	  use	  them:127	  
	  
A. S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­ing	  is	  that	  p.	  
B. S	  Φ-­ed	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p.	  
C. S	  Φ-­ed	  becauseR	  p	  
	  
A-­‐C	  are	  typically	  understood	  to	  express	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations.128	  
They	  cite	  only	  the	  content	  of	  what	  S	  believes	  as	  S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  The	  common	  
explanation	  forms	  A	  and	  B	  appear	  to	  express	  explananda	  consisting	  of	  a	  call	  for	  S’s	  
reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  which	  makes	  S’s	  reason	  the	  explanantia	  of	  A	  and	  B.	  	  C	  has	  the	  same	  
explananda,	  except	  that	  it	  is	  implicit	  in	  the	  ‘because’	  connective,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  
understood	  as	  the	  ‘because’	  of	  providing	  an	  agential	  reason.	  	  Here	  is	  a	  common	  
assumption	  of	  the	  explananda	  expressed	  by	  A-­‐C:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  some	  actions	  (of	  human	  agents)	  not	  being	  performed	  in	  
light	  of	  reasons.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  seems	  that	  some	  actions	  are	  done,	  literally,	  for	  no	  reason	  
at	  all,	  as	  when,	  for	  example,	  someone	  whistles	  while	  walking	  or	  gestures	  while	  
speaking.	  
127	  Not	  included	  in	  the	  examples	  here	  are	  teleological	  explanations	  like	  ‘S	  Φ-­‐ed	  in	  
order	  to	  Ψ’.	  	  As	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  teleological	  explanations	  are	  not,	  strictly	  
speaking,	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Nevertheless,	  they	  are	  an	  important	  kind	  of	  rational	  
explanation	  that	  can	  accordingly	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  agential	  behavior.	  	  	  
128	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  results	  from	  Chapter	  3	  are	  successful	  and	  thus	  focus	  here	  only	  
on	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  forms	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	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Explanandum	  reason-­only	  thesis:	  	  the	  explanandum	  of	  a	  reason-­explanation	  
calls	  only	  for	  agential	  reasons.129	  
	  
	   Moreover,	  the	  explanantia	  expressed	  by	  A-­‐C	  typically	  are	  just	  S’s	  reasons	  for	  
Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Call	  this	  view	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  explanans	  the	  
explanans	  reason-­only	  thesis:	  
	  
Explanans	  reason-­only	  thesis:	  	  the	  explanans	  of	  reason-­explanation	  is	  only	  the	  
agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­ing.	  
	  
The	  reason-­‐only	  theses	  are	  by	  and	  large	  taken	  for	  granted	  by	  anti-­‐psychologists.130	  
(From	  here	  I	  mainly	  set	  aside	  the	  explanandum	  reason-­‐only	  thesis	  and	  take	  up	  the	  
explanans	  reason-­‐only	  thesis.	  	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  will	  have	  primary	  relevance	  to	  the	  
discussion	  that	  follows.)	  	  Anti-­‐psychologists	  by	  and	  large	  have	  assumed	  that	  the	  
explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  merely	  agential	  reasons.	  	  On	  my	  account,	  
such	  reason	  statements	  are	  not	  explanations	  at	  all;	  rather,	  they	  are	  reason-­‐citations.	  	  
By	  ‘reason-­‐citation’	  I	  mean	  simply	  that	  the	  agential	  reason	  exclusively	  fills	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  explanans	  of	  standard	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  each	  of	  the	  explanans	  
of	  forms	  A-­‐C	  we	  see	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  that	  S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  what	  
the	  explanans	  will	  need	  to	  provide.	  	  However,	  anti-­‐psychologists	  typically	  assume	  
that	  reasons	  only	  are	  the	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  I	  leave	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  explanadum	  ‘calling	  for’	  agential	  reasons	  intuitive	  here.	  
130	  See	  Dancy	  (2000),	  Stout	  (2009),	  Alvarez	  (2010).	  	  Notable	  exceptions	  include	  
Wayne	  Davis	  (2003)	  and	  Constantine	  Sandis	  (forthcoming	  ms),	  both	  of	  whom	  seem	  
to	  reject	  the	  explanans	  reason-­‐only	  thesis.	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   Putting	  the	  standard	  view	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  reason-­‐explanation,	  including	  the	  
reason-­‐only	  theses,	  to	  use	  in	  a	  concrete	  example,	  consider	  the	  Terrie	  case.	  	  Terrie	  
waters	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  Her	  reason	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  that	  her	  neighbor	  failed	  to	  
water	  it.131	  Accordingly,	  consider	  explanation	  form	  A	  with	  the	  Terrie	  case	  as	  its	  
content:	  
	  
AT:	  	  The	  reason	  for	  which	  Terrie	  watered	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  her	  
neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it.	  
	  
If	  the	  standard	  view	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  is	  correct,	  and	  the	  reason-­‐only	  thesis	  is	  
true,	  then	  the	  explanandum	  calls	  only	  for	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  Terrie	  watered	  her	  
neighbor’s	  lawn,	  and	  the	  explanans	  is	  only	  Terrie’s	  reason	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  
watered	  it.	  	  The	  same	  appears	  to	  hold	  for	  forms	  B	  and	  C	  when	  we	  apply	  the	  Terrie	  
case	  to	  them:	  
	  
BT:	  	  Terrie	  watered	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  
not	  watered	  it.	  
	  
CT:	  	  Terrie	  watered	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  becauseR	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  
watered	  it.	  
	  
I	  contend	  that	  adherence	  to	  the	  explanans	  reason-­‐only	  thesis	  contributes	  
significantly	  to	  the	  factivity	  problem	  for	  error	  cases.	  	  It	  does	  so	  because	  even	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  I	  consider	  only	  standard	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanation	  forms	  in	  what	  
follows	  because	  my	  ultimate	  goal	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  satisfactory	  account	  of	  an	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	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error	  cases	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	  explain	  an	  agent’s	  action	  is	  her	  reason,	  so	  when	  
Terrie’s	  cited	  reason	  is	  false,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  false	  explanans.	  	  The	  explanans	  reason-­‐
only	  thesis	  has	  it	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason,	  and	  nothing	  else,	  explains	  her	  action,	  and	  so	  
the	  explanation	  of	  her	  action	  in	  error	  cases	  is	  false.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  improve	  upon	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation	  by	  Maria	  Alvarez132	  and	  Jonathan	  Dancy133.	  	  According	  to	  the	  former,	  we	  
do	  not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  latter	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  
in	  error	  cases,	  but	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  non-­‐factive	  and	  thus	  lead	  to	  paradox.	  
	   My	  view	  is	  closest	  to	  that	  of	  Constantine	  Sandis’	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation.	  	  His	  approach	  to	  the	  factivity	  problem	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  factivity	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  agential	  reasons	  explain	  their	  actions.	  	  He	  
writes:	  
	  
None	  of	  this	  [the	  denial	  that	  agential	  reasons	  explain]	  is	  to	  say	  that	  agential	  reasons	  may	  not	  
feature	  in	  action	  explanations	  (regardless	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  beliefs),	  but	  only	  that	  their	  role	  
within	  them	  is	  not	  that	  of	  explanans.134	  	  
	  
By	  denying	  that	  agential	  reasons	  explain	  actions	  Sandis	  is	  able	  to	  resolve	  the	  
factivity	  problem.	  	  By	  claiming	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  do	  not	  have	  reasons	  as	  
their	  explanantia,	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn,	  namely,	  that	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Alvarez	  (2010)—see	  also	  Chapter	  2	  for	  more	  on	  her	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation.	  
133	  Dancy	  (2000)	  and	  (2009)—see	  also	  Chapter	  2	  for	  more	  on	  his	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation.	  
134	  Sandis	  (forthcoming:	  5-­‐6)	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neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it,	  does	  not	  explain	  Terrie’s	  watering	  the	  lawn.	  	  What,	  
then,	  explains	  Terrie’s	  action	  if	  not	  her	  reason	  for	  doing	  what	  she	  does?	  	  According	  
to	  Sandis’	  view,	  typical	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations	  provide	  just	  the	  
agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  but	  they	  conventionally	  imply	  more:	  	  
	  
When	  we	  explain	  actions	  by	  citing	  one	  or	  more	  agential	  reasons,	  thereby	  implying	  strictly	  
that	  (a)	  the	  agent	  took	  p	  and/or	  q	  to	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  her	  action	  and	  (b)	  acted	  
accordingly.135	  
	  
According	  to	  Sandis,	  a	  typical	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanation	  is	  more	  than	  
the	  citation	  of	  a	  reason.136	  In	  addition	  what	  is	  said	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  believed	  the	  
reason	  to	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  Φ-­‐ing,	  and	  then	  acted	  on	  this	  reason.137	  Thus	  when	  we	  
explain	  Terrie’s	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  by	  claiming	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not,	  
we	  are	  also	  claiming	  that	  Terrie	  took	  it	  that	  her	  neighbor’s	  not	  watering	  the	  lawn	  
counted	  in	  favor	  of	  watering	  his	  lawn,	  and	  that	  she	  acted	  on	  that	  very	  consideration.	  
	   Sandis’	  full	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  preserves	  their	  factivity	  because	  
even	  in	  error	  cases	  Terrie’s	  believing	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn	  
when	  he	  had	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  reason-­‐explanation	  offered.	  	  It	  would	  have	  to	  in	  
order	  to	  for	  her	  reason	  to	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  her	  watering	  the	  lawn.	  	  This	  will	  be	  true	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Sandis	  (forthcoming:	  11)	  
136	  I	  say	  more	  about	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  reason-­‐citation	  and	  a	  reason-­‐
explanation	  below	  in	  Section	  4.1.2.	  
137	  Sandis	  appears	  to	  be	  endorsing	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  good	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  
reasons.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  it	  that	  agential	  reasons	  appear	  to	  agents	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  particular	  Φ-­‐ing	  they	  have	  in	  mind.	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  endorse	  
this	  theory	  here.	  	  Rather,	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  I	  wish	  only	  to	  endorse	  the	  claim	  that	  agents	  
typically	  take	  (or	  believe)	  the	  reason	  to	  be	  the	  case.	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even	  if	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanation	  merely	  cites	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  
watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  Additionally,	  because	  Sandis’	  view	  solves	  the	  factivity	  
problem	  it	  also	  solves	  the	  paradox	  problem.	  	  If	  reason-­‐explanations	  have	  true	  
explanantia,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  they	  will	  not	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  paradoxes	  that	  
arise	  in	  non-­‐factive	  contexts.	  
Sandis	  seems	  to	  reject	  two	  common	  assumptions	  regarding	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  	  He	  appears	  to	  deny	  the	  explanans	  reason-­‐only	  thesis	  and	  that	  agential	  
reasons	  explain	  action.	  	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  denying	  that	  agential	  reasons	  
explain	  actions	  is	  a	  huge	  cost	  to	  Sandis’	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  This	  appears	  
to	  imply	  that	  action	  explanation	  does	  not	  properly	  rationalize	  agential	  behavior,	  
even	  in	  non-­‐error	  cases.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  reasons	  do	  not	  explain,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  rationalize	  
behavior	  in	  the	  reason-­‐sensitive	  manner	  we	  are	  interested	  in?	  	  This	  is	  a	  new	  
problem.	  	  Call	  it	  the	  general	  reason-­sensitive	  rationalization	  problem.138	  	  
It	  would	  be	  ideal	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  that	  encompassed	  the	  virtues	  of	  each	  of	  
the	  above	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  This	  theory	  would	  
accommodate	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  while	  providing	  for	  an	  explanatory	  
role	  for	  reasons	  in	  such	  explanations.	  	  In	  making	  such	  accommodations	  we	  would	  
solve	  the	  factivity	  problem,	  the	  no-­‐reason	  problem,	  and	  the	  general	  rationalization	  
problem.	  	  All	  that	  would	  be	  remaining	  would	  be	  to	  solve	  the	  paradox	  problem	  and	  
the	  reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalization	  problem.	  	  In	  Section	  4.3	  I	  develop	  an	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Sandis’	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  has	  the	  theoretical	  tools	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  
problem,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  make	  them	  explicit.	  	  One	  of	  my	  contributions	  to	  a	  new	  
manner	  of	  thinking	  about	  reason-­‐explanations,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Sandis’	  theory,	  is	  to	  
show	  how	  reasons	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanation	  despite	  not	  
featuring	  as	  explanantia.	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psychologistic	  theory	  that	  can	  accommodate	  these	  virtues	  and	  solve	  each	  of	  these	  
problems	  by	  developing	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  
	  
4.3	  The	  Contextualization	  Theory	  of	  Reason-­Explanation	  
The	  view	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  to	  be	  developed	  here	  begins	  with	  the	  
rejection	  of	  the	  explanans	  reason-­‐only	  thesis	  as	  it	  is	  typically	  understood.	  	  In	  
particular,	  and	  on	  my	  view,	  explanantia	  say	  at	  least	  that	  the	  agent	  believes	  the	  
reason	  in	  question,	  and	  that	  she	  acted	  for	  it.139	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  am	  going	  to	  provide	  
an	  explicit	  account	  of	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanation	  that	  distinguishes	  
reason-­‐explanations	  from	  what	  I	  call	  ‘reason-­‐citations’.	  	  Then	  I	  reconsider	  error-­‐
cases	  again	  in	  light	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  developed	  here.	  	  Finally,	  I	  
show	  how	  the	  account	  here	  can	  preserve	  all	  of	  the	  virtues	  of	  a	  good	  theory	  of	  
reason-­‐explanation.	  	  This	  will	  involve	  showing	  how	  agential	  reasons	  can	  be	  said	  to	  
have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations	  without	  
countenancing	  the	  further	  claim	  that	  agential	  reasons	  thereby	  explain	  actions.140	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  I	  revise	  Sandis’	  first	  condition	  above,	  which	  claims	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  
assume	  that	  agents	  take	  their	  reason	  to	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  what	  they	  set	  out	  to	  
do.	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  whether	  agential	  reasons	  are	  such	  that	  agents	  
always	  see	  them	  as	  favoring	  their	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  There	  is	  a	  substantial	  debate	  
about	  this	  issue.	  	  What	  seems	  uncontroversial	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  psychological	  
relation	  holding	  between	  agents	  and	  their	  reasons.	  	  For	  simplicity’s	  sake	  I	  assume	  
that	  this	  relation	  is	  typically	  the	  belief	  relation.	  	  	  
140	  I	  take	  my	  theory	  here	  to	  be	  complementary	  to	  Sandis’.	  	  We	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  agree	  
on	  the	  nature	  of	  agential	  reasons.	  	  I	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  he	  would	  agree	  with	  my	  
account	  of	  reasons	  and	  explanation	  that	  follows	  below.	  	  Nor	  do	  I	  know	  whether	  he	  
would	  agree	  with	  my	  account	  of	  where	  anti-­‐psychologists	  have	  gone	  wrong	  in	  
thinking	  about	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  he	  would	  
think	  about	  the	  reasons-­‐only	  theses.	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4.3.1	  Reason-­Explanations	  vs.	  Reason	  Citations	  
Focusing	  only	  on	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  forms	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  above,	  we	  
have	  at	  least	  three	  main	  kinds	  of	  explanation:	  
	  
A. S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­ing	  is	  that	  p.	  
B. S	  Φ-­ed	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p.	  
C.	  	  S	  Φ-­ed	  becauseR	  p.	  
	  
If	  the	  statements	  expressed	  by	  A-­‐C	  are	  taken	  at	  face	  value,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  
citing	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  sufficient	  for	  explaining	  S’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  However,	  this	  
seems	  false.	  	  Merely	  stating	  a	  reason	  cannot	  by	  itself	  explain	  S’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  It	  also	  needs	  
to	  be	  stated	  that	  S	  acted	  for	  the	  reason	  she	  did,	  and	  in	  order	  for	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  one	  
for	  which	  S	  acted,	  the	  reason	  must	  be	  appropriately	  related	  to	  S’s	  psychology.	  	  
Suppose	  we	  are	  seeking	  to	  understand	  Terrie’s	  behavior.	  	  She	  is	  watering	  her	  
neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  If	  someone	  tried	  to	  explain	  her	  behavior	  merely	  by	  citing	  a	  reason	  
(without	  implying	  anything	  further),	  say,	  that	  her	  neighbor	  asked	  her	  to	  water	  it	  for	  
him,	  we	  would	  not	  have	  explained	  Terrie’s	  behavior	  at	  all.	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  
Terrie’s	  behavior	  the	  reason	  cited,	  i.e.,	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  asked	  her	  to	  water	  his	  
lawn	  for	  him,	  we	  would	  at	  least	  need	  to	  imply	  that	  this	  reason	  is	  the	  one	  for	  which	  
she	  acted,	  which	  typically	  implies	  that	  she	  believed	  (or	  was	  otherwise	  aware	  of)	  the	  
reason	  to	  be	  the	  case.141	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  Sandis	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim	  (forthcoming:	  18-­‐19).	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I	  think	  that	  philosophers	  are	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  statements	  expressed	  by	  A-­‐
C—as	  they	  are	  explicitly	  stated—are	  genuine	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Rather,	  they	  
should	  be	  considered	  mere	  reason-­citations	  if	  all	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  do	  is	  cite	  a	  reason	  
without	  implying	  that	  the	  reason	  cited	  is	  the	  one	  for	  which	  the	  agent	  Φ-­‐ed.	  	  Since	  
reasons	  by	  themselves—as	  explanantia—do	  not	  explain	  action,	  reason-­‐citations	  
where	  only	  reasons	  are	  claimed	  to	  feature	  do	  not	  explain	  action	  either.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  
sense	  that	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  reasons	  do	  not	  explain	  action.	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  can	  and	  do	  explain	  agential	  behavior	  via	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  must	  mean	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  must	  involve	  
more	  than	  citing	  agential	  reasons.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  we	  must	  state	  the	  agential	  
reason	  in	  the	  proper	  context.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Sandis	  that	  unless	  it	  is	  implied	  that	  S	  took	  
that	  p	  to	  be	  the	  case	  and	  acted	  for	  p	  the	  agent’s	  behavior	  will	  not	  be	  properly	  
explained.	  	  Moreover,	  I	  agree	  with	  Sandis	  that	  when	  we	  provide	  content	  for	  
explanations	  of	  the	  forms	  A-­‐C	  we	  conventionally	  imply	  an	  explanans	  consisting	  at	  
least	  of	  the	  agent	  taking	  that	  p	  to	  be	  the	  case	  and	  then	  acting	  for	  p.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  these	  implicatures	  are	  essential	  parts	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  even	  though	  
they	  are	  not	  proper	  parts	  of	  the	  agential	  reasons	  themselves.	  	  Thus	  the	  general	  
picture	  here	  is	  of	  explanantia	  consisting	  of	  agential	  reasons,	  which	  imply	  that	  they	  
are	  appropriately	  related	  to	  agents’	  psychologies,	  and	  was	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  
they	  acted.	  
The	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  here	  is	  only	  superficially	  the	  same	  as	  
typical	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  only	  have	  the	  same	  
surface	  grammar.	  	  When	  we	  provide	  reason-­‐explanations	  we	  offer	  an	  agential	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reason.	  	  However,	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  the	  theory	  stands	  in	  stark	  constrast	  to	  typical	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories.	  	  	  	  
	   Reason-­‐explanations	  do	  not	  typically	  have	  the	  semantic	  structure	  that	  their	  
surface	  grammar	  suggests.	  	  The	  underlying	  structure	  is	  more	  complex	  because	  what	  
such	  explanations	  call	  for	  more	  than	  agential	  reasons,	  which	  in	  turn	  requires	  
explanantia	  citing	  more	  than	  just	  agential	  reasons.	  	  Anti-­‐psychologists	  have	  typically	  
failed	  to	  keep	  this	  in	  mind,	  which	  has	  led	  them	  to	  fail	  to	  see	  that	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
difficult	  problems	  for	  the	  view	  can	  be	  handled.	  	  We	  provide	  agential	  reasons	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  wanting	  to	  explain	  behavior,	  which	  we	  have	  seen	  implies	  more	  than	  
providing	  citations	  of	  reasons.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  call	  the	  correct	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  the	  Contextualization	  Theory	  of	  Reason-­Explanation	  (or	  
the	  Contextualization	  Theory	  for	  short)	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  I	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  it	  
distinct	  from	  theories	  that	  assume	  a	  reason-­‐citation	  theory	  of	  such	  explanations.	  	  
Also,	  I	  call	  it	  this	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  reasons	  require	  context	  in	  order	  
to	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  action.142	  
	  
4.3.2	  Contextualization	  Theory	  &	  Error	  Cases	  	  
Suppose	  we	  were	  to	  make	  explicit	  the	  ‘deep’	  structure	  of	  the	  explanans	  of	  A.	  	  
Typically,	  it	  would	  read	  something	  like	  the	  following:	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  I	  say	  more	  about	  this	  role	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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D. S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­ing	  is	  that	  S	  believed	  that	  p.143	  
	  
In	  what	  immediately	  follows	  I	  would	  like	  to	  spend	  some	  time	  responding	  to	  how	  the	  
deep	  structure	  expressed	  by	  D	  can	  help	  deal	  with	  error	  cases,	  and	  then	  provide	  
some	  related	  support	  for	  contextualization	  theory.	  
If	  someone	  uttered	  D	  in	  the	  context	  of	  providing	  a	  reason-­‐explanation,	  this	  
would	  often	  sound	  redundant.144	  This	  is	  because	  the	  explanandum	  in	  D	  calls	  for	  the	  
agent’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  which	  is	  an	  agential	  reason,	  so	  it	  is	  implied	  that	  the	  reason	  
offered	  was	  the	  one	  she	  believed	  and	  acted	  for.	  	  So	  suppose	  one	  were	  to	  provide	  the	  
following	  reason-­‐explanation	  for	  Terrie’s	  watering	  of	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn:	  	  “Terrie’s	  
reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  she	  believed	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  
not	  watered	  it”.	  	  In	  contexts	  where	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Terrie’s	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  
his	  lawn,	  this	  explanation	  would	  sound	  redundant	  because	  we	  usually	  only	  need	  to	  
be	  explicit	  about	  believing	  our	  reason	  when	  we	  believe	  falsely.	  	  In	  contexts,	  for	  
example,	  where	  Terrie	  is	  wrong	  about	  her	  neighbor’s	  watering	  the	  lawn,	  it	  seems	  
appropriate	  for	  us	  to	  offer	  the	  explanation	  including	  Terrie’s	  believing	  that	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  This	  is	  only	  one	  example,	  but	  it	  would	  hold	  in	  the	  other	  examples	  one	  the	  
necessary	  changes	  were	  made.	  	  The	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  will	  
typically	  imply	  the	  agent’s	  believing	  that	  p.	  	  The	  reason	  they	  do	  not	  always	  have	  the	  
latter	  form	  is	  that	  there	  are	  counterexamples	  involving	  cases	  where	  agents	  Φ	  for	  a	  
reason	  that	  they	  only	  believe	  that	  they	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  April	  might	  go	  to	  church	  for	  
the	  reason	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  she	  believes	  in	  God.	  	  However,	  April	  has	  lost	  the	  
first-­‐order	  belief	  in	  God	  months	  ago.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  explanantia	  can	  have	  the	  
form	  ‘S	  has	  the	  psychological	  relation	  P	  to	  that	  p’.	  
144	  I	  am	  assuming	  that	  this	  would	  sound	  especially	  redundant	  to	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologists	  ears,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  psychologist’s	  ears.	  	  [Note:	  	  even	  psychologists	  
can	  claim	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  often	  expressed	  using	  the	  form	  found	  in	  D.	  	  
They	  claim	  that	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  psychologies	  is	  
explained	  by	  their	  identity.]	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neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn.	  	  That	  is,	  someone	  might	  correct	  us	  when	  we	  
claim	  that	  Terrie	  watered	  the	  lawn	  because	  the	  neighbor	  had	  not.	  	  In	  these	  kinds	  of	  
cases	  involving	  correction,	  we	  might	  respond	  by	  claiming	  that	  Terrie	  believed	  that	  
her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  the	  lawn	  in	  order	  to	  show	  (or	  remind)	  our	  audience	  
that	  Terrie	  believed	  her	  reason	  for	  watering	  the	  lawn.	  	  In	  these	  cases	  we	  are	  
showing	  our	  audience	  what	  already	  lies	  implicit	  in	  our	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  We	  are	  
not	  providing	  or	  citing	  another	  reason—a	  psychologistic	  reason,	  say—in	  order	  to	  
correct	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  Terrie	  acted.	  	  Rather,	  we	  are	  naturally	  seeking	  to	  
explain	  Terrie’s	  action	  via	  speaking	  truths.	  	  We	  are	  not	  saying	  that	  we	  thought	  
Terrie	  acted	  for	  one	  reason,	  but	  then	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  she	  had	  acted	  for	  another	  
one	  altogether.	  	  We	  are	  simply	  uncovering	  the	  implicit	  presuppositions	  of	  what	  we	  
had	  said	  when	  offering	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  in	  order	  to	  
speak	  truly	  when	  explaining	  her	  action.	  	  Indeed,	  these	  considerations	  support	  the	  
claim	  that	  explanatory	  contexts,	  even	  in	  our	  ordinary	  efforts	  to	  explain,	  are	  
factive.145	  	  	  	  
Psychologistic	  philosophers	  have	  taken	  error	  cases	  involving	  correction	  to	  
support	  their	  theories	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  The	  account	  here	  is	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  
this.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  I	  take	  the	  long	  route	  home	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  
shorter	  route	  is	  backed	  up	  with	  heavy	  traffic,	  so	  I	  take	  the	  back	  roads	  home.	  	  
Suppose	  further	  that	  later	  my	  roommate	  asks	  me	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  I	  drove	  the	  
back	  roads	  home.	  	  I	  reply	  by	  saying	  “The	  690	  was	  backed	  up	  with	  heavy	  traffic,	  so	  I	  
took	  the	  back	  roads	  home.”	  	  At	  this	  point,	  we	  could	  imagine	  my	  roommate	  telling	  me	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  I	  say	  more	  about	  the	  factivity	  of	  explanation,	  and	  in	  particular	  about	  its	  
relationship	  to	  speaking	  truly	  just	  below.	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that	  he	  was	  on	  the	  690	  at	  the	  same	  time	  I	  was	  on	  the	  back	  roads,	  and	  traffic	  was	  not	  
backed	  up.	  	  We	  could	  imagine	  further	  my	  response,	  “Well,	  I	  thought	  the	  690	  was	  
backed	  up.”	  	  	  
In	  this	  case	  have	  I	  changed	  my	  reason	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  690	  was	  
backed	  up	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  I	  thought	  the	  690	  was	  backed	  up?	  	  Not	  according	  to	  the	  
theory	  developed	  here.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  I	  have	  done	  is	  contextualize	  my	  reason	  for	  
driving	  the	  back	  roads	  home.	  	  I	  have	  made	  explicit	  that	  I	  believed	  my	  reason,	  and	  
this	  goes	  toward	  explaining	  taking	  the	  route	  I	  did.	  	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  another	  
roommate	  asks	  me	  a	  bit	  later	  my	  reason	  for	  taking	  that	  route.	  	  I	  would	  probably	  
reply	  by	  saying	  “I	  thought	  the	  690	  was	  backed	  up	  with	  heavy	  traffic”	  because	  I	  know	  
now	  that	  the	  690	  was	  not	  backed	  up	  with	  heavy	  traffic.	  	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  my	  
reason	  for	  being	  late	  has	  changed?	  	  Again,	  not	  according	  to	  this	  theory.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  
I	  know	  that	  my	  reason	  is	  false,	  so	  it	  must	  also	  be	  contextualized	  within	  the	  context	  
of	  my	  believing	  it.	  	  	  
Indeed,	  I	  think	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  contextualization	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  
that	  we	  are	  truth-­‐speakers.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  typically	  follow	  the	  Gricean	  conversational	  
norm	  of	  speaking	  only	  what	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  true.146	  Accordingly,	  we	  seek	  to	  explain	  
our	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  truth.	  	  And	  since	  my	  reason	  is	  false,	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  need	  
to	  make	  explicit	  what	  is	  usually	  implicit	  in	  providing	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Since	  it	  is	  
implicitly	  true	  that	  I	  believe	  my	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  I	  state	  that	  I	  believe	  my	  reason	  in	  
order	  to	  speak	  truly	  according	  to	  the	  Gricean	  conversational	  truth-­‐maxim.	  	  It	  is	  
worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  this	  truth	  norm	  governing	  our	  conversational	  expressions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Grice	  (1975:	  46)	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might	  be	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  norms	  governing	  the	  factivity	  of	  explanation,	  
including	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  We	  provide	  explanations	  quite	  regularly	  in	  
conversations,	  so	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  we	  are	  also	  to	  speak	  truly	  when	  providing	  
explanations.	  	  	  
Let’s	  reconsider	  the	  case	  where	  my	  second	  roommate	  asks	  me	  my	  reason	  for	  
taking	  the	  back	  roads	  home	  after	  I	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  I	  was	  wrong	  about	  traffic	  
being	  backed	  up	  on	  the	  690.	  	  When	  I	  tell	  my	  roommate	  that	  I	  thought	  the	  690	  was	  
backed	  up	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  quite	  natural	  for	  him	  to	  infer	  immediately	  that	  I	  had	  been	  
wrong	  about	  the	  690	  being	  backed	  up.	  	  (Assume,	  if	  necessary,	  that	  I	  answer	  him	  
matter-­‐of-­‐factly	  so	  as	  not	  to	  give	  away	  the	  falsehood	  by	  my	  tone	  or	  other	  such	  
manner	  of	  expressing	  myself.)	  	  What	  best	  explains	  this	  data	  is	  that	  my	  roommate	  
inferred	  that	  I	  discovered	  my	  agential	  reason	  (the	  one	  I	  acted	  for)	  to	  be	  false,	  and	  so	  
in	  order	  to	  explain	  my	  behavior	  truly	  I	  needed	  to	  say	  that	  I	  believed	  that	  the	  690	  
was	  backed	  up.	  	  My	  roommate	  does	  not	  think	  that	  my	  reason	  changed.	  	  Nor	  does	  he	  
think	  that	  my	  reason	  was	  literally	  my	  thinking	  that	  the	  690	  is	  backed	  up.	  	  Rather,	  he	  
thinks	  that	  I	  acted	  for	  a	  false	  reason,	  which	  I	  came	  to	  realize	  was	  false,	  which	  is	  why	  
I	  had	  to	  make	  explicit	  my	  believing	  my	  reason.	  	  He	  sees	  that	  if	  the	  explanation	  I	  
offered	  is	  explicitly	  to	  avoid	  falsehood	  that	  I	  need	  to	  include	  what	  was	  implied	  by	  
acting	  for	  the	  false	  reason	  that	  I	  did.	  
Two	  final	  and	  related	  considerations	  provide	  support	  for	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  defended	  here.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  often	  
provide	  reason-­‐explanations	  without	  any	  explicit	  appeal	  whatsoever	  to	  agential	  
psychologies.	  	  When	  we	  ask	  for	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  we	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say	  things	  like	  “she	  did	  it	  because	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not”,	  or	  “her	  neighbor	  asked	  her	  
to”,	  or	  that	  “she	  promised	  him	  that	  she	  would	  do	  so”.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  someone	  asks	  
Della’s	  reasons	  for	  covering	  the	  tomato	  plants,	  we	  say	  things	  like	  “they	  will	  not	  
survive	  the	  cold	  weather”	  or	  more	  simply,	  “it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  cold	  tonight”.	  	  It	  is	  
really	  only	  in	  error	  cases	  that	  we	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  psychological	  feature	  to	  
the	  explanation.	  	  These	  facts	  find	  some	  support	  for	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason	  
explanations	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  typically	  perfectly	  fine	  not	  to	  mention	  psychological	  
features	  when	  providing	  reason-­‐explanations.	  
Psychologists	  will	  need	  to	  claim	  that	  even	  though	  we	  typically	  provide	  
reason-­‐explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  content,	  this	  overlooks	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  content	  cited	  was	  believed	  by	  (or	  otherwise	  psychologically	  related	  to)	  the	  
agent.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  psychologist	  will	  need	  to	  say	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  of	  the	  
forms	  A-­‐C	  have	  a	  deeper	  structure	  than	  what	  the	  surface	  grammar	  suggests.	  	  That	  is,	  
in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  linguistic	  data,	  psychologists	  have	  to	  say,	  for	  example,	  
that	  S’s	  believing	  that	  p	  that	  serves	  as	  S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Psychologists	  might	  also	  
claim	  that	  error	  cases	  help	  reveal	  this	  deeper	  semantic	  structure.	  
It	  is	  significant	  that	  anti-­‐psychologists	  can	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  a	  deeper	  
semantic	  structure	  to	  reason-­‐explanations	  as	  they	  are	  typically	  provided.	  	  We	  can	  
also	  agree	  with	  psychologists	  that	  error	  cases	  do	  in	  fact	  help	  reveal	  the	  deeper	  
semantic	  structure	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  However,	  psychologistic	  theories	  go	  
wrong	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  deeper	  structure	  consists	  of	  an	  essential	  constituent	  of	  
agential	  reasons	  themselves.	  	  Instead,	  on	  the	  account	  here,	  the	  deeper	  structure	  
consists	  of	  an	  essential	  constituent	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  essential	  to	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acting	  for	  reasons	  that	  agents,	  for	  example,	  believe	  their	  reason,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  
follow	  from	  this	  that	  the	  essential	  connection	  is	  one	  of	  essential	  constituency	  with	  
the	  agential	  reason.147	  	  So	  the	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  
developed	  here	  is	  not	  the	  only	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  that	  recognizes	  a	  
deeper	  semantic	  structure.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  both	  accounts	  recognize	  
the	  same	  implicit	  structure.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  psychologist	  and	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  concerns	  whether	  the	  implicit	  structure	  is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  agent’s	  
reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Nevertheless,	  that	  psychologistic	  philosophers	  have	  been	  forced	  
to	  countenance	  the	  deep	  semantic	  structure	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  seems	  to	  be	  
independent	  evidence	  for	  the	  theory	  here	  that	  argues	  for	  such	  structure.148	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.3.3	  Theoretical	  Advantages	  of	  Contextualization	  Theory	  
	   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  show	  how	  it	  is	  that	  the	  contextualization	  theory	  
is	  able	  to	  preserve	  each	  of	  the	  virtues	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  stated	  above.	  	  These	  
virtues	  are	  accounting	  for	  the	  following:	  	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation,	  the	  fact	  
that	  reason-­‐explanations	  feature	  agential	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases,	  and	  that	  reasons	  
have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  (To	  be	  clear:	  	  showing	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  See	  Section	  4.2	  below	  where	  I	  provide	  an	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  account	  of	  the	  
necessary	  connection	  between	  agential	  reasons	  and	  agential	  psychologies.	  	  The	  
answer	  is	  anticipated	  here:	  	  agential	  psychologies	  are	  essential	  to	  acting	  for	  reasons;	  
indeed,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  
148	  In	  conversation	  and	  e-­‐mail	  correspondence,	  psychologistically	  minded	  
philosopher	  John	  Monteleone	  conceded	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  seem	  often	  to	  have	  
anti-­‐psychologistic	  forms,	  but	  that	  the	  form	  is	  actually	  psychologistic	  when	  the	  
deeper	  structure	  is	  made	  explicit.	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virtues	  hold	  will	  allow	  us	  in	  turn	  to	  solve	  the	  paradox	  and	  the	  reason-­‐sensitive	  
rationalization	  problems.)	  	  	  
The	  contextualization	  theory	  preserves	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  
because	  the	  explanans	  conventionally	  imply	  the	  agent’s	  taking	  that	  p	  to	  be	  true	  as	  
what	  explains	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.149	  	  Thus	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  p	  (the	  agent’s	  reason)	  is	  false,	  
it	  will	  be	  true	  that	  S	  believed	  that	  p,	  and	  we	  all	  agree	  that	  a	  reason	  must	  be	  properly	  
related	  to	  an	  agent’s	  psychology	  for	  it	  to	  be	  that	  for	  which	  he	  Φ’s.	  	  Thus	  the	  agent’s	  
belief	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  central	  to	  rationalizing	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  When	  we	  rationalize	  
Terrie’s	  behavior	  by	  claiming	  that	  she	  took	  her	  neighbor	  to	  have	  watered	  the	  lawn,	  
this	  explanation	  will	  still	  hold	  if	  we	  find	  out	  that	  she	  was	  wrong.	  	  That	  is,	  supposing	  
Terrie’s	  belief	  is	  false,	  ‘Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  he	  
had	  not	  watered	  it’	  has	  a	  true	  explanans	  even	  though	  her	  reason	  is	  false	  because	  it	  is	  
implied	  that	  Terrie	  believed	  her	  reason	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  
A	  more	  difficult	  matter	  is	  whether	  the	  contextualization	  theory	  can	  account	  
for	  the	  explanatory	  role	  of	  reasons	  in	  reason-­‐explanations	  and	  thus	  solve	  the	  
general	  reason-­‐sensitive	  rationalization	  problem.	  	  I	  think	  it	  can.	  	  Sandis	  claims	  that	  
reasons	  do	  not	  explain	  actions	  even	  though	  they	  rightly	  feature	  in	  reason-­‐
explanations.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Sandis	  that	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  as	  they	  are	  provided	  in	  
standard	  reason-­‐explanations	  do	  not	  explain	  actions.	  	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  
from	  this	  that	  agential	  reasons	  do	  not	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  There	  will	  be	  exceptions	  to	  this	  form—see	  fn.	  21	  above.	  	  The	  key	  thing	  is	  that	  the	  
psychological	  relation	  (whatever	  it	  is)	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  explanation.	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explanations.150	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  understand	  agential	  reasons	  as	  having	  more	  than	  
just	  a	  featuring	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  More	  specifically,	  I	  suggest	  that	  agential	  
reasons	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role,	  albeit	  an	  implicit	  one,	  in	  reason-­‐explanations.	  
	   When	  we	  cite	  Terrie’s	  belief	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn,	  we	  
have	  provided	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  for	  her	  action	  of	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  view	  developed	  here	  so	  far	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason	  
is	  an	  agential	  reason	  that	  explains	  her	  action.	  	  This	  means,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  it	  is	  
typically	  Terrie’s	  belief	  about	  the	  reason	  that	  does	  the	  explaining.	  	  Indeed,	  Terrie’s	  
belief	  seems	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  explaining	  her	  watering	  the	  lawn.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
Terrie’s	  reason	  does	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  the	  reason-­‐explanation.	  Terrie	  
watered	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn,	  i.e.,	  ‘he	  had	  not	  watered	  it’,	  is	  the	  content	  of	  Terrie’s	  
belief,	  so	  in	  citing	  Terrie’s	  belief	  we	  are	  citing	  that	  content,	  which	  certainly	  has	  a	  
role	  in	  explaining	  Terrie’s	  action.	  	  So	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  reason	  does	  not	  add	  anything	  
to	  the	  explanation	  that	  is	  not	  already	  provided	  by	  the	  belief	  of	  which	  it	  is	  the	  
content—the	  belief	  is	  the	  particular	  belief	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  content.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  reason	  contributes	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  action	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  
in	  turn	  explains	  the	  action.	  	  Again,	  the	  reason	  does	  not	  contribute	  anything	  that	  the	  
belief	  already	  had	  not,	  but	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  belief	  it	  thereby	  contributes	  to	  the	  
explanation.	  	  More	  concretely,	  Terrie’s	  believing	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  
his	  lawn	  contributes	  content	  to	  Terrie’s	  belief.	  	  The	  explanation	  of	  Terrie’s	  behavior	  
is	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn.	  	  Beliefs	  have	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  Sandis	  thinks	  that	  reasons	  cannot	  have	  an	  
explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  He	  just	  does	  not	  say	  much	  about	  what	  
their	  explanatory	  role	  is,	  if	  indeed	  they	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  on	  his	  account.	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particular	  contents	  essentially,	  so	  by	  citing	  Terrie’s	  belief,	  we	  also	  feature	  its	  
content.	  	  So	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  has	  an	  explanatory	  
role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations,	  only	  her	  reason	  adds	  nothing	  to	  what	  her	  belief	  already	  
does.	  	  	  
	   We	  can	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  have	  an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  reason-­‐
explanations	  by	  considering	  the	  claim	  that	  beliefs	  have	  the	  explanatory	  role	  they	  do,	  
at	  least	  in	  part,	  because	  of	  the	  contents	  they	  have.	  	  We	  can	  make	  this	  clear	  by	  
considering	  Terrie’s	  belief.	  	  She	  believes	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn,	  
and	  this	  belief	  explains	  her	  watering	  his	  lawn.	  	  However,	  if	  Terrie	  had	  believed	  
otherwise,	  namely,	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  already	  watered	  his	  lawn,	  then	  her	  belief	  
would	  not	  explain	  her	  action	  at	  all.	  	  What	  changed	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  is	  what	  she	  
believed.	  	  The	  content	  of	  Terrie’s	  belief	  is	  essential	  to	  explaining	  her	  action.	  	  Only	  
the	  belief	  with	  the	  content	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  the	  lawn	  can	  explain	  
her	  watering	  it.	  	  	  
Now	  consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  instead	  of	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn,	  Terrie	  
mows	  it.	  	  In	  this	  case	  were	  we	  to	  cite	  her	  belief	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  
his	  lawn,	  we	  would	  be	  dumbfounded	  because	  the	  content	  of	  her	  belief	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  lead	  to	  her	  action,	  i.e.,	  to	  her	  mowing	  the	  neighbor’s	  lawn.	  	  Instead,	  if	  Terrie	  
were	  to	  tell	  us	  that	  she	  was	  mowing	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  becauseR	  he	  had	  not	  
mowed	  it,	  we	  would	  think	  that	  her	  belief	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  mowed	  it	  
explains	  her	  action.	  	  So	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  agential	  beliefs	  have	  an	  
explanatory	  role	  precisely	  because	  beliefs	  themselves	  partly	  have	  their	  explanatory	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power	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  contents.	  	  Beliefs	  with	  different	  contents	  would	  lead	  to	  
different	  actions,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  different	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  	  
	   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  that	  agents	  can	  act	  for	  reasons	  
in	  error	  cases	  and	  to	  solve	  the	  paradox	  problem.	  	  According	  to	  Alvarez,	  agents	  do	  
not	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases	  because	  false	  propositions	  cannot	  explain	  action.	  	  
She	  was	  led	  to	  this	  conclusion,	  it	  appears,	  because	  she	  holds	  two	  common	  
assumptions,	  namely,	  reasons	  explain	  actions,	  and	  false	  propositions	  cannot	  
explain.151	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  former	  claim	  is	  false.	  	  Reasons	  have	  an	  explanatory	  
role	  in	  reason-­‐explanations,	  but	  by	  themselves	  they	  do	  not	  explain.	  	  Moreover,	  since	  
reasons	  do	  not	  explain,	  reasons	  as	  false	  propositions	  do	  not	  explain	  in	  the	  relevant	  
sense	  either.	  	  Thus,	  rationalizations	  consisting	  of	  beliefs	  with	  false	  propositional	  
contents	  do	  not	  require	  that	  the	  contents	  explain	  because	  the	  belief	  does	  the	  
explaining.	  	  And	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  that	  false	  agential	  reasons	  are	  still	  the	  
reasons	  the	  agents	  acted	  for	  when	  they	  acted.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  agential	  
reasons	  not	  explaining	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  the	  
false	  proposition	  that	  he	  had	  not	  watered	  it.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  seems	  to	  capture	  what	  
happens	  in	  ordinary	  cases	  involving	  error.	  	  We	  are	  sensitive	  and	  responsive	  to	  
reasons	  for	  acting	  as	  we	  do,	  but	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  our	  reasons	  are	  false.	  
	   We	  see	  that	  contextualization	  theory	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  
ontology	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  developed	  here.	  	  Propositionalism	  has	  it	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  can	  be	  false	  propositions,	  like	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  the	  
neighbor’s	  lawn	  when	  she	  was	  wrong	  about	  his	  watering	  it.	  	  Once	  it	  was	  rejected	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  since	  Alvarez	  thinks	  that	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  
explain	  action	  that	  she	  rejects	  the	  deeper	  semantic	  structure	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	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that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations,	  we	  were	  in	  a	  
position	  to	  countenance	  the	  intuitive	  truth	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  error	  cases.	  	  
This	  is	  because	  we	  were	  able	  to	  preserve	  the	  factivity	  of	  reason-­‐explanation	  even	  if	  
agents	  act	  for	  false	  propositions.	  	  	  
Contextualization	  theory	  can	  solve	  the	  paradox	  problem	  too.	  	  Proper	  reason-­‐
explanations	  will	  typically	  have	  a	  form,	  when	  made	  explicit,	  like	  D	  provided	  above.	  	  
This	  form	  and	  others	  like	  it	  avoid	  the	  paradox	  problem	  because	  the	  explanantia	  
typically	  consist	  of	  S’s	  believing	  that	  p.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  paradox	  problem	  
results	  when	  we	  conjoin	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  false	  reason	  provided	  in	  a	  reason-­‐
citation:	  	  Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  
not	  watered	  it,	  but	  he	  had	  watered	  it.	  	  The	  result	  here	  is	  a	  contradiction.	  	  However,	  
since	  reasons	  do	  not	  explain,	  i.e.,	  are	  not	  explanantia	  in	  reason-­‐explanations,	  they	  
should	  not	  be	  cited	  as	  explanantia	  of	  Terrie’s	  behavior.	  	  Instead,	  our	  
contextualization	  theory	  reason-­‐explanation,	  when	  made	  fully	  explicit,	  will	  be:	  	  
Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  watering	  her	  neighbor’s	  lawn	  is	  that	  she	  believed	  that	  her	  
neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  it,	  but	  he	  had	  watered	  it.	  	  This	  is	  not	  contradictory	  
because	  Terrie’s	  belief	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn	  is	  not	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  neighbor	  having	  watered	  it.	  
One	  might	  object	  that	  I	  have	  offered	  an	  account	  of	  psychological-­‐explanation	  
in	  place	  of	  an	  account	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.152	  That	  is,	  it	  might	  be	  agreed	  that	  the	  
contextualization	  theory	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  rational	  explanation;	  however,	  the	  objection	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  Alvarez	  (2001:	  168)	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  reason-­‐explanations	  and	  
psychological-­‐explanations.	  	  She	  claims	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  explain	  actions	  by	  
citing	  reasons	  only,	  and	  that	  psychological-­‐explanations	  explain	  actions	  by	  citing	  
agential	  psychological	  states,	  which	  need	  not	  make	  reference	  to	  agential	  reasons.	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goes,	  it	  is	  just	  a	  kind	  of	  psychological	  explanation	  insofar	  as	  it	  explains	  via	  beliefs.	  	  
This	  would	  be	  bad	  because	  without	  an	  account	  of	  the	  latter	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  would	  remain	  without	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanations.	  
	   The	  counter-­‐objection	  here	  is	  that	  contextualization	  theory	  may	  well	  be	  a	  
kind	  of	  psychological	  explanation	  insofar	  as	  they	  essentially	  involve	  reference	  to	  
psychologies.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  theory	  is	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  because	  agents’	  
reasons	  are	  not	  the	  psychological	  entities	  even	  though	  the	  latter	  do	  the	  explaining.	  	  	  	  
This	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  agential	  reasons	  need	  to	  be	  properly	  related	  
to	  their	  psychologies,	  and	  that	  without	  this	  relation	  we	  cannot	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  that	  
a	  reason	  had	  a	  motivating	  role	  in	  agents’	  actions.	  
	   Finally,	  I	  think	  we	  can	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  in	  response	  to	  those	  who	  think	  that	  
contextualization	  theory	  is	  counterintuitive.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  when	  we	  say	  things	  like	  
“Terrie’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  R”,	  we	  can	  be	  doing	  one	  of	  at	  least	  two	  things.	  	  We	  could	  
literally	  be	  providing	  only	  Terrie’s	  (motivating)	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  in	  which	  case	  we	  
would	  be	  offering	  a	  reason-­‐citation.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  for	  our	  reason-­‐statement	  to	  
explain,	  we	  need	  at	  least	  to	  assume	  that	  Terrie’s	  reason	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  Terrie	  
believed	  and	  that	  she	  acted	  on.	  	  Conextualization	  theory	  merely	  makes	  these	  
implications	  explicit.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  need	  to	  change	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  we	  speak.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  when	  we	  theorize,	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  these	  implications	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4.4	  Anti-­Psychologism	  &	  The	  Psychology	  Problem	  
	   Recall	  the	  psychology	  problem	  from	  Chapter	  2.	  	  It	  was	  claimed	  that	  anti-­‐
psychologism	  must	  explain	  B:	  
	  
B:	  	  If	  R	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  agent	  S	  Φ-­s,	  then	  necessarily	  R	  is	  related	  to	  S’s	  
psychology.	  
	  
We	  examined	  two	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  efforts	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  B,	  both	  of	  
which	  seemed	  unsatisfactory.	  	  Alvarez	  claimed	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  B	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  
truth	  of	  psychologism,	  which	  it	  correct,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  provide	  an	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  explanation	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  B.153	  Dancy	  claims	  that	  the	  explanation	  for	  
R’s	  necessary	  relation	  to	  A’s	  psychology	  is	  that	  S’s	  psychology	  is	  an	  enabling	  
condition	  for	  R	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  S	  Φ’s.154	  This	  allows	  Dancy	  to	  claim	  that	  
psychological	  features	  of	  agents	  enable	  them	  to	  act	  for	  reasons	  without	  the	  
psychological	  features	  thereby	  being	  proper	  parts	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  (as	  he	  
construes	  reason-­‐explanations).	  	  We	  recall	  that	  Dancy	  writes:	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  consideration	  that	  is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  an	  explanation,	  and	  a	  
consideration	  that	  is	  required	  for	  an	  explanation	  to	  go	  through,	  but	  which	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  part	  
of	  that	  explanation.	  	  I	  call	  the	  latter	  ‘enabling	  conditions’.	  	  For	  instance,	  that	  England	  is	  not	  
sinking	  beneath	  the	  waves	  today	  is	  a	  consideration	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  which	  what	  explains	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Alvarez	  (2010:	  175)	  	  
154	  Dancy	  (2005)	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my	  actions	  would	  be	  incapable	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  But	  that	  does	  nothing	  to	  show	  that	  England’s	  
not	  submerging	  today	  is	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  I	  do	  what	  I	  do.155	  
	  
Dancy’s	  claim	  here	  is	  aimed	  toward	  an	  account	  of	  B.	  	  Dancy	  considers	  an	  agent	  
(himself)	  acting,	  and	  he	  claims	  that	  the	  following	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  enabling	  
condition	  for	  his	  Φ-­‐ing:	  	  the	  fact	  that	  England	  is	  not	  submerged	  beneath	  the	  waves	  
of	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean.	  	  We	  can	  agree	  that	  this	  fact	  in	  some	  sense	  enables	  Dancy	  to	  Φ.	  	  
However,	  Dancy	  does	  not	  think	  that	  this	  fact	  about	  England	  and	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  
has	  a	  proper	  role	  in	  a	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  fact	  here	  would	  not	  be	  a	  
proper	  part	  of	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  of	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Dancy’s	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanation	  assumes	  that	  reasons	  explain,	  so	  the	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  
are	  only	  agential	  reasons.	  	  He	  also	  accepts	  both	  reason-­‐only	  theses	  outlined	  above,	  
so	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  additional	  enabling	  facts	  are	  not	  proper	  parts	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  
reason-­‐explanations.	  
	   Wayne	  Davis	  has	  offered	  the	  following	  challenge	  to	  Dancy’s	  view	  of	  enabling	  
conditions:	  
	  
Dancy’s	  answer	  [to	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  psychologies	  and	  reasons]	  is	  that	  the	  
belief	  is	  an	  enabling	  condition.	  	  Believing	  that	  p	  enables	  one	  to	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p.	  	  
This	  is	  true,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  just	  a	  restatement	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  explain,	  namely,	  
that	  we	  cannot	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p	  unless	  we	  believe	  that	  p.156	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Dancy	  (2000:	  127)	  
156	  Davis	  (2005:	  77)	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Davis	  claims	  that	  Dancy	  has	  not	  really	  explained	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  
his	  psychology	  (his	  believing	  that	  p)	  and	  his	  acting	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p.	  	  The	  reason	  
for	  this	  is	  that	  Dancy	  has	  merely	  tried	  to	  explain	  the	  necessary	  connection	  in	  terms	  
of	  enabling	  conditions,	  which,	  according	  to	  Davis,	  just	  are	  necessary	  conditions.	  	  If	  
this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  Dancy	  has	  offered	  an	  explanation	  of	  B	  by	  merely	  
restating	  (or	  rephrasing)	  what	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  	  	  
It	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  Dancy’s	  case	  of	  enabling	  conditions	  in	  the	  
passage	  just	  above	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  what	  he	  means	  by	  ‘enabling	  conditions’.	  	  
Dancy	  claims	  that	  the	  following	  fact	  is	  an	  enabling	  condition	  for	  his	  Φ-­‐ing:	  	  that	  
England	  has	  not	  been	  engulfed	  by	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  were	  
England	  engulfed	  by	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean,	  many	  actions	  would	  be	  (physically)	  
impossible	  for	  Dancy	  to	  perform,	  so	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  fact	  Dancy	  cites	  here	  is	  
necessary	  for	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Thus	  on	  this	  score	  Davis’	  criticism	  seems	  sound.	  	  However,	  
Dancy’s	  concept	  of	  enabling	  conditions	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  akin	  to	  the	  
concept	  of	  background	  conditions,	  which	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  but	  which	  are	  
usually	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  context	  of	  explanation	  because	  of	  their	  generality.	  	  In	  
thinking	  about	  Dancy’s	  case	  more,	  the	  fact	  that	  England	  is	  not	  submerged	  is	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  Dancy’s	  Φ-­‐ing,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  just	  
about	  everyone’s	  Φ-­‐ing	  as	  they	  do	  in	  normal	  circumstances.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  many	  events	  that	  are	  not	  closely	  related	  to	  actions.	  	  
Therefore,	  when	  we	  rationalize	  Dancy’s	  Φ-­‐ing,	  we	  need	  not	  cite	  the	  fact	  that	  England	  
is	  not	  submerged.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  relevant	  to	  his	  Φ-­‐ing,	  because,	  as	  
a	  background	  condition,	  it	  makes	  possible	  so	  many	  other	  events	  (besides	  actions)	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that	  citing	  it	  would	  not	  add	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  his	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Suppose	  we	  were	  to	  
explain	  Dancy’s	  going	  for	  a	  walk	  by	  citing	  his	  reason,	  say,	  that	  it	  was	  nice	  out.	  	  Then	  
if	  we	  added	  to	  our	  explanation	  that	  England	  was	  not	  engulfed	  with	  water	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  his	  walking,	  we	  would	  think	  that	  the	  latter	  fact	  is	  quite	  irrelevant	  to	  explaining	  his	  
going	  for	  walk	  even	  though	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  his	  going	  for	  a	  walk.	  
Dancy’s	  appeal	  to	  enabling	  conditions	  seems	  able	  to	  avoid	  Davis’	  objection	  
that	  it	  is	  redundant.157	  That	  is,	  we	  can	  interpret	  Dancy	  as	  explaining	  the	  necessary	  
connection	  between	  agential	  reasons	  and	  psychologies	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  
agential	  psychologies	  are	  necessarily	  related	  to	  agential	  reasons	  because	  the	  former	  
enable	  agential	  reasons	  to	  be	  agential	  reasons,	  where	  an	  enabling	  condition	  just	  is	  a	  
kind	  of	  background	  condition.	  	  This	  means	  that	  citing	  an	  enabling	  condition	  should	  
not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  generic	  sense	  of	  ‘necessary	  condition’	  that	  Davis	  seems	  to	  
have	  in	  mind.	  	  That	  is,	  Dancy’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  necessary	  connection	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  an	  effort	  to	  state	  what	  kind	  of	  necessary	  condition	  holds	  between	  agents’	  reasons	  
and	  psychologies.158	  
Of	  course,	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  necessary	  connections.	  	  Some	  things	  
are	  necessarily	  connected	  because	  of	  their	  logical	  relations	  to	  each	  other.	  	  For	  
example,	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  necessarily	  related	  to	  Samuel	  Clemens	  because	  Mark	  Twain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  The	  line	  of	  thought	  developed	  should	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  Dancy.	  	  However,	  it	  
seems	  Dancy	  could	  endorse	  this	  strategy	  of	  defending,	  in	  part,	  his	  theory	  of	  enabling	  
conditions.	  	  
158	  Prima	  facie,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  at	  least	  two	  meanings	  of	  what	  is	  being	  asked	  for	  
in	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  psychologies.	  	  
The	  first	  requests	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  there	  is	  a	  necessary	  connection,	  and	  the	  
second	  requests	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  necessity	  that	  connects	  reasons	  and	  
psychologies.	  	  It	  seems	  Dancy’s	  answer	  can	  be	  used	  to	  answer	  both	  kinds	  of	  request.	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and	  Samuel	  Clemens	  are	  the	  same	  person.	  	  The	  necessary	  connection	  here	  is	  logical	  
identity.	  	  There	  is	  also	  conceptual	  necessity.	  	  The	  concepts	  ‘bachelor’	  and	  ‘unmarried	  
man’	  are	  conceptually	  related	  because	  they	  just	  mean	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  Moreover,	  
there	  is	  physical	  necessity.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  claim	  that	  electrons	  are	  negatively	  
charged	  is	  a	  physically	  necessary	  truth	  that	  holds	  between	  electrons	  and	  their	  
negative	  charges.	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  Dancy’s	  theory	  of	  enabling	  conditions	  could	  be	  understood	  
as	  a	  distinct	  kind	  of	  necessary	  connections	  between	  things.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  have	  
seen	  that	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  akin	  to	  background	  conditions.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  very	  
general	  conditions	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  things,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  proximally	  related	  to	  
the	  things	  they	  make	  possible.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  England	  was	  not	  submerged	  
into	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  is	  not	  proximally	  related	  to	  Dancy’s	  going	  for	  a	  walk	  such	  
that	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  include	  it	  in	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  of	  his	  behavior.	  	  Other	  
examples	  of	  enabling	  condition	  on	  a	  par	  with	  Dancy’s	  suggestion	  might	  be	  that	  the	  
force	  of	  gravity	  keeps	  Dancy	  on	  the	  Earth’s	  surface	  such	  that	  he	  can	  write	  at	  his	  
desk,	  that	  the	  temperature	  of	  England	  during	  summer	  is	  necessary	  for	  him	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  go	  swimming	  in	  the	  lake,	  or	  that	  severe	  famine	  has	  not	  overtaken	  the	  UK	  
makes	  it	  possible	  for	  Dancy	  to	  eat	  a	  hearty	  noontime	  meal.	  	  At	  best,	  these	  enabling	  
conditions	  are	  far	  removed,	  and	  thus	  only	  distally	  related,	  to	  Dancy’s	  actions.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  they	  are	  necessary	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  his	  actions.	  	  It	  would	  
appear,	  then,	  that	  Dancy	  could	  escape	  Davis’	  criticisms	  of	  his	  efforts	  to	  explain	  B.	  
If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  we	  can	  understand	  Dancy’s	  theory	  of	  enabling	  conditions	  
as	  providing	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  account	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  necessity	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  B.	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This	  would	  mean	  that	  B	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  R	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  
which	  S	  Φ’s,	  then	  necessarily	  R	  is	  related	  to	  S’s	  psychology,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  S’s	  
psychology	  is	  a	  background	  condition	  for	  R	  to	  be	  S’s	  reason	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  And	  this	  
would	  mean	  that	  R’s	  psychology	  in	  some	  distal	  sense	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  S	  to	  Φ	  for	  
R.	  	  However,	  as	  an	  enabling	  condition,	  the	  psychological	  relation	  here	  it	  is	  not	  
proximally	  enough	  related	  to	  S’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  background	  condition.	  
Of	  course,	  the	  account	  I	  am	  developing	  on	  Dancy’s	  behalf	  is	  imprecise—the	  
notions	  of	  distal	  and	  proximal	  conditions,	  as	  presented,	  are	  admittedly	  quite	  vague.	  	  
I	  assume	  we	  have	  an	  intuitive	  grasp	  of	  clear	  cases	  of	  distal	  background	  conditions	  to	  
actions,	  e.g.,	  the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  general	  socioeconomic	  conditions,	  etc.	  	  Clear	  
examples	  of	  proximal	  condition	  for	  actions	  would	  be	  agential	  voluntariness	  and	  
agential	  reasons,	  to	  name	  only	  a	  couple.	  	  This	  much,	  however,	  seems	  clear,	  Dancy	  is	  
correct	  that	  background	  conditions	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  We	  
may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  how	  distally	  related	  background	  conditions	  are	  to	  
agents’	  actions,	  but	  we	  do	  have	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  direct	  relevance	  to	  particular	  
actions	  is	  quite	  low;	  low	  enough,	  in	  fact,	  not	  to	  be	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  
act.	  	  The	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  agential	  psychologies	  are	  on	  a	  par	  with	  enabling	  
background	  conditions.	  	  	  
There	  are	  two	  significant	  and	  related	  problems	  with	  Dancy’s	  account	  here.	  	  
The	  first	  significant	  problem	  is	  that	  Dancy’s	  account	  rests	  on	  a	  dubious	  analogy	  
between	  conditions	  like	  England	  not	  being	  submerged	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  for	  his	  
Φ-­‐ing,	  and	  conditions	  like	  his	  believing	  the	  reason	  he	  has	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  We	  can	  readily	  
agree	  that	  the	  former	  condition	  is	  an	  enabling	  condition	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	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distal	  background	  condition.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  seems	  false	  that	  psychologies	  are	  so	  
distally	  related	  to	  agents’	  Φ-­‐ing	  when	  they	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  mere	  
citations	  of	  reasons	  do	  not	  explain	  agential	  behavior	  unless	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  
reason	  for	  which	  the	  behavior	  was	  performed	  was	  appropriately	  related	  to	  the	  
agent’s	  psychology.	  	  Now	  consider	  mere	  background	  conditions.	  	  If	  I	  were	  to	  leave	  
out	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  Dancy’s	  going	  for	  a	  walk	  today	  that	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  did	  
not	  submerge	  England	  yesterday,	  I	  could	  very	  well	  have	  an	  adequate	  explanation.	  	  
However,	  if	  I	  leave	  out	  that	  Dancy	  believed	  that	  it	  is	  healthy	  to	  go	  for	  walks	  in	  
explaining	  his	  behavior,	  I	  could	  not	  have	  adequately	  rationalized	  his	  behavior.	  	  And	  
the	  latter	  is	  true	  even	  though	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  I	  could	  adequately	  explain	  Dancy’s	  
behavior	  without	  mentioning	  any	  background,	  or	  enabling,	  conditions.	  	  	  
The	  second	  problem	  with	  Dancy’s	  account	  here	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  
the	  psychological	  relations	  to	  reasons	  are	  not	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  
That	  is,	  if	  psychological	  relations	  are	  mere	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  acting	  for	  
reasons,	  then	  they	  are	  not	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  Enabling	  conditions	  
are	  too	  distally	  related	  to	  actions	  to	  be	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  true	  
that	  we	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  did	  not	  submerge	  England	  
is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  Dancy’s	  going	  for	  a	  walk	  for	  a	  reason.	  	  But	  it	  does	  seem	  that	  
psychological	  relations	  are	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  The	  contextualization	  
theory	  developed	  and	  defended	  in	  this	  chapter	  predicts	  this.	  	  We’ve	  seen	  that	  
psychological	  relations	  are	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  
contextualization	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  insists	  that	  agential	  beliefs	  typically	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explain	  actions.	  	  That	  Dancy’s	  theory	  of	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  does	  not	  predict	  that	  
psychologies	  are	  proper	  parts	  of	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  is	  a	  cost	  against	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  Dancy	  the	  fact	  that	  reasons	  are	  enabling	  conditions	  means	  that	  
agential	  psychologies	  need	  not	  feature	  in	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  After	  all,	  we	  do	  not	  
need	  to	  feature	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Atlantic	  did	  not	  submerge	  England	  in	  order	  to	  
explain	  Dancy’s	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Analogously,	  then,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  feature	  the	  fact,	  for	  
example,	  that	  Terrie	  believes	  that	  her	  neighbor	  had	  not	  watered	  his	  lawn	  in	  order	  to	  
explain	  Terrie’s	  watering	  of	  the	  lawn.	  	  We	  need	  only	  feature	  her	  reason	  for	  doing	  
what	  she	  does.	  	  It	  seems	  though	  that	  proper	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  reason-­‐explanations	  
at	  least	  imply	  agential	  beliefs,	  which	  feature	  their	  contents	  as	  an	  agent’s	  reasons	  for	  
Φ-­‐ing.	  	  They	  typically	  do	  so	  implicitly	  via	  conventional	  implicature,	  but	  they	  can	  also	  
be	  made	  explicit	  in	  the	  relevant	  contexts.	  	  Psychologies	  are	  essential	  to	  explaining	  
their	  actions,	  because	  without	  the	  psychological	  relation	  to	  the	  belief,	  reasons	  would	  
not	  be	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  they	  act.	  	  Thus,	  Dancy	  appears	  to	  get	  the	  wrong	  theory	  
of	  reason-­‐explanation:	  	  he	  assumes	  that	  explanantia	  of	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  only	  
agential	  reasons.	  
What	  all	  of	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  Dancy	  was	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  psychologies	  are	  
mere	  enabling	  conditions,	  where	  enabling	  conditions	  are	  understood	  as	  necessary	  
background	  conditions.	  	  Psychologies	  explain	  agential	  behaviors,	  and	  when	  
psychological	  relations	  to	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  explanations	  of	  actions,	  our	  
explanations	  rationalize	  (in	  a	  reason-­‐sensitive	  manner)	  such	  behavior.	  	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ	  are	  featured	  in	  such	  explanations.	  	  Thus	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psychologies	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  their	  reasons	  to	  be	  motivating	  reasons;	  
however,	  they	  are	  more	  than	  mere	  enabling	  conditions.	  
Since	  agential	  psychologies	  are	  not	  mere	  enabling	  conditions,	  the	  question	  
about	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  S’s	  psychology	  and	  S’s	  acting	  for	  R	  re-­‐
presents	  itself.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  question	  regarding	  explaining	  B	  is	  still	  in	  need	  of	  an	  
answer.	  
What	  is	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  an	  agent’s	  
psychology	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  she	  Φ’s?	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  answer	  here	  is	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  must	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action.	  	  But	  the	  
only	  way	  that	  reasons	  can	  have	  such	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  action	  is	  if	  they	  are	  
related	  appropriately	  to	  an	  agent’s	  psychology.	  	  Thus,	  the	  necessary	  connection	  
exists	  because	  of	  the	  role	  the	  reason	  has	  in	  motivating	  the	  agent	  to	  action.	  	  	  
This	  explanation	  seems	  uninformative.	  	  If	  we	  are	  seeking	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  why	  motivating	  reasons	  entail	  a	  necessary	  connection	  between	  agential	  
reasons	  and	  their	  psychologies,	  then	  it	  seems	  trivial	  to	  say	  that	  psychologies	  make	  
possible	  the	  motivational	  role	  reasons	  have	  in	  action.	  	  The	  reason	  it	  seems	  trivial	  is	  
that	  motivating	  reasons	  just	  are	  reasons	  that	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  agents’	  
psychologies	  such	  that	  the	  former	  are	  able	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  action.	  	  This	  is	  
just	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  Φ’s.	  	  	  
	   However,	  I	  think	  this	  points	  us	  in	  the	  proper	  direction	  for	  thinking	  about	  an	  
explanation	  for	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  psychologies	  and	  motivating	  
reasons.	  	  The	  connection	  appears	  to	  be	  one	  of	  conceptual	  necessity.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  
motivating	  reasons	  just	  are	  reasons	  that	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  psychologies	  such	  that	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the	  former	  can	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  action,	  then	  it	  follows	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
conceptual	  necessity	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  related	  to	  agential	  psychologies.	  	  
Thus,	  if	  what	  is	  sought	  is	  simply	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  necessity	  in	  the	  antecedent	  of	  
B,	  it	  just	  follows	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  conceptual	  truth	  that	  psychologies	  are	  related	  to	  
reasons.159	  We	  see	  how	  this	  account	  is	  different	  from	  Dancy’s	  in	  that	  the	  
psychological	  relation	  here	  just	  is	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  a	  reason.	  
This	  essential	  difference	  between	  Dancy’s	  view	  and	  mine	  is	  also	  captured	  by	  
the	  differences	  in	  our	  theories	  of	  reason-­‐explanation.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy,	  reason-­‐
explanations	  consist	  of	  explanantia	  citing	  only	  motivating	  reasons—agential	  beliefs	  
are	  mere	  enabling	  conditions	  lacking	  a	  role	  in	  the	  reason-­‐explanations.	  	  Accordingly,	  
the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  agents’	  psychologies	  and	  their	  reasons	  is	  not	  part	  
of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  agents	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  I	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  
beliefs	  are	  essential	  to	  reason-­‐explanations,	  from	  which	  it	  follows	  that	  beliefs	  
(psychologies)	  are	  part	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  
More	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  necessary	  connection	  between	  psychologies	  and	  
reasons	  for	  acting	  than	  that	  it	  is	  conceptually	  true	  that	  the	  latter	  just	  involves,	  in	  
part,	  the	  psychological	  relation.	  	  This	  is	  because	  reasons	  for	  action	  have	  a	  
motivational	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  without	  this	  
motivational	  role	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  these	  reasons	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  motivating	  
reasons,	  or	  reasons	  for	  which	  agent’s	  act.	  
Thus	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  the	  motivational	  role	  reasons	  have	  implies	  
that	  they	  have	  causal	  powers.	  	  On	  the	  propositionalist	  theory	  of	  reasons	  developed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  Compare	  this	  with	  Davis	  (2005:	  77):	  “…acting	  because	  one	  believes	  that	  p	  is	  part	  
of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  p.”	  Our	  views	  are	  very	  similar	  on	  this	  score.	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here,	  reasons	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  abstract	  objects.	  	  Accordingly,	  I	  assume	  that	  
abstracta	  are	  incapable	  of	  causal	  interaction.	  	  Reasons	  are	  therefore	  incapable	  of	  
causal	  interaction.	  	  So,	  if	  reasons	  have	  powers	  to	  motivate,	  then	  ‘motivate’	  must	  be	  
understood	  noncausally.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  concept	  of	  motivation	  has	  causal	  
implications,	  then	  reasons	  themselves	  will	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  motivate.	  	  That	  is,	  
the	  motivational	  role	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons	  would	  have	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  some	  other	  
way.	  
On	  the	  view	  here	  reasons	  are	  not	  causes.	  	  Further	  related	  questions	  arise	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  reason	  and	  causes.	  	  Are	  reason-­‐explanations	  a	  species	  of	  
causal	  explanations?	  	  How	  can	  reasons	  be	  motivating	  reasons	  in	  light	  of	  their	  causal	  
inertness?	  	  The	  first	  question	  here	  I	  have	  nothing	  to	  say	  about.	  	  However,	  regarding	  
the	  second	  question,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  an	  adequate	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  	  I	  shall	  
provide	  this	  answer	  in	  Chapter	  6	  below.	  
Before	  moving	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  chapter,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
main	  serious	  problems	  facing	  anti-­‐psychologism	  have	  been	  solved	  by	  this	  
propositionalist	  account.	  	  The	  final	  problem	  here	  was	  finding	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  
necessary	  connection	  holding	  between	  agential	  psychologies	  and	  their	  reasons	  for	  
acting.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  connection	  is	  a	  conceptual	  one	  because	  agents’	  
psychologies—typically	  their	  beliefs—are	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  It	  
must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  does	  not	  entail	  psychologism.	  	  The	  claim	  here	  is	  not	  
that	  agents’	  psychologies	  are	  part	  of	  agential	  reasons;	  rather,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  agents’	  
acting	  for	  reasons.	  
	  
	   138	  
4.5	  Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  4	  
	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  developed	  a	  propositionalist	  theory	  of	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
reasons.	  	  Motivating	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  true	  
or	  false.	  	  We	  saw	  that	  we	  needed	  to	  rethink	  the	  standard	  theory	  of	  reason-­‐
explanations	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  many	  of	  the	  apparent	  longstanding	  problems	  facing	  
anti-­‐psychologism	  in	  order	  to	  make	  propositionalism	  tenable.	  	  However,	  
propositionalism	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  developed	  and	  defended	  yet.	  	  There	  are	  a	  
series	  of	  difficult	  objections	  that	  it	  still	  faces	  and	  that	  need	  solutions.	  	  In	  the	  
following	  chapters	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  dealing	  with	  these	  objections	  and	  showing	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Chapter	  5:	  	  
Propositional	  Anti-­Psychologism:	  




This	  chapter	  expands	  on	  the	  account	  of	  anti-­‐psychologism	  developed	  in	  
Chapter	  4.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  defend	  propositionalism	  against	  an	  objection	  to	  it	  by	  
Jonathan	  Dancy.	  	  Then	  I	  consider	  both	  Russellian	  and	  Fregean	  theories	  of	  
propositionalism.	  	  I	  respond	  to	  objections	  to	  both	  kind	  of	  theories	  and	  show	  that	  a	  
Russellian	  theory	  is	  to	  be	  preferred	  to	  a	  Fregean	  theory.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  
preference	  is	  that	  a	  significant	  problem	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  exist	  to	  Fregean	  
propositionalism.	  
	  	  	  	  
5.1	  Why	  Propositions?	  
I	  have	  no	  knockdown	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  are	  propositions.	  	  
Another	  competing	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  view	  has	  it	  that	  reasons	  are	  states	  of	  
affairs.160	  I	  also	  have	  no	  knockdown	  argument	  against	  such	  theories.161	  	  
Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  one	  consideration	  that	  has	  some	  persuasive	  force	  for	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  reasons	  are	  propositions.	  	  The	  consideration	  is	  that	  reasons	  feature	  
as	  premises	  in	  our	  practical	  reasoning.	  	  Moreover,	  these	  very	  same	  premises	  are	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Jonathan	  Dancy	  (2000).	  
161	  If	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  better	  candidates	  for	  being	  reasons,	  then	  
I	  would	  adopt	  that	  view.	  	  See	  Stephen	  Everson	  (2009)	  for	  arguments	  against	  what	  
he	  calls	  “state	  theorists”	  regarding	  reasons.	  	  His	  arguments	  all	  rest	  on	  the	  view	  that	  
reasons	  would	  have	  to	  be	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  I	  deny	  that	  this	  would	  have	  to	  
be	  the	  case	  for	  a	  state	  theorist,	  so	  I	  reject	  his	  arguments.	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reasons	  for	  acting,	  and	  the	  premises	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  are,	  of	  course,	  
propositions.162	  
	   No	  matter	  which	  theory	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  one	  prefers,	  it	  is	  usually	  
understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  means-­‐end	  reasoning.	  	  We	  have	  certain	  ends	  or	  goals,	  and	  
we	  reason	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  those	  ends.	  	  Psychologists	  claim	  that	  practical	  
reasoning	  begins	  with	  desires,	  and	  so	  they	  include	  them	  in	  the	  premises	  of	  their	  
practical	  reasoning.163	  	  For	  example,	  Caleb	  might	  want	  to	  go	  to	  the	  movies,	  and	  this	  
desire	  leads	  him	  to	  reason	  practically	  about	  how	  to	  get	  to	  the	  movies.	  	  His	  reasoning	  
on	  the	  standard	  psychologistic	  model	  might	  look	  like	  this:	  	  (iii)	  I	  want	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
movies;	  (iv)	  I	  believe	  that	  driving	  to	  the	  theater	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  get	  to	  the	  movies;	  
so	  (v)	  I	  decide	  to	  drive	  to	  the	  movies.	  	  Psychologistic	  philosophers	  take	  this	  form	  of	  
practical	  reasoning	  to	  support	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  
because	  psychological	  states	  are	  represented	  in	  propositions	  (iii)	  and	  (iv).	  	  We	  have	  
seen	  (Chapter	  3)	  that	  psychologism	  faces	  severe	  problems,	  so	  we	  deny	  this	  form	  of	  
practical	  reasoning.	  
Some	  anti-­‐psychologists	  claim	  that	  the	  content	  of	  our	  desires	  serve	  as	  our	  
ends	  in	  practical	  reasoning	  because	  they	  are	  goals	  we	  want	  to	  attain.164	  	  
Nevertheless,	  they	  claim,	  desires	  do	  not	  figure	  directly	  in	  our	  practical	  reasoning.	  	  
Instead,	  they	  motivate	  us	  to	  act	  and	  provide	  content	  to	  the	  directions	  toward	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Not	  every	  action	  we	  perform	  for	  a	  reason	  is	  done	  as	  a	  result	  of	  practical	  
reasoning,	  but	  the	  premises	  of	  a	  line	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  are	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
thing	  as	  the	  reasons	  we	  act	  for	  when	  they	  are	  not	  results	  of	  practical	  reasoning.	  	  Our	  
actions	  are	  the	  results	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  when	  they	  involve	  some	  kind	  of	  means-­‐
end	  reasoning.	  
163	  See	  Davidson	  1963	  for	  a	  proto-­‐typical	  account	  of	  psychologistic	  practical	  
reasoning.	  
164	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010b).	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our	  actions	  tend.165	  	  A	  standard	  case	  of	  this	  second	  kind	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  might	  
begin	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  get	  healthier.	  	  Suppose	  Dorothy	  has	  gone	  to	  her	  doctor	  and	  
has	  been	  told	  that	  her	  cholesterol	  levels	  are	  too	  high,	  so	  the	  doctor	  tells	  her	  to	  eat	  
less	  saturated	  fat.	  	  A	  premise	  in	  Dorothy’s	  practical	  reasoning	  could	  be	  something	  
like:	  (vi)	  my	  (Dorothy’s)	  doctor	  has	  recommended	  that	  I	  eat	  less	  saturated	  fat.	  	  But	  
since	  Dorothy’s	  practical	  reasoning	  tends	  to	  lead	  to	  action	  directed	  at	  satisfying	  her	  
desires,	  we	  need	  another	  premise	  here.	  	  That	  premise	  could	  be	  (vii)	  fruits	  and	  
vegetables	  have	  much	  less	  saturated	  fat	  than	  meat	  and	  dairy	  foods.	  	  And	  from	  this	  
Dorothy	  could	  conclude	  that	  (viii)	  therefore,	  I	  (Dorothy)	  will	  eat	  more	  fruits	  and	  
vegetables	  and	  less	  meat	  and	  dairy	  foods.	  	  The	  conclusion	  (here	  at	  least)	  is	  a	  
decision,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  content	  of	  Dorothy’s	  desire—it	  is	  how	  Dorothy	  has	  
decided	  to	  meet	  her	  goal	  of	  improving	  her	  health.166	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  these	  are	  very	  simple	  sketches	  of	  examples	  of	  practical	  reasoning,	  
but	  I	  think	  they	  are	  paradigmatic	  of	  how	  we	  often	  do	  (and	  perhaps	  should)	  
practically	  reason.	  	  When	  Dorothy	  eats	  more	  fruits	  and	  vegetables	  she	  will,	  
presumably,	  begin	  to	  achieve	  her	  desire	  of	  improved	  health,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  
which	  she	  will	  have	  eaten	  more	  fruits	  and	  vegetables	  will	  be	  the	  claims	  expressed	  by	  
sentences	  (vi)	  and	  (vii).167	  Likewise,	  when	  Caleb	  reasons	  (via	  practical	  reasoning)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Consider	  Aristotle’s	  claim	  from	  De	  Anima	  that	  the	  object	  of	  our	  desire	  is	  the	  
“stimulant	  of	  practical	  thought”	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  
itself.	  	  See	  this	  quoted	  passage	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  section	  6.2.	  
166	  There	  is	  substantial	  debate	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  practical	  
reasoning.	  	  Here	  I	  assume	  that	  conclusions	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  are	  typically	  
decisions.	  	  See	  Alvarez	  (2010a)	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  this	  claim.	  
167	  In	  Section	  5.4	  below	  I	  say	  more	  about	  the	  role	  of	  desires	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  
action.	  	  To	  anticipate,	  desires	  provide	  our	  goals	  (ends)	  with	  content.	  	  Desires	  are	  
intimately	  related	  to	  our	  purposes.	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about	  how	  to	  get	  himself	  to	  the	  movies,	  he	  puts	  himself	  in	  position	  to	  satisfy	  that	  
desire.	  
	   Now,	  there	  are	  many	  debates	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  
including	  the	  natures	  of	  both	  the	  premises	  and	  conclusion	  and	  even	  how	  the	  
premises	  relate	  to	  conclusions.	  	  I	  cannot	  get	  into	  these	  difficult	  debates	  here.	  	  What	  I	  
wanted	  to	  show	  is	  that	  the	  premises	  in	  practical	  reasoning	  are	  propositions,	  and	  if	  
this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  our	  reasons	  for	  acting	  could	  also	  very	  well	  be	  propositions.	  	  I	  
take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  prima	  facie	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  just	  are	  the	  
premises	  offered	  in	  our	  practical	  deliberations.	  	  This	  appearance	  of	  reasons	  as	  
propositions	  is	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  my	  defense	  of	  propositionalism.	  	  	  
	   I	  should	  note	  here	  that	  those	  philosophers	  who	  think	  agential	  reasons	  are	  to	  
be	  identified	  with	  states	  of	  affairs	  could	  claim	  that	  the	  premises	  of	  practical	  
reasoning	  represent	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  are	  our	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  assuming	  
propositions	  represent	  states	  of	  affairs.	  	  Or	  perhaps	  they	  could	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  
some	  other	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  the	  premises	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  and	  
the	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  serve	  as	  our	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  state	  of	  
affairs	  theorist	  could	  claim	  that	  Dorothy’s	  reason	  for	  deciding	  to	  eat	  more	  fruits	  and	  
vegetables	  is	  not	  the	  proposition	  that	  Dorothy’s	  doctor	  recommends	  that	  she	  eat	  
less	  saturated	  fat.	  	  Rather	  it	  is	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  of	  her	  doctor	  recommending	  that	  
she	  eat	  less	  saturated	  fat	  that	  is	  her	  reason	  for	  deciding	  to	  eat	  more	  fruits	  and	  
vegetables.	  	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  knockdown	  argument	  against	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  theorist	  
here.	  	  I	  am	  simply	  going	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  
premises	  of	  our	  practical	  reasoning,	  which	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  propositional	  contents	  of	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agential	  beliefs.	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  engage	  here	  in	  a	  debate	  with	  state	  of	  affairs	  
theorist	  by	  claiming	  that	  states	  of	  affairs	  cannot	  be	  agential	  reasons.	  	  	  
However,	  some	  state	  of	  affairs	  theorists	  think	  that	  reasons	  cannot	  be	  
propositions.168	  In	  what	  immediately	  follows	  I	  would	  like	  to	  consider	  and	  challenge	  
an	  argument	  for	  this	  claim.	  
	  
5.2	  The	  Insubstantiality	  of	  Propositions?	  
	   Jonathan	  Dancy	  has	  argued	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  thing	  
to	  be	  normative	  reasons.	  	  If	  true,	  this	  would	  be	  bad,	  because	  on	  the	  propositionalist	  
theory	  of	  reasons	  developed	  here	  some	  normative	  reasons	  are	  also	  motivating	  
reasons.	  	  He	  writes:	  
	  
Now	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  …	  propositions	  are	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  thing	  to	  be	  good	  reasons	  
for	  action.	  	  It	  seems	  just	  obvious	  that	  they	  are	  not.	  …	  [Propositions]	  are,	  as	  we	  might	  say,	  too	  
thin	  or	  insubstantial	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  an	  action	  wrong.	  	  They	  are	  the	  wrong	  sort	  of	  beast.	  	  
Reasons	  for	  action	  are	  things	  like	  his	  self-­‐satisfaction,	  her	  distress,	  yesterday’s	  bad	  weather,	  
and	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  dollar.169	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Dancy,	  things	  that	  are	  the	  case—obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs—are	  the	  
right	  kind	  of	  things	  to	  be	  normative	  reasons.	  	  However,	  propositions	  are	  “the	  wrong	  
sort	  of	  beast”.	  	  Likewise,	  they	  are	  too	  “thin	  or	  insubstantial”	  to	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  See	  Dancy	  (2000)	  for	  an	  example.	  	  We	  will	  examine	  his	  arguments	  in	  Section	  5.2	  
below.	  
169	  Dancy	  (2000:	  115)	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important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Dancy	  also	  has	  true	  propositions	  in	  mind	  here—they	  
are	  just	  one	  of	  the	  general	  kinds	  of	  propositions,	  the	  other	  being	  false	  propositions.	  	  
Dancy	  argues	  that	  propositions	  are	  either	  structured	  abstract	  objects	  or	  sets	  of	  
possible	  worlds,	  and	  it	  is	  “obvious”	  that	  both	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  things	  are	  not	  
candidates	  for	  good	  reasons.170	  
It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Dancy	  thinks	  that	  the	  abstract	  nature	  of	  propositions	  is	  
what	  accounts	  for	  its	  thin	  insubstantiality	  because	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  presumably	  
abstract	  things	  as	  well.171	  So	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  it	  means	  for	  propositions	  to	  be	  too	  
thin	  and	  insubstantial.172	  	  Perhaps	  by	  examining	  how	  Dancy	  supports	  his	  claim	  here	  
we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  get	  clearer.	  	  He	  writes:	  
	  
One	  consideration	  that	  supports	  this	  claim	  is	  that	  anything	  that	  has	  a	  truth	  value	  must	  be	  in	  
some	  way	  representational,	  since	  for	  something	  to	  be	  true	  things	  must	  be	  as	  it	  represents	  
them	  as	  being.	  	  But	  no	  representation	  can	  as	  such	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  anything	  …	  No	  
representation	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  no	  representation	  can	  be	  a	  good	  reason.173	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Dancy	  considers	  only	  these	  two	  views	  of	  propositions.	  	  I	  assume	  in	  what	  follows	  
that	  propositions	  are	  not	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds	  for	  standard	  reasons	  involving	  the	  
fine-­‐grained	  nature	  of	  propositions.	  	  That	  is,	  if	  possible	  worlds	  are	  sets	  of	  possible	  
worlds,	  then	  all	  metaphysically	  necessary	  truths	  would	  express	  the	  same	  
proposition.	  	  Intuitively,	  the	  proposition	  encoded	  in	  the	  sentence	  ‘2+2=4’	  is	  distinct	  
from	  the	  proposition	  encoded	  in	  the	  sentence	  ‘It	  is	  wrong	  to	  torture	  people	  for	  fun’.	  	  
Propositions	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  so	  coarse-­‐grained.	  	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  below	  in	  Section	  
5.3.1,	  I	  think	  propositions	  are	  structured	  abstract	  entities.	  
171	  See	  Thomas	  Wetzel’s	  article	  “States	  of	  Affairs”	  in	  the	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  
Philosophy,	  2003:	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-­‐of-­‐affairs/	  
172	  For	  a	  different	  but	  related	  discussion	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  Stephen	  Everson	  (2009:	  
29-­‐30).	  	  Everson	  also	  claims	  to	  be	  unclear	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  Dancy’s	  remarks.	  
173	  Ibid.	  p.	  117	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Dancy’s	  claim	  about	  the	  representational	  nature	  of	  propositions	  might	  
provide	  us	  some	  direction	  with	  respect	  to	  clarifying	  his	  argument	  against	  
propositionalism.	  	  Dancy’s	  argument	  here	  might	  be	  that	  representations,	  even	  when	  
true,	  are	  too	  thin	  and	  insubstantial	  to	  serve	  as	  good	  reasons.	  	  Thus,	  the	  (true)	  
representation	  that	  Miles	  is	  in	  distress	  is	  too	  thin	  and	  insubstantial	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
good	  reason	  for	  providing	  him	  relief.	  	  If	  we	  take	  Dancy’s	  view,	  which	  is	  that	  
obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  good	  reasons,	  then	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  
Dancy’s	  argument	  as	  this:	  	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs,	  like	  Miles’	  distress,	  are	  
metaphysically	  more	  robust	  than	  true	  propositions	  like	  that	  Miles	  is	  in	  distress.	  	  And	  
once	  the	  obvious	  difference	  between	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  true	  
representations	  is	  made	  clear,	  we	  see	  that	  only	  the	  former	  can	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  In	  
fact,	  Dancy	  claims	  to	  agree	  with	  Alvin	  Plantinga	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  difference	  
between	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  propositions.174	  	  Again,	  he	  writes:	  
	  
In	  general	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  great	  distinction	  between	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  are	  capable	  
of	  being	  the	  case	  and	  those	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  true.	  	  Plantinga	  (1974)	  argues	  that	  a	  
possible	  world	  is	  a	  maximal	  state	  of	  affairs,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  obtain	  (only	  the	  actual	  
world	  obtains).	  	  For	  each	  such	  world	  there	  is	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  or	  book	  for	  that	  world,	  
which	  things	  are	  true	  if	  the	  world	  obtains,	  each	  proposition	  being	  made	  true	  by	  a	  state	  of	  
affairs	  that	  obtains	  or	  is	  the	  case	  there.	  	  Like	  Plantinga,	  I	  see	  an	  ontological	  gulf	  between	  
things	  capable	  of	  being	  the	  case	  (i.e.	  states	  of	  affairs)	  and	  things	  capable	  of	  being	  true	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  See	  Plantinga	  (1974).	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(either	  propositions	  or	  sentences).	  	  And	  only	  those	  capable	  of	  being	  the	  case	  are	  capable	  of	  
being	  a	  good	  reason.175	  	  
	   	  
Dancy	  assumes	  that	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  things	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  the	  
case,	  and	  propositions	  are	  the	  things	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  true.176	  It	  can	  be	  
agreed	  that	  Dancy	  and	  Plantinga	  articulate	  an	  intuitive	  distinction	  here	  such	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  significant	  ontological	  difference	  between	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  
propositions.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  this	  distinction	  is	  supposed	  to	  
establish	  the	  ontological	  robustness	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  over	  propositions,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  
assumed	  that	  the	  ontological	  difference	  is	  significant.	  	  Dancy’s	  Plantinga-­‐inspired	  
passage	  above	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  significance	  is	  supposed	  to	  amount	  to,	  and	  
neither	  does	  Plantinga.	  	  (This	  is	  not	  Plantinga’s	  fault.	  	  His	  project	  was	  the	  
metaphysics	  of	  modality,	  not	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  reasons.)	  	  In	  fact,	  Plantinga,	  in	  the	  
1974	  book	  Dancy	  cites,	  says	  very	  little	  about	  the	  difference	  other	  than	  what	  Dancy	  
claims	  he	  does	  above.177	  
We	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Dancy	  couldn’t	  mean	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  
propositions	  are	  too	  thin	  and	  insubstantial	  that	  they	  lack	  causal	  powers.	  	  This	  is	  
because	  even	  states	  of	  affairs	  would	  appear	  to	  lack	  causal	  powers	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  
abstract	  nature.178	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Dancy	  (2000:	  116-­‐117)	  
176	  For	  a	  view	  that	  identifies	  states	  of	  affairs	  with	  propositions,	  see	  Roderick	  
Chisholm	  (1970,	  1971).	  
177	  See	  Plantinga	  (1974),	  especially	  Chapter	  4.	  
178	  I	  take	  it	  that	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  concrete	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  cause,	  and	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  
abstract	  that	  it	  cannot.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  do	  not	  take	  either	  mark	  as	  sufficient	  for	  
definitions.	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Perhaps	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  from	  analogy	  we	  can	  appeal	  to	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
continue	  trying	  to	  understand	  Dancy’s	  claim	  about	  the	  thinness	  and	  insubstantiality	  
of	  propositions.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  involving	  not	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  but	  instead	  
evidence	  for	  believing.	  	  Suppose	  you	  are	  provided	  a	  photograph	  of	  your	  friend	  at	  the	  
soccer	  match.	  	  Someone	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  evidence	  you	  have	  for	  believing	  that	  he	  
was	  at	  the	  match	  is	  not	  the	  photograph	  itself	  but	  what	  the	  photograph	  depicts.	  	  
Analogously,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  our	  reasons	  are	  not	  the	  propositions	  (the	  
representing	  thing)	  but	  rather	  are	  the	  things	  the	  propositions	  represent.	  	  My	  reason	  
for	  helping	  someone	  is	  not	  the	  representation	  I	  have	  of	  someone	  in	  distress	  but	  
rather	  the	  person’s	  distress.	  	  Therefore,	  perhaps	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  proposition	  to	  
be	  too	  insubstantial	  to	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  is	  that	  propositions	  by	  themselves	  are	  like	  
photos.	  	  They	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  representation	  of	  something.	  	  And	  just	  as	  mere	  
representations	  of	  things	  are	  not	  sources	  of	  evidence,	  mere	  propositions	  or	  states	  of	  
affairs	  are	  not	  sources	  of	  good	  reasons.	  
At	  least	  at	  first	  glance,	  this	  argument	  from	  analogy	  fails.	  	  It	  seems	  false	  that	  
photographs	  themselves	  are	  not	  sources	  of	  evidence.	  	  And	  if	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  does	  
not	  follow	  from	  this	  that	  propositions	  cannot	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  might	  be	  
true	  that	  what	  photographs	  depict	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  “closer”	  to	  the	  circumstances	  
than	  the	  photograph	  itself.	  	  In	  the	  situation	  involving	  your	  friend	  at	  the	  soccer	  
match,	  the	  photograph	  might	  depict	  him	  sitting	  in	  some	  bleachers	  with	  a	  field	  of	  
players	  in	  front	  of	  him	  chasing	  a	  soccer	  ball.	  	  Maybe	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  we	  could	  say	  
that	  what	  the	  photos	  depict	  has	  more	  evidentiary	  value	  than	  the	  photos	  (the	  things	  
that	  depict)	  themselves.	  	  However,	  even	  if	  this	  claim	  is	  right,	  it	  does	  not	  show	  that	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photos	  do	  not	  have	  significant	  evidentiary	  value	  themselves.	  	  Analogously,	  even	  if	  it	  
were	  assumed	  that	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  more	  thick	  and	  substantial,	  it	  
would	  not	  follow	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  thick	  and	  substantial	  enough	  to	  be	  good	  
reasons.	  	  As	  it	  stands,	  the	  constructed	  argument	  from	  analogy	  appears	  to	  fail.	  
Still,	  maybe	  we	  can	  take	  something	  away	  from	  the	  analogy	  between	  the	  
evidence	  for	  belief	  and	  the	  substantiality	  of	  being	  good	  a	  reason.	  	  Maybe	  Dancy	  has	  
something	  like	  this	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  substantial	  
enough	  to	  be	  good	  reasons:	  	  good	  reasons	  must	  be	  things	  that	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  
things	  that	  happen	  rather	  than	  mere	  depictions	  of	  them.	  	  Depictions,	  we	  might	  say,	  
are	  too	  far	  removed	  to	  be	  robust	  enough	  to	  be	  good	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  Of	  course,	  
this	  language	  is	  far	  too	  metaphorical	  to	  be	  precise,	  but	  the	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  see	  if	  we	  
can	  get	  precise	  about	  Dancy’s	  claims	  by	  first	  thinking	  about	  things	  in	  a	  more	  
metaphorical	  manner.	  	  So,	  the	  idea	  being	  proposed	  here	  is	  that	  good	  reasons	  have	  to	  
be	  the	  things	  that	  propositions	  represent	  because	  they	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  real	  things	  
that	  occur.	  	  Conversely,	  good	  reasons	  cannot	  be	  things	  like	  propositions	  because	  
they	  are	  too	  removed	  from	  the	  real	  things	  that	  occur.	  
Assuming	  we	  are	  clear	  enough	  regarding	  Dancy’s	  claims	  here,	  we	  have	  a	  tu	  
quoque	  argument	  against	  them	  that	  speak	  against	  his	  claiming	  that	  propositions	  are	  
too	  thin	  and	  insubstantial.	  	  Dancy	  believes	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  non-­‐factive,	  
which	  for	  him	  means	  that	  reason-­‐explanations	  citing	  non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  
can	  still	  be	  explanatory	  even	  though	  the	  reason	  does	  not	  obtain.179	  These	  reasons	  
can	  serve	  as	  motivating	  reasons,	  i.e.,	  they	  can	  be	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act.	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Non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs,	  no	  matter	  one’s	  ontology	  of	  states	  of	  affairs,	  would	  
seem	  to	  be	  “thin”	  and	  “insubstantial”	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  non-­‐obtaining.	  	  For	  
example,	  suppose	  Miles	  is	  not	  really	  in	  distress—he’s	  pretending,	  but	  you	  falsely	  
believe	  that	  he	  is	  in	  distress.	  	  You	  come	  to	  Miles’	  apparent	  aid.	  	  Did	  Miles’	  distress	  
cause	  you	  to	  come	  to	  his	  aid?	  	  How	  could	  it	  have?	  	  	  
One	  might	  attempt	  to	  claim	  that	  Miles’	  playing	  around	  caused	  it	  though,	  and	  
that	  was	  an	  obtaining	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  The	  counter-­‐response	  here	  is	  that	  this	  might	  
well	  be	  true,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  your	  reason	  for	  helping	  Miles.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy,	  your	  
reason	  was	  Miles’	  distress,	  which	  did	  not	  obtain.	  	  Nevertheless,	  according	  to	  Dancy	  
this	  non-­‐obtaining	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  effective	  (in	  some	  manner	  or	  other)	  in	  serving	  
as	  a	  reason	  for	  acting.	  	  Sure,	  it	  was	  a	  motivating	  reason,	  but	  motivating	  reasons	  
seem	  to	  have	  substantial	  roles	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action,	  whatever	  is	  meant	  by	  
‘substantial’	  here.	  	  One	  thing	  it	  might	  mean	  is	  that	  false	  or	  non-­‐obtaining	  motivating	  
propositions	  are	  related	  in	  some	  way	  to	  the	  psychologies	  of	  agents,	  and	  that	  such	  
propositions	  can	  have	  a	  proper	  role	  in	  their	  actions,	  including	  being	  the	  reasons	  for	  
which	  it	  is	  said	  agents	  act.	  	  Much	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  about	  this	  proper	  role.	  	  
But	  it	  seems	  fairly	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  role	  the	  reason,	  as	  a	  non-­‐obtaining	  state	  of	  
affairs,	  has	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action	  could	  be	  just	  as	  thin	  and	  insubstantial	  as	  the	  
role	  that	  a	  proposition	  itself	  has.180	  	  
We	  still	  need	  to	  tie	  this	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  Dancy’s	  claim	  that	  propositions	  
are	  not	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  thing	  to	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  According	  to	  Dancy,	  motivating	  
reasons	  have	  to	  be	  the	  kinds	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  He	  does	  not	  mean	  by	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this	  that	  every	  motivating	  reason	  can	  be	  a	  good	  reason.181	  Rather,	  motivating	  
reasons	  need	  to	  be	  the	  right	  kinds	  of	  things	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  ontological	  status	  to	  be	  
good	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  of	  the	  right	  ontological	  kind	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
candidates	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  Dancy	  argues	  that	  reasons	  need	  to	  be	  states	  of	  affairs	  
for	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  where	  an	  agent	  acts	  for	  a	  reason	  that	  does	  
not	  obtain:	  	  you	  come	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  Miles	  for	  the	  non-­‐obtaining	  state	  of	  affairs	  of	  him	  
being	  in	  distress.	  	  Now,	  even	  though	  non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  cannot	  be	  good	  
reasons	  when	  they	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  act,	  those	  very	  states	  of	  affairs	  
can	  be	  good	  reasons	  for	  acting	  in	  situations	  where	  they	  obtain.	  	  Thus,	  the	  state	  of	  
affairs	  of	  Miles	  being	  in	  distress	  could	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  come	  to	  his	  aid	  so	  long	  as	  
the	  state	  of	  affairs	  obtains.	  
We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  state	  the	  tu	  quoque	  argument	  against	  Dancy.	  	  
Non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  of	  the	  same	  ontological	  kind	  as	  obtaining	  states	  of	  
affairs.	  	  But	  Dancy	  claims	  that	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  robust	  enough	  to	  be	  good	  reasons	  
because	  of	  the	  ontological	  kind	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  	  This	  explains	  why,	  according	  
to	  Dancy,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  can	  be	  good	  
reasons—they	  belong	  to	  the	  right	  ontological	  kind.	  	  So,	  this	  means	  that	  non-­‐
obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  robust	  enough	  to	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  But,	  
the	  argument	  continues,	  how	  much	  more	  robust	  can	  non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  
be	  than	  propositions?	  	  The	  thought	  here	  is	  that	  there	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  much	  
difference	  at	  all	  in	  terms	  of	  ontological	  robustness.	  	  Non-­‐obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  
seem	  to	  be	  just	  as	  ontologically	  thin	  (or	  robust)	  and	  insubstantial	  (or	  substantial)	  as	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propositions.	  	  And	  even	  if	  the	  former	  are	  more	  robust,	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  by	  much.	  	  Thus,	  
it	  seems	  false	  that	  their	  robustness	  over	  propositions	  makes	  them	  better	  candidates	  
for	  being	  good	  reasons.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  appears	  wrong	  to	  claim	  propositions	  are	  not	  
robust	  enough	  to	  be	  good	  reasons.	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  argument	  against	  Dancy	  teaches	  us	  that	  any	  
anti-­‐psychologist	  who	  claims	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  can	  be	  false	  or	  non-­‐obtaining	  
must	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons	  that	  can	  accommodate	  this	  claim.	  	  
Perhaps	  we	  could	  put	  this	  in	  Dancy’s	  terminology:	  	  reasons	  need	  to	  be	  thin	  and	  
insubstantial	  enough	  to	  be	  such	  that	  they	  can	  be	  reasons	  even	  if	  they	  are	  false	  or	  do	  
not	  obtain.	  	  In	  fact,	  views	  claiming	  that	  reasons	  are	  intentional	  objects,	  or	  even	  
views	  countenancing	  apparent	  reasons	  will	  have	  to	  account	  for	  how	  it	  is	  that	  such	  
thin	  entities	  could	  have	  a	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action.182	  Thus,	  it	  
seems	  that	  any	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  view	  must	  have	  a	  theory	  according	  to	  which	  the	  
reasons	  (or	  apparent	  reasons)	  are	  thin	  entities,	  but	  also	  according	  to	  which	  these	  
entities	  are	  able	  to	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  action.	  	  
	   It	  seems	  that	  we	  are	  at	  a	  loss	  regarding	  Dancy’s	  strategy	  to	  argue	  against	  
propositionalism.	  	  Dancy’s	  claims	  were	  difficult	  to	  figure	  out	  with	  precision,	  and	  so	  
much	  of	  the	  discussion	  and	  argumentation	  in	  this	  section	  is	  much	  less	  precise	  than	  I	  
would	  have	  preferred.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  the	  debate	  between	  Dancy	  and	  the	  
propositionalist	  has	  been	  advanced	  here.	  	  We	  learned	  that	  some	  strategies	  to	  
account	  for	  the	  ontological	  difference	  between	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  propositions	  fail,	  
and	  that	  if	  Dancy’s	  argument	  against	  propositionalism	  is	  to	  succeed	  then	  it	  must	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  I	  have	  Alvarez	  (2010)	  and	  Stout	  (2009)	  in	  mind	  here.	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first	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  ontological	  question	  concerning	  the	  metaphysical	  gulf	  
between	  propositions	  and	  states	  of	  affairs.	  
	  
5.3	  Other	  Problems	  with	  Propositions?	  
	   Propositionalism	  requires	  the	  existence	  of	  propositions.	  	  The	  project	  here	  
cannot	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  defense	  of	  their	  existence.	  	  Nevertheless,	  some	  of	  
the	  standard	  reasons	  offered	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  propositions	  are	  provided.183	  	  It	  is	  
assumed	  that	  this	  will	  be	  sufficient	  for	  our	  purposes	  here.	  	  After	  a	  very	  brief	  defense	  




	   It	  seems	  that	  sentences	  encode	  information.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  sentence	  ‘The	  
man	  speaks’	  seems	  to	  encode	  information.	  	  So	  does	  the	  distinct	  sentence	  ‘El	  hombre	  
habla’.	  	  In	  fact,	  these	  distinct	  sentences	  seem	  to	  encode	  the	  same	  information,	  which	  
could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  their	  meaning.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  the	  
meaning	  of	  these	  sentences	  are	  the	  linguistic	  items	  with	  which	  we	  are	  presented	  
because	  the	  linguistic	  items	  are	  distinct.	  	  These	  bits	  of	  encoded	  information—these	  
meanings—are,	  to	  use	  contemporary	  parlance,	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  by	  the	  
sentences.184	  	  Moreover,	  it	  seems	  that	  propositions	  are	  true	  or	  false	  depending	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Jeffrey	  King’s	  (2007)	  work	  on	  propositions	  for	  the	  section	  5.3.2	  
of	  this	  chapter.	  
184	  I	  am	  going	  to	  assume,	  for	  clarity’s	  sake,	  that	  propositions	  are	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  
the	  information	  encoded	  by	  sentences.	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their	  relation	  to	  the	  world.	  	  Propositions	  are	  true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  world	  agrees	  with	  
the	  information	  expressed	  by	  them,	  and	  they	  are	  false	  otherwise.	  
	   A	  second	  consideration	  is	  that	  there	  are	  things	  that	  we	  believe,	  wish	  for,	  
doubt,	  claim,	  assume,	  etc.	  	  And	  it	  seems	  that	  these	  are	  the	  very	  things	  that	  we	  take	  to	  
be	  true	  and	  false.	  	  Jordan	  believes	  that	  Canada	  has	  the	  coldest	  climate	  in	  North	  
America.	  	  What	  Jordan	  seems	  to	  believe	  is	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  the	  
sentence	  ‘Canada	  has	  the	  coldest	  climate	  in	  North	  America’.	  	  And	  both	  the	  sentence	  
and	  belief	  appear	  to	  be	  either	  true	  or	  false	  depending	  on	  what	  is	  the	  case	  in	  North	  
America.	  	  So,	  we	  seem	  to	  have	  propositional	  attitudes	  that	  have	  propositions	  as	  their	  
objects.	  	  The	  propositions	  of	  our	  attitudes	  can	  likewise	  be	  possibly	  or	  necessarily	  
true	  or	  false	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be.	  
	   There	  may	  be	  many	  other	  considerations	  for	  thinking	  that	  propositions	  exist,	  
including	  considerations	  for	  working	  out	  a	  theory	  of	  semantics	  for	  natural	  
languages	  that	  have	  modal	  locutions	  and	  verbs	  of	  propositional	  attitudes	  as	  
discussed	  just	  above.	  	  Having	  propositions	  available	  to	  the	  semanticist	  could	  make	  
for	  a	  tidy	  semantics	  for	  such	  natural	  languages.	  	  Surely	  even	  more	  considerations	  
may	  exist,	  but	  hopefully	  the	  several	  provided	  are	  sufficient	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  
saying	  more	  about	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  has	  it	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  propositions.	  	  	  
	   Propositions	  seem	  to	  have	  constituents.	  	  Moreover,	  these	  constituents	  are	  
reflected	  in	  the	  sentences	  to	  which	  the	  propositions	  are	  intimately	  related.	  	  The	  
sentence	  ‘Tim	  is	  hungry’	  expresses	  a	  proposition	  (relative	  to	  a	  context	  of	  utterance),	  
and	  according	  to	  those	  who	  think	  propositions	  have	  constituents,	  this	  proposition	  is	  
a	  structured	  entity	  of	  some	  sort.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  proposition	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itself	  consists	  of	  entities.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  the	  structured	  view	  of	  propositions	  is	  
assumed	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  one.	  	  	  
	   Structuralists	  about	  propositions	  disagree	  about	  what	  make	  up	  the	  structure	  
of	  propositions.	  	  The	  Russellian	  view	  has	  it	  that	  individuals,	  properties,	  and	  
relations	  make	  up	  propositions.185	  	  On	  a	  very	  basic	  Russellian	  view,	  the	  proposition	  
that	  Tim	  is	  hungry	  has	  at	  least	  the	  individual	  Tim	  and	  the	  property	  of	  being	  hungry.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  on	  a	  very	  simple	  Fregean	  view	  propositions	  are	  constituted	  by	  
senses.	  	  Frege	  argued	  that	  names,	  descriptions,	  and	  other	  terms	  have	  more	  than	  just	  
referents;	  they	  also	  express	  senses,	  which	  are,	  roughly,	  distinct	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  
of	  the	  referents	  of	  the	  terms.	  	  Thus,	  the	  proposition	  that	  Tim	  is	  hungry	  is	  constituted	  
by	  some	  sense	  expressed	  by	  the	  name	  ‘Tim’.	  	  The	  name	  ‘Tim’	  might,	  for	  example,	  
express	  the	  sense	  the	  son	  of	  Tom	  or	  the	  man	  who	  works	  at	  the	  bank,	  as	  these	  are	  
various	  possible	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  the	  individual	  Tim	  who	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  
name	  ‘Tim’.186	  	  The	  other	  part	  of	  the	  Fregean	  sentence	  here	  would	  be	  constituted	  by	  
the	  predicate	  ‘is	  hungry’,	  which	  has	  the	  property	  of	  being	  hungry	  as	  its	  referent,	  but	  
the	  proposition	  consists	  of	  the	  sense	  expressed	  by	  the	  predicate	  ‘is	  hungry’.	  
	   So	  far	  I	  have	  provided	  but	  simple	  versions	  of	  Russellian	  and	  Fregean	  
theories.	  	  As	  complete	  theories	  of	  propositions	  they	  are	  much	  more	  complicated	  
than	  could	  be	  covered	  here.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  that	  some	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  Some	  (King	  2007)	  call	  the	  view	  the	  Neo-­‐Russellian	  view.	  	  Others	  (Salmon	  1980)	  
call	  it	  the	  ‘naïve	  theory’.	  	  Moreover,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  only	  need	  
to	  distinguish	  between	  two	  main	  kinds	  of	  structuralist	  positions.	  	  
186	  A	  way	  of	  understanding	  what	  senses	  are	  is	  by	  considering	  the	  two	  senses	  
expressed	  by	  the	  proper	  name	  ‘Tim’.	  	  The	  son	  of	  Tom	  and	  the	  man	  who	  works	  at	  the	  
bank	  are	  expressions	  of	  ‘Tim’	  that	  have	  different	  descriptive	  content.	  	  Below	  I	  will	  
sometimes	  refer	  to	  senses	  as	  descriptive	  contents	  of	  names	  and	  descriptions.	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features	  have	  been	  provided	  for	  what	  is	  to	  follow.	  	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  problems	  for	  
propositionalism	  that	  have	  been	  considered	  in	  the	  literature	  depend	  only	  on	  some	  
of	  the	  fundamental	  features	  of	  Fregeanism	  and	  Russellianism.	  
	   Just	  a	  bit	  more	  should	  be	  said	  about	  the	  versions	  of	  Russellianism	  and	  
Fregeanism	  to	  be	  supposed.	  	  First,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  constituents	  of	  propositions	  
correspond	  in	  some	  way	  to	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  sentences	  of	  which	  they	  are	  expressions.	  	  
So,	  constituents	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  Tim	  is	  hungry	  correspond	  in	  some	  way	  to	  
the	  parts	  of	  the	  sentence	  ‘Tim	  is	  hungry’.	  	  What	  I	  mean	  by	  ‘correspondence’	  here	  is	  
something	  like	  the	  following.	  	  The	  simple	  subject-­‐predicate	  sentence	  ‘Tim	  is	  hungry’	  
expresses	  a	  proposition.	  	  The	  proposition	  expressed	  here	  consists	  of	  things	  that	  
relate	  back	  to	  the	  subject	  and	  predicate	  terms	  of	  the	  sentence.	  	  Second,	  I	  do	  not	  
suppose	  a	  worked	  out	  view	  of	  the	  basic	  semantic	  units	  of	  sentences.	  	  Thus,	  I	  do	  not	  
suppose	  a	  worked	  out	  view	  of	  what	  the	  basic	  constituents	  of	  propositions	  are.	  	  
Third,	  I	  do	  not	  suppose	  that	  an	  exact	  isomorphic	  correspondence	  between	  terms	  in	  
a	  sentence	  and	  its	  propositional	  constituents.	  	  There	  may	  well	  be	  one,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  
need	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  this.	  	  Third,	  I	  suppose	  an	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  
expression	  ‘term’.	  	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  anything	  technical	  when	  I	  use	  it.	  	  The	  relevant	  
examples	  I	  use	  will	  involve	  terms	  like	  ‘Oedipus’,	  ‘his	  fiancé’,	  ‘his	  mother’,	  etc.	  	  Fourth,	  
I	  take	  the	  latter	  expressions	  mentioned	  to	  be	  terms,	  but	  I	  take	  no	  stance	  on	  whether	  
the	  expressions	  ‘his	  fiancé’	  or	  ‘his	  mother’	  (or	  other	  similar	  terms)	  correspond	  to	  
one	  or	  more	  constituents	  of	  propositions.	  	  Fifth,	  I	  will	  only	  consider	  simple	  
sentences	  with	  subject-­‐predicate	  form.	  	  Complex	  sentences	  with	  other	  forms	  will	  
not	  be	  needed	  to	  generate	  the	  problems	  against	  Russellianism	  or	  Fregeanism.	  	  As	  I	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see	  it,	  these	  issues	  are	  all	  orthogonal	  to	  the	  issues	  to	  be	  discussed	  and	  responded	  to	  
in	  this	  section.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  natures	  of	  the	  objections	  to	  propositionalism	  do	  
not	  depend	  on	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  features	  of	  theories	  of	  propositions.	  
	  
5.3.2	  Russellian	  Propositionalism	  
To	  be	  clear,	  a	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositionalism	  is	  one	  that	  countenances	  
Russellian	  propositions	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  reasons	  are	  
very	  often	  Fregean	  in	  nature,	  but	  a	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositionalism	  seeks	  to	  
accommodate	  Russellian	  reasons	  too.	  	  An	  initial	  problem	  for	  propositionalism	  arises	  
if	  Russellianism	  is	  true.	  	  This	  is	  because	  reason	  contexts	  seem	  to	  be	  intensional.	  	  
That	  is,	  expressions	  of	  reasons	  in	  contexts	  where	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  provided	  
do	  not	  always	  permit	  substitution	  of	  their	  constitutive	  terms	  with	  co-­‐referring	  
terms	  such	  that	  truth-­‐values	  are	  always	  preserved.	  	  Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  whether	  
something	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  someone	  Φ-­‐s	  depends	  on	  the	  descriptive	  content	  of	  
the	  reason.	  	  By	  considering	  examples	  involving	  propositions	  with	  distinct	  
descriptive	  contents	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	  this.	  	  For	  example,	  whether	  Oedipus	  has	  his	  
mother	  or	  his	  fiancé	  in	  mind	  seems	  to	  make	  all	  the	  difference	  in	  what	  Oedipus’	  
reason	  is	  for	  going	  to	  the	  church,	  even	  if	  Oedipus’	  mother	  and	  fiancé	  are	  the	  same	  
person.187	  	  A	  candidate	  reason	  for	  Oedipus’	  going	  to	  the	  church	  is	  that	  his	  fiancé	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  The	  Oedipus	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  the	  Oedipus	  of	  Sophocles’	  Oedipus	  the	  King.	  In	  this	  
tragedy,	  Oedipus	  notoriously	  finds	  himself	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  he	  both	  kills	  
his	  father	  and	  marries	  his	  mother,	  Queen	  Jocasta,	  without	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  his	  
father	  he	  is	  killing	  and	  his	  mother	  who	  he	  is	  marrying.	  	  Upon	  discovering	  what	  he	  
had	  done,	  Oedipus	  tears	  his	  eyes	  out.	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waiting	  there	  to	  marry	  him.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  false	  to	  claim	  that	  Oedipus	  went	  to	  the	  
church	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  his	  mother	  was	  waiting	  there	  to	  marry	  him.	  
	  	  To	  examine	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  bit	  more	  detail,	  let	  us	  look	  at	  a	  passage	  by	  
propositionalist	  philosopher	  Stephen	  Everson:	  
	  
Thus	  whilst	  Oedipus	  should	  go	  to	  the	  church	  because	  his	  fiancée	  is	  waiting	  there	  to	  marry	  
him,	  it	  is	  dubious	  that	  he	  should	  go	  because	  his	  mother	  is	  waiting	  there	  to	  marry	  him.	  	  If	  
there	  are	  such	  cases,	  then	  this	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  motivate	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  sense	  –	  even	  if	  many	  reasons	  will	  tolerate	  perfectly	  happily	  the	  
substitution	  of	  co-­‐referring	  terms.188	  
	  
Everson	  argues	  that	  if	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  proposition	  P1	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  agent	  S	  
to	  Φ,	  yet	  proposition	  P2,	  which	  is	  expressed	  by	  a	  sentence	  that	  is	  referentially	  
equivalent	  to	  the	  sentence	  expressing	  P1,	  is	  not	  a	  reason	  for	  agent	  S	  to	  Φ,	  then	  there	  
is	  motivation	  to	  think	  that	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  found	  exclusively	  “in	  the	  realm	  of	  
sense”.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  sense	  is	  that	  that	  reasons	  are	  found	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  descriptive	  contents	  
of	  propositions.	  	  The	  descriptive	  contents	  serve	  to	  determine	  the	  referents	  of	  the	  
propositions.	  	  But,	  the	  argument	  here	  continues,	  since	  propositions	  expressed	  by	  co-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  See	  Everson	  (2009:	  40).	  	  Everson	  thinks	  that	  reasons	  for	  acting	  are	  facts,	  which	  
he	  takes	  to	  be	  true	  propositions.	  	  He	  seems	  to	  think	  that	  reasons	  always	  have	  a	  
normative	  role	  in	  the	  rational	  explanation	  of	  action.	  	  Thus	  he	  focuses	  on	  Oedipus’	  
normative	  reasons	  for	  going	  to	  the	  church.	  	  He	  and	  I	  disagree	  about	  the	  normative	  
role	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  This	  difference	  will	  be	  reflected	  in	  how	  I	  discuss	  
Oedipus’	  reasons	  for	  going	  to	  the	  church—they	  need	  not	  have	  a	  normative	  role	  in	  
his	  actions.	  	  And	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  we	  disagree	  regarding	  the	  truth	  of	  Russellian	  
reasons.	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referential	  sentences	  are	  not	  necessarily	  identical,	  reasons	  are	  not	  to	  be	  found	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  reference—and	  the	  Russellian	  claims	  that	  sometimes	  reasons	  are	  found	  at	  
the	  level	  of	  reference.	  	  	  	  
Everson’s	  claims	  here	  might	  provide	  some	  initial	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  
Russellian	  propositions	  do	  not	  have	  a	  place	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons,	  thus	  
challenging	  a	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositionalism.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  it’s	  only	  general	  
descriptive	  contents	  that	  motivate	  agents	  rather	  than	  propositions	  with	  particular	  
individuals	  as	  consituents.	  	  Other	  related	  cases	  also	  speak	  in	  favor	  of	  thinking	  that	  
Russellian	  propositions	  do	  not	  have	  a	  place	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  
Suppose	  Roy	  runs	  away,	  and	  he	  offers	  as	  his	  reason	  for	  doing	  so	  that	  that	  woman	  
was	  there.	  	  This	  reason	  does	  not	  seem,	  by	  itself,	  sufficient	  to	  motivate	  Roy	  to	  run	  
away.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  descriptive	  features	  of	  the	  woman	  are	  required	  in	  order	  for	  Roy	  
to	  be	  motivated	  to	  run	  away	  from	  her.	  	  	  Indeed,	  it	  would	  seem	  very	  natural	  for	  us	  to	  
ask	  Roy	  what	  it	  was	  about	  that	  woman	  that	  prompted	  his	  running	  away,	  and	  he	  
could	  respond	  that	  she	  was	  pointing	  a	  gun	  at	  him.	  	  Thus,	  the	  related	  proposition	  that	  
the	  woman	  was	  pointing	  a	  gun	  at	  him	  motivated	  Roy	  to	  run	  away	  from	  her.	  	  So,	  the	  
argument	  goes,	  what	  motivates	  agents	  like	  Roy	  are	  not	  the	  Russellian	  propositions	  
but	  rather	  the	  Fregean	  propositions	  to	  which	  the	  Russellian	  propositions	  are	  
related.	  	  	  
I	  think	  these	  considerations	  against	  the	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons	  fail	  because	  sometimes	  agents	  act	  for	  Russellian	  propositions	  themselves.	  	  
Moreover,	  this	  might	  be	  true	  even	  if	  there	  are	  general	  propositions	  to	  which	  the	  
Russellian	  propositions	  are	  related.	  	  We	  can	  motivate	  this	  claim	  by	  looking	  at	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examples	  involving	  proper	  names	  and	  indexicals	  because	  sentences	  involving	  them	  
are	  thought	  to	  express	  Russellian	  propositions.	  	  	  
One	  common	  kind	  of	  action	  that	  is	  motivated	  by	  Russellian	  propositions	  
involve	  cases	  where	  agents	  are	  indifferent	  to	  any	  of	  the	  possible	  descriptions	  
related	  to	  the	  individuals	  in	  question	  yet	  act	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  question	  anyway.	  	  	  
It	  seems	  perfectly	  possible	  that	  Devon	  takes	  Benjamin	  to	  the	  park	  for	  the	  reason	  
that	  Benjamin	  loves	  to	  feed	  the	  ducks;	  or	  perhaps	  Devon	  takes	  him	  to	  the	  park	  for	  
the	  reason	  that	  he	  (referring	  to	  Benjamin)	  loves	  to	  feed	  the	  ducks.	  	  Likewise	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  Ryann	  brings	  Destiny	  some	  hot	  tea	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  she	  (referring	  to	  
Destiny)	  is	  not	  feeling	  well.	  	  In	  these	  everyday	  cases	  we	  imagine	  the	  agent	  acting	  for	  
a	  reason	  that	  is	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  a	  Russellian	  proposition.	  	  We	  imagine	  Devon	  
and	  Ryann	  acting	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  question	  and	  not	  for	  any	  of	  the	  descriptive	  
properties	  associated	  with	  the	  individuals,	  because	  they	  were	  indifferent	  to	  such	  
properties.	  	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  might	  be	  significant	  for	  our	  examples	  that,	  for	  example,	  
Benjamin	  is	  Devon’s	  son	  and	  Destiny	  is	  Ryann’s	  daughter,	  but	  when	  Devon	  takes	  his	  
son	  to	  the	  park	  or	  Ryann	  brings	  her	  daughter	  tea,	  again,	  they	  act	  for	  the	  individuals	  
in	  question	  and	  are	  indifferent	  to	  the	  related	  descriptive	  contents	  associated	  with	  
‘Benjamin’	  and	  ‘Destiny’.	  
Indeed,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  other	  cases	  involving	  indexicals	  that	  reveal	  that	  
agents	  act	  for	  Russellian	  propositions.	  	  Suppose	  the	  meeting	  with	  my	  advisor	  is	  at	  
noon	  on	  May	  17,	  2012,	  which	  happens	  to	  be	  today,	  and	  it	  is	  about	  noon.	  	  I	  go	  to	  the	  
meeting.	  	  My	  reason	  for	  driving	  to	  the	  coffee	  shop	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  I	  have	  a	  meeting	  
with	  my	  advisor	  today	  at	  noon.	  	  Now,	  initially	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  we	  can	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describe	  my	  reason	  for	  acting	  by	  appealing	  to	  purely	  descriptive	  contents.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  
might	  be	  said	  that	  my	  reason	  for	  driving	  to	  the	  coffee	  shop	  is,	  for	  example,	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  advisement	  meeting	  at	  the	  coffee	  shop	  at	  noon	  on	  May	  17,	  2012.	  	  However,	  this	  
cannot	  be	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  I	  act	  because	  I	  must	  believe	  when	  I	  am	  driving	  to	  the	  
coffee	  shop	  that	  now	  it	  is	  just	  about	  noon	  (assuming	  that	  I	  am	  just	  minutes	  away)	  
and	  that	  today	  is	  May	  17,	  2012.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  any	  advisement	  meeting.	  	  It	  
is	  my	  advisement	  meeting.	  	  If	  it	  were	  just	  someone’s	  advisement	  meeting,	  that	  
would	  not	  motivate	  me	  to	  go	  the	  coffee	  shop.	  	  So	  we	  see	  in	  this	  everyday	  kind	  of	  case	  
that	  there	  are	  essential	  indexicals	  in	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  I	  act.	  	  If	  this	  case	  is	  right,	  
then	  it	  implies	  that	  Russellian	  propositions	  have	  a	  role	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons.	  	  Moreover,	  that	  some	  of	  our	  de	  re	  beliefs	  are	  essential	  to	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  
further	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  Russellian	  propositions	  have	  a	  role	  in	  motivating	  
action	  because	  that	  which	  is	  believed	  is	  my	  reason	  for	  acting.189	  	  	  	  
There	  is	  another	  problem	  for	  Russellian	  propositionalism	  that	  needs	  solving.	  	  
We	  could	  imagine	  a	  case	  in	  which	  Saul	  is	  asked	  his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  
Saul	  explains	  that	  his	  reason	  is	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  there	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  We	  
could	  imagine	  further	  that	  Saul	  does	  not	  know	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  Samuel	  Clemens,	  
so	  he	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  he	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Samuel	  
Clemens	  is	  there	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  But	  according	  to	  Russellian	  
propositionalism	  these	  reasons	  are	  the	  very	  same,	  so	  Saul	  had	  to	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  
that	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs	  if	  he	  acted	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  The	  example	  of	  this	  paragraph	  is	  mine	  but	  it	  owes	  the	  philosophical	  points	  to	  the	  
work	  of	  John	  Perry	  (1979)	  and	  Thomas	  McKay	  (1984).	  	  Perry’s	  1979	  shows	  that	  
there	  are	  cases	  of	  essential	  indexicality,	  and	  McKay’s	  1984	  argues	  persuasively	  for	  
the	  claim	  that	  de	  re	  belief	  is	  essential	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  intentional	  action.	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reason	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  The	  Russellian	  
propositionalist	  needs	  to	  solve	  this	  problem.190	  	  	  
To	  be	  clear,	  consider	  sentences	  (1a)	  and	  (1b).191	  
	  
(1a)	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
(1b)	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
	  
Suppose	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1a)	  is	  taken,	  in	  a	  particular	  context,	  to	  be	  
Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  If	  Russellianism	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  
proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1b)	  is	  also	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  But	  
keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  case	  developed	  above,	  Saul	  doesn’t	  even	  believe	  that	  Mark	  
Twain	  is	  Samuel	  Clemens.	  	  The	  intuition	  here	  is	  that	  while	  the	  proposition	  
expressed	  by	  (1a)	  is	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop,	  the	  proposition	  
expressed	  by	  (1b)	  could	  not	  be.	  	  Saul	  believes	  that	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1a)	  
is	  his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  church,	  though	  he	  presumably	  does	  not	  believe	  the	  
same	  for	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1b).	  	  However,	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  are	  completely	  
co-­‐referential.	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  from	  this	  that	  an	  agent’s	  reasons	  are	  not	  
found	  at	  the	  level	  of	  reference,	  and	  so	  that	  Russellian	  propositions	  are	  not	  agential	  
reasons.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  would	  seem	  tempting	  to	  claim	  that	  even	  though	  the	  terms	  
‘Mark	  Twain’	  and	  ‘Samuel	  Clemens’	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  individual,	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  	  A	  Russellian	  propositionalist	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  a	  Russellian	  about	  propositions	  
and	  is	  a	  propositionalist	  about	  reasons.	  
191	  Here	  I	  switch	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  that	  does	  not	  have	  the	  
assumption	  that	  they	  are	  normative	  reasons.	  	  As	  I	  made	  clear	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  do	  think	  
that	  some	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  normative.	  	  If	  one	  thinks,	  as	  does	  Everson,	  that	  all	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  normative,	  one	  can	  make	  the	  appropriate	  changes	  to	  (1a)	  
and	  (1b).	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express	  different	  propositions	  because	  of	  the	  different	  descriptive	  contents	  
associated	  with	  the	  proper	  names.	  	  If	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  different	  propositions,	  
they	  express	  different	  reasons	  too.	  	  And	  if	  they	  express	  different	  reasons	  this	  is	  
because	  of	  the	  different	  senses	  making	  up	  the	  propositions.	  
	   So	  if	  the	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositions	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  
(1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  the	  same	  proposition	  and	  are	  thus	  the	  same	  reason	  for	  which	  
Saul	  went	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  In	  order	  to	  see	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  wrong	  with	  this,	  
consider	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  Saul	  were	  told	  by	  the	  Russellian-­‐propositionalist	  
that	  he	  had	  gone	  to	  the	  bookshop	  because	  Samuel	  Clemens	  was	  there	  giving	  out	  
autographs.	  	  Saul	  would,	  it	  seems	  rightly,	  emphatically	  claim	  that	  he	  did	  not	  act	  for	  
that	  reason—he	  doesn’t	  even	  believe	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  Samuel	  Clemens.	  	  He	  would	  
insist	  that	  it	  could	  not	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  he	  acted.	  	  Thus,	  Fregean	  
propositionalists	  would	  argue,	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop	  must	  be	  one	  
that	  is	  under	  a	  description	  that	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  his	  reason,	  e.g.,	  Mark	  Twain,	  the	  
author	  of	  The	  Adventures	  of	  Huckleberry	  Finn,	  is	  giving	  out	  autographs	  at	  the	  
bookshop.	  	  This	  is	  why	  Saul	  would	  deny	  that	  his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop	  is	  
that	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  there	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  The	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  
whether	  we	  should	  take	  Saul’s	  rejection	  of	  claim	  that	  he	  acted	  for	  the	  proposition	  
expressed	  by	  (1b)	  as	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	  his	  actually	  doing	  so.	  	  I	  think	  we	  can	  
answer	  this	  question	  negatively.	  
Following	  recent	  developments	  in	  Russellian	  theories	  of	  reference	  in	  
intensional	  contexts,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  account	  for	  the	  identity	  of	  propositions	  
expressed	  by	  sentences	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  and	  thus	  the	  identity	  of	  reasons	  expressed	  by	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them.	  	  These	  developments	  will	  in	  turn	  enable	  us	  to	  account	  for	  how	  it	  is	  that	  the	  
proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1b)	  is	  also	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  The	  
developments	  of	  interest	  here	  are	  by	  Nathan	  Salmon	  and	  Scott	  Soames.192	  	  Their	  
insights	  can	  help	  to	  preserve	  Russellianism	  about	  reasons	  in	  light	  of	  the	  challenges	  
expressed	  in	  the	  Saul	  case	  above.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  show	  how	  these	  insights	  can	  
help	  to	  resolve	  these	  challenges.	  	  These	  insights	  are	  consistent,	  and	  could	  be	  looked	  
at	  as	  complementing	  each	  other	  in	  an	  overall	  defense	  of	  the	  Russellian	  view	  of	  
reasons	  as	  propositions.	  	  	  
For	  the	  first	  insight	  consider	  the	  following	  passage	  by	  Salmon:	  
	  
What	  is	  important	  is	  to	  recognize	  that,	  whatever	  mode	  of	  acquaintance	  with	  an	  object	  is	  
involved	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  of	  someone’s	  entertaining	  a	  singular	  proposition	  about	  that	  
object,	  that	  mode	  of	  acquaintance	  is	  part	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  one	  apprehends	  the	  
singular	  proposition,	  for	  it	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  one	  is	  familiar	  with	  one	  of	  the	  main	  
ingredients	  of	  the	  proposition.	  	  This	  generates	  something	  analogous	  to	  an	  “appearance”	  or	  a	  
“guise”	  for	  singular	  propositions.	  …	  This	  unorthodox	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
propositions	  and	  their	  apprehension	  thus	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  notion	  of	  “failing	  to	  
recognize”	  a	  proposition	  by	  mistaking	  it	  for	  a	  new	  and	  different	  piece	  of	  information.193	  
	  
This	  passage	  claims	  that	  there	  are	  modes	  by	  which	  we	  are	  acquainted	  with	  objects	  
of	  singular	  propositions	  (Russellian	  propositions).	  	  Moreover,	  these	  modes	  of	  
acquaintance	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  we	  apprehend	  (or	  grasp)	  the	  singular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  See	  Salmon	  (1986)	  and	  Soames	  (2002).	  
193	  Salmon	  (1986:	  109)	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proposition,	  and	  they	  are	  the	  means	  (at	  least	  in	  part)	  because	  they	  are	  the	  means	  for	  
grasping	  the	  “ingredients”	  of	  the	  proposition.	  	  Salmon	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  from	  here	  
that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  propositions	  to	  be	  expressed	  via	  guises.	  	  This	  possibility	  leads	  
to	  the	  further	  possibility	  that	  agents	  can	  make	  mistakes	  recognizing	  propositions.	  	  
One	  way	  we	  can	  make	  a	  mistake	  is	  that	  sometimes	  we	  think	  that	  there	  are	  two	  
propositions	  expressed	  by	  distinct	  sentences	  when	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  only	  one	  
proposition	  expressed	  by	  them.	  
	   Salmon	  goes	  on	  to	  write:	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  modified	  naïve	  theory	  [the	  Russellian	  theory]	  should	  hold	  that	  
the	  grasping	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  information	  places	  one	  in	  a	  position	  to	  “see	  through”	  the	  
information,	  so	  to	  speak,	  and	  to	  recognize	  it	  infallibly	  as	  the	  same	  information	  encountered	  
earlier	  in	  different	  surroundings	  under	  quite	  different	  circumstances.194	  
	  
Salmon	  calls	  his	  claims	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  orthodox	  theory	  of	  propositions	  because	  
the	  latter	  theory	  has	  it	  that	  one	  cannot	  make	  mistakes	  in	  grasping	  propositions.195	  	  If	  
this	  challenge	  is	  correct,	  then	  this	  means	  that	  Saul	  could	  be	  making	  a	  mistake	  in	  
thinking	  that	  he	  did	  not	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1b),	  namely,	  that	  Samuel	  
Clemens	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  The	  Russellian-­‐propositionalist	  
can	  in	  turn	  claim	  that	  reasons	  are	  determined	  exclusively	  by	  the	  referents	  of	  the	  
corresponding	  sentences,	  so	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  the	  same	  propositions.	  	  What	  
leads	  us	  to	  think	  that	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  different	  propositions	  is	  that	  we	  think	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Salmon	  (1986:	  109)	  
195	  Salmon	  (1986:	  109)	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that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Saul	  believe	  one	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  	  However,	  for	  the	  
conclusion	  here	  that	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  distinct	  propositions	  to	  follow	  another	  
assumption	  would	  need	  to	  hold,	  namely,	  that	  propositions	  are	  infallibly	  grasped	  by	  
agents	  like	  Saul.	  	  If	  this	  assumption	  were	  correct,	  then	  even	  though	  the	  senses	  
determine	  the	  same	  referent,	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  would	  be	  distinct—
otherwise	  Saul	  would	  have	  believed	  both	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  expressed	  reasons	  for	  him	  to	  
go	  to	  the	  church.	  
	   Salmon’s	  claim	  that	  we	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  information	  content	  of	  a	  
sentence	  infallibly	  seems	  right.	  	  Moreover,	  a	  committed	  Russellian	  about	  
propositions	  can	  claim	  that	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  the	  same	  proposition—the	  
semantic	  contents	  of	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  are	  identical	  because,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  the	  semantic	  
contents	  are	  composed	  exclusively	  of	  the	  referents	  of	  (1a)	  and	  (1b).	  	  This	  should	  
lead	  us	  to	  rethink	  our	  initial	  intuitions	  regarding	  the	  Saul	  case—the	  intuitions	  that	  
led	  us,	  with	  Everson’s	  suggestion,	  to	  deny	  that	  a	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  
propositionalism	  is	  possible.	  	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop	  can	  be	  that	  
Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  there	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  Surely	  Saul	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  
this	  was	  his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop,	  but	  he	  is	  wrong	  about	  what	  he	  
believes	  because	  of	  the	  guise	  in	  which	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  is	  presented	  to	  him.	  	  
We	  did	  not,	  at	  first,	  believe	  that	  this	  was	  Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop,	  but	  
likewise	  we	  were	  wrong.	  	  We	  falsely	  assumed	  that	  Saul	  infallibly	  recognizes	  the	  
semantic	  contents	  of	  (1a)	  and	  (1b).	  	  This	  led	  Saul	  (and	  the	  Fregean)	  to	  conclude	  
falsely	  that	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  distinct	  propositions,	  and	  therefore	  express	  
distinct	  reasons	  for	  which	  Saul	  went	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  Thus,	  Salmon’s	  insight	  into	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Saul’s	  fallibility	  regarding	  knowing	  the	  propositions	  of	  which	  he	  is	  aware	  invites	  a	  
solution	  to	  Everson’s	  problem.	  	  Quite	  simply,	  Saul	  is	  wrong	  to	  deny	  that	  (1b)	  is	  his	  
reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  the	  same	  proposition,	  so	  
the	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  reasons	  predicts	  that	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  the	  same	  reason	  
for	  which	  Saul	  went	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  	  
	   We	  can	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  the	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositionalism	  
defended	  here.	  	  Both	  Scott	  Soames	  and	  Nathan	  Salmon	  argue	  that	  sentences	  have	  
not	  only	  semantic	  contents,	  but	  they	  also	  convey	  other	  information	  depending	  on	  the	  
contexts	  of	  their	  use.196	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  following	  two	  sentences:	  
	  
(2a)	  The	  esteemed	  university	  scholar	  has	  been	  nominated	  for	  teacher	  of	  the	  year.	  
(2b)	  The	  university’s	  favorite	  lecturer	  has	  been	  nominated	  for	  teacher	  of	  the	  year.	  
	  
(2a)	  and	  (2b)	  express	  the	  proposition	  that,	  Smith,	  say,	  has	  been	  nominated	  for	  
teacher	  of	  the	  year,	  where	  ‘Smith’	  refers	  to	  the	  very	  same	  person	  the	  descriptive	  
phrases	  in	  (2a)	  and	  (2b)	  do.	  	  Nevertheless,	  (2a)	  and	  (2b)	  are	  used	  to	  convey	  other	  
descriptive	  information.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  (2a)	  and	  (2b)	  the	  different	  descriptive	  
information	  conveyed	  is	  about	  the	  university	  professor	  who	  has	  been	  nominated	  for	  
teacher	  of	  the	  year.	  	  The	  key	  points	  to	  take	  from	  this	  example	  is	  that	  there	  is	  what,	  in	  
certain	  contexts,	  is	  semantically	  expressed	  when	  one	  utters	  sentences	  like	  (2a)	  and	  
(2b),	  but	  there	  is	  also	  what	  is	  pragmatically	  conveyed	  by	  such	  utterances.	  	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  Scott	  Soames	  (2002:	  217-­‐220).	  Compare	  with	  Salmon	  (1986:	  78-­‐79).	  	  In	  what	  
follows,	  I	  focus	  mainly	  on	  Soames’	  account	  of	  the	  view.	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propositions	  pragmatically	  conveyed	  have	  different	  descriptive	  features	  associated	  
with	  the	  referents	  they	  help	  to	  fix.	  
With	  the	  distinction	  between	  semantic	  content	  expressed	  and	  pragmatic	  
information	  conveyed,	  and	  with	  Salmon’s	  rejection	  of	  agential	  infallibility	  regarding	  
the	  propositions	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  in	  mind,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  more	  sense	  
of	  Saul’s	  denial	  that	  he	  went	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  
there	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  It	  will	  be	  true	  that	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1b)	  is	  
Saul’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop	  because	  of	  what	  (1b)	  semantically	  
expresses:	  	  that	  very	  person	  picked	  out	  by	  ‘Samuel	  Clemens’	  will	  be	  at	  the	  bookshop	  
giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  However,	  (1b)	  pragmatically	  conveys	  that	  the	  person	  giving	  
out	  autographs	  is	  also	  named	  Samuel	  Clemens,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  surprise	  to	  Saul.	  	  In	  
Salmon’s	  terminology,	  the	  guise	  (the	  appearance)	  in	  which	  the	  semantic	  content	  of	  
(1b)	  is	  presented	  is	  one	  about	  which	  Saul	  is	  mistaken.	  	  This	  explains	  Saul’s	  denying	  
that	  he	  acted	  for	  that	  reason.	  	  He	  did	  not	  recognize	  that	  the	  semantic	  content	  of	  (1b)	  
is	  the	  same	  as	  (1a).	  	  Therefore,	  he	  is	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  he	  did	  not	  act	  for	  the	  reason	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  semantic	  content	  of	  (1b).	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  
think	  that	  Saul	  is	  not	  in	  an	  infallible	  position	  regarding	  all	  ways	  of	  expressing	  what	  
he	  believes.	  	  Moreover,	  agents	  like	  Saul	  are	  often	  not	  in	  positions	  to	  distinguish	  the	  
difference	  between	  the	  semantic	  content	  of	  what	  they	  believe	  and	  the	  varied	  and	  
various	  ways	  in	  which	  other	  sentences	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  convey	  that	  information.	  
I	  need	  to	  say	  something	  briefly	  about	  how	  it	  is	  that	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  
(1b)	  can	  motivate	  Saul	  to	  go	  to	  the	  bookshop	  even	  though	  Saul	  would	  deny	  believing	  
it.	  	  The	  general	  move	  here	  is	  that	  Saul	  can	  believe	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1b)	  and	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at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  unaware	  of	  it.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  virtue	  of	  believing	  the	  reason	  
expressed	  by	  (1a),	  Saul	  believes	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1b),	  and	  so	  the	  reason	  
expressed	  by	  (1b)	  does	  motivate	  him.	  	  Finally,	  we	  have	  already	  dealt	  with	  the	  issue	  
of	  Russellian	  propositions	  having	  a	  motivational	  role	  in	  agency	  above,	  so	  there	  are	  
no	  other	  special	  problems	  for	  the	  Saul	  case	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  Saul	  
can	  be	  motivated	  to	  act	  by	  the	  Russellian	  proposition	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  at	  the	  
bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
	   These	  efforts	  to	  defend	  Russellianism	  about	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  not	  
decisive,	  but	  they	  do	  seem	  to	  move	  the	  debate	  forward.	  	  Typically,	  debates	  within	  
anti-­‐psychologism	  involve	  whether	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  states	  of	  affairs	  or	  
propositions.	  	  Everson’s	  challenges	  to	  Russellian	  propositionalism,	  as	  well	  as	  
challenges	  to	  the	  latter	  theory’s	  ability	  to	  account	  for	  acting	  for	  Russellian	  reasons,	  
helped	  to	  move	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  	  We	  have	  been	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  
each	  of	  the	  challenges	  with	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  solutions.	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  continue	  furthering	  the	  discussion.	  	  Everson	  has	  argued	  that	  
we	  should	  understand	  reasons	  as	  Fregean	  propositions,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  
Fregean	  proposotionalism	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  
	   	  
5.3.3	  Fregean	  Propositionalism	  	  	  
	   I	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  Fregeanism.	  	  We	  saw	  above	  that	  Fregeans	  
claim	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  constituted	  by	  referents	  but	  rather	  by	  senses.197	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  This	  is	  one	  manner	  of	  presenting	  Fregeanism	  about	  propositions.	  	  I	  learned	  much	  
about	  Frege’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  and	  its	  legacy	  from	  Soames	  (2010),	  especially	  
Chapter	  1.	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Gottlob	  Frege	  (the	  founder	  of	  the	  view	  named	  after	  him)	  concluded	  that	  senses	  exist	  
from	  considerations	  like	  the	  ones	  briefly	  sketched	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Section	  5.3.1.	  	  	  
One	  main	  function	  of	  language	  is	  to	  represent	  the	  world,	  and	  we	  do	  this	  
through	  using	  words	  and	  sentences	  to	  stand	  for	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
argued	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  sentences	  cannot	  simply	  be	  the	  referents	  of	  the	  words	  
and	  sentences	  because	  there	  are	  puzzle	  cases	  that	  appear	  to	  show	  otherwise.	  	  These	  
cases	  are	  instances	  of	  a	  puzzle	  known	  as	  Frege’s	  Puzzle.	  	  	  
	   Consider	  the	  following	  sentences:	  
	  
(3a)	  Hesperus	  is	  Hesperus.	  
(3b)	  Hesperus	  is	  Phosphorus.	  
	  
Frege	  argued	  that	  if	  (3a)	  and	  (3b)	  express	  propositions	  with	  the	  same	  constituents,	  
then	  they	  would	  have	  the	  same	  meaning.	  	  However,	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  
(3a)	  is	  trivially	  true,	  whereas	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (3b)	  appears	  to	  express	  
a	  substantive	  empirical	  claim.	  	  Given	  this	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  significance,	  Frege	  
argued,	  that	  (3a)	  and	  (3b)	  cannot	  have	  the	  same	  meaning.	  	  He	  then	  reasoned	  that	  
the	  names	  ‘Hesperus’	  and	  ‘Phosphorus’	  express	  distinct	  senses,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  (3a)	  
and	  (3b)	  have	  distinct	  meanings.	  	  This	  solution	  to	  Frege’s	  Puzzle	  is	  in	  part	  what	  led	  
to	  the	  Fregean	  thesis	  that	  the	  constituents	  of	  propositions	  are	  senses	  and	  not	  the	  
referents	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  sentences.	  
	   If	  all	  propositions	  are	  constituted	  by	  senses,	  then	  assuming	  propositionalism,	  
reasons	  will	  also	  be	  constituted	  by	  senses.	  	  This	  is	  one	  way	  of	  understanding	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Everson’s	  claim	  that	  “reasons	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  sense”.	  	  If	  competing	  
theories	  of	  propositions	  are	  unable	  to	  resolve	  Frege’s	  puzzle,	  then	  there	  may	  be	  
good	  reason	  to	  adopt	  a	  Fregean	  view	  of	  reasons	  over	  their	  competitors.198	  	  In	  fact,	  
the	  Fregean	  view	  predicts	  that	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  by	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  are	  
distinct	  reasons	  for	  Saul’s	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop:	  
	  
(1a)	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
(1b)	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
	  
If	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  sense,	  then	  since	  the	  propositions	  
expressed	  by	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  are	  constituted	  by	  different	  senses,	  they	  express	  
different	  propositions.	  	  And	  if	  (1a)	  and	  (1b)	  express	  different	  propositions,	  then	  
they	  express	  different	  reasons.	  	  One	  significant	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Fregeans	  
have	  a	  straightforward	  account	  of	  why	  it	  seems,	  at	  first	  glance	  anyway,	  that	  Saul	  acts	  
for	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (1a)	  but	  not	  for	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  
(1b).199	  	  	  
	   According	  to	  Everson’s	  Fregean	  version	  of	  reasons,	  reasons	  have	  an	  
ineliminable	  normative	  dimension	  to	  them,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  problem	  for	  Fregean	  
propositionalism.	  	  Saul	  can	  act	  for	  a	  reason	  only	  if	  that	  reason	  is	  also	  a	  reason	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  Even	  if	  there	  are	  Russellian	  solutions	  to	  Frege’s	  puzzle	  cases	  (see	  Section	  5.3.2	  
for	  solutions)	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  whether	  both	  kinds	  of	  propositions	  could	  
serves	  as	  theories	  of	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  perhaps	  both	  Russellianism	  and	  Fregeanism	  
about	  reasons	  could	  be	  true.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  propositionalism	  about	  
reasons	  could	  be	  either	  Russellian	  or	  Fregean.	  	  	  
199	  We	  have	  seen	  (Section	  5.3.2)	  that	  Russellians	  have	  an	  account	  of	  why	  we	  should	  
think	  that	  Paul	  acts	  for	  both	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1a)	  and	  (1b).	  	  However,	  
some	  might	  find	  the	  Fregean	  theory	  more	  intuitive.	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him	  to	  act.	  	  Accordingly,	  if	  Saul	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  
is	  signing	  autographs	  there,	  then	  that	  reason	  is	  also	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  
go	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  	  
We	  could	  imagine	  another	  case	  in	  which	  Paul’s	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  the	  bookshop	  
multiply	  because	  there	  are	  many	  distinct	  Fregean	  reasons	  for	  him	  to	  go.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  
could	  imagine	  there	  being	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  author	  Paul	  goes	  to	  get	  an	  autograph	  
from	  is	  known	  for	  having	  several	  different	  names,	  and	  each	  of	  these	  names	  have	  
distinct	  senses.	  	  We	  could	  suppose	  that	  Paul	  knows	  that	  the	  author	  is	  known	  by	  
several	  different	  names.	  	  Suppose	  John	  Steinbeck	  is	  the	  relevant	  author,	  and	  that	  he	  
is	  also	  known	  by	  the	  following	  names:	  	  John	  Schmidt,	  Frank	  Garvey,	  and	  Jack	  
Stargell.	  	  (Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  is	  a	  fictional	  case	  involving	  an	  actual	  person,	  
namely,	  John	  Steinbeck.)	  Then	  each	  of	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  would	  be	  reasons	  for	  Paul	  to	  go	  to	  
the	  bookshop:	  
	  
(1c)	  John	  Steinbeck	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
(1d)	  John	  Schmidt	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
(1e)	  Frank	  Garvey	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
(1f)	  Jack	  Stargell	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  stipulation	  above	  that	  the	  names	  in	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  have	  distinct	  senses,	  
the	  propositions	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  for	  the	  Fregean	  will	  be	  distinct.	  	  Thus,	  in	  this	  
case,	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  implies	  that	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  here	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  
are	  distinct.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  typically	  having	  more	  reasons	  (count	  noun)	  to	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Φ	  leads	  to	  having	  more	  reason	  (mass	  noun)	  to	  Φ.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  Paul’s	  
having	  all	  the	  different	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  the	  bookshop	  leads	  to	  his	  having	  more	  
reason	  to	  go.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  seems	  that	  that	  at	  most	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  Paul	  has	  to	  go	  to	  
the	  bookshop	  provide	  him	  with	  all	  the	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  bookshop,	  and	  that	  many	  of	  
them	  simply	  will	  not	  contribute	  anything	  to	  his	  having	  more	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
bookshop.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  more	  reason	  problem.	  
	   Everson’s	  reply	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  this:	  
	  
Certainly,	  when	  we	  decide	  how	  we	  should	  act,	  we	  will	  be	  concerned	  to	  determine	  what	  
reasons	  there	  are	  for	  and	  against	  some	  course	  of	  action,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  a	  very	  crude	  
mistake	  to	  think	  that	  if	  there	  are	  more	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  than	  there	  are	  not	  to,	  this	  would	  
provide	  even	  prima	  facie	  support	  for	  inferring	  that	  there	  is	  more	  reason	  to	  Φ	  than	  not	  to	  Φ.	  
	  
Everson’s	  claim	  here	  seems	  right.	  	  We	  can	  readily	  imagine	  cases	  where	  agents	  have	  
many	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  but	  have,	  for	  example,	  one	  moral	  reason	  not	  to	  Φ	  that	  outweighs	  
the	  many	  reasons	  to	  Φ.	  	  For	  example,	  Max	  might	  have	  many	  reasons	  to	  take	  his	  
family	  on	  vacation:	  	  his	  partner	  needs	  it;	  his	  children	  have	  not	  been	  on	  vacation	  
since	  they	  were	  much	  younger;	  Max’s	  vacation	  time	  from	  work	  is	  about	  to	  expire,	  
etc.	  	  But	  he	  also	  has	  a	  strong	  countervailing	  reason	  not	  to	  take	  his	  family	  on	  
vacation:	  	  he	  promised	  to	  donate	  what	  would	  be	  his	  vacation	  money	  to	  the	  local	  
homeless	  shelter.	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  appears	  that	  Max	  has	  more	  reasons	  to	  take	  his	  
family	  on	  vacation,	  but	  he	  has	  more	  reason	  to	  donate	  to	  the	  homeless	  shelter.	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   Everson’s	  claim	  that	  having	  more	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  does	  not	  imply	  having	  more	  
reason	  to	  Φ	  is	  plausible.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  still	  a	  bit	  counterintuitive	  that	  there	  will	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  many	  more	  cases	  than	  we	  would	  have	  thought	  in	  which	  someone’s	  
having	  more	  reasons	  to	  Φ	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  their	  also	  having	  more	  reason	  to	  Φ.	  	  This	  
objection	  against	  Fregeanism	  is	  certainly	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  argument	  
against	  the	  position.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  the	  more	  reason	  problem	  is	  a	  counterintuitive	  
result	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  does	  well	  to	  avoid.	  
	   Nevertheless,	  even	  if	  the	  problem	  of	  more	  reason	  does	  not	  count	  significantly	  
against	  Fregeanism,	  there	  is	  another	  problem	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  that	  does.	  	  We	  
know	  that	  according	  to	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  
are	  distinct	  reasons	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  constituted	  by	  distinct	  senses.	  	  Imagine	  a	  case	  
where	  Paul	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop,	  and	  he	  has	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  in	  
mind	  because	  he	  knows	  that	  each	  of	  the	  names	  in	  them	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  individual.	  	  
Now,	  it	  seems	  false	  that	  Paul	  really	  is	  acting	  for	  distinct	  reasons	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Given	  
that	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  are	  different	  (for	  the	  Fregean)	  because	  they	  
are	  constituted	  by	  distinct	  senses,	  is	  it	  right	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  distinct	  reasons?	  	  If	  
we	  are	  inclined	  to	  answer	  negatively	  here,	  which	  I	  think	  we	  should	  be,	  then	  Fregean	  
propositionalism	  is	  in	  trouble	  because	  it	  predicts	  that	  these	  are	  distinct	  reasons.	  	  In	  
fact,	  this	  case	  shows	  that	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  predicts	  that	  there	  are	  possible	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10. If	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  is	  true,	  then	  Paul	  acts	  for	  more	  than	  one	  reason	  
in	  the	  case	  described.	  
11. Paul	  acts	  for	  only	  one	  reason	  in	  the	  case	  described.	  
	  
12.	  	  Therefore,	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  is	  false.	  
	  
	   Support	  for	  the	  premise	  10	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Paul	  case.	  	  Supposing	  that	  Fregean	  
propositionalism	  is	  true,	  Paul	  would	  have	  to	  act	  for	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐
(1f)	  because	  he	  believes	  each	  of	  the	  propositions	  and	  has	  them	  in	  mind	  as	  he	  goes	  to	  
the	  bookshop.	  	  But	  intuitively,	  Paul	  doesn’t	  act	  for	  each	  of	  these	  reasons.	  	  Indeed,	  we	  
can	  say	  more	  to	  defend	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  possible	  situations	  in	  which	  Paul	  
acts	  for	  too	  many	  reasons.	  	  Suppose	  Paul	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop	  and	  is	  motivationally	  
indifferent	  between	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)-­‐(1f).	  	  We	  can	  understand	  this	  
claim	  about	  motivational	  indifference	  in	  terms	  of	  motivational	  force.200	  The	  basic	  
idea	  here,	  though	  put	  sketchily,	  is	  that	  the	  things	  that	  motivate	  agents	  do	  so	  with	  a	  
particular	  internal	  force.	  	  For	  example,	  being	  hungry	  motivates	  people	  to	  get	  food,	  
and	  when	  we	  think	  about	  hunger	  as	  a	  motivation,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  
internal	  force—or	  something	  akin	  to	  an	  internal	  force—that	  it	  exerts	  pressure	  of	  
some	  kind	  on	  our	  motivational	  systems.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  seems	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  to	  
claim	  that	  motivating	  reasons	  work	  on	  our	  motivational	  systems	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  
way;	  there	  is	  an	  internal	  motivational	  force	  that	  they	  somehow	  exert	  on	  us.	  	  To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  I	  am	  speaking	  somewhat	  loosely	  here.	  	  In	  Section	  6.1	  in	  Chapter	  6	  below	  I	  argue	  
that	  reasons	  do	  not	  have	  motivational	  properties.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  they	  do	  have	  a	  role	  in	  
the	  motivation	  of	  action,	  though.	  	  My	  claims	  about	  reasons	  and	  motivation	  here	  
should	  be	  interpreted	  ultimately	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  I	  say	  about	  the	  issue	  below.	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claim,	  then,	  that	  Paul	  is	  motivationally	  indifferent	  between	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  
(1c)-­‐(1f)	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  these	  reasons	  have	  the	  same	  motivational	  force	  for	  Paul	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  none	  of	  the	  reasons	  provide	  any	  motivational	  force	  over	  and	  above	  
what	  the	  others	  provide.	  	  For	  example,	  Paul	  acts	  for	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1c),	  
and	  if	  the	  Fregean	  is	  right	  he	  also	  acts	  for	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1d).201	  	  Paul	  is	  
motivationally	  indifferent	  between	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)	  and	  (1d)	  when	  the	  
reason	  expressed	  by	  (1d)	  does	  not	  add	  any	  further	  motivational	  force	  for	  Paul’s	  
going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  
	   Cases	  involving	  motivational	  indifference	  are	  easily	  imaginable.	  	  Paul	  is	  
simply	  indifferent	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  person	  John	  Steinbeck	  can	  be	  
picked	  out	  via	  the	  different	  descriptive	  contents,	  even	  though	  he	  knows	  the	  various	  
ways	  captured	  in	  sentences	  (1c)-­‐(1f).	  Intuitively,	  these	  are	  not	  distinct	  reasons	  for	  
Paul’s	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  But	  if	  Fregeanism	  is	  true,	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  
by	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  are	  distinct	  reasons	  for	  Paul’s	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop.	  	  Thus,	  if	  Fregean	  
propositionalism	  is	  true,	  Paul	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  too	  many	  reasons.	  	  	  
	   Support	  for	  premise	  11	  is	  straightforward.	  	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  Paul	  only	  acts	  
for	  one	  reason	  when	  he	  goes	  to	  the	  bookshop	  given	  his	  motivational	  indifference	  to	  
what	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  other	  sentences.	  	  	  
	   The	  too	  many	  reasons	  argument	  seems	  to	  provide	  further	  support	  for	  the	  
Russellian	  theory	  of	  propositionalism.	  	  In	  the	  Paul	  case	  involving	  going	  to	  the	  
bookshop	  for	  John	  Steinbeck’s	  autograph	  we	  see	  that	  he	  only	  seems	  to	  act	  for	  one	  
reason	  despite	  the	  four	  different	  names	  in	  the	  subject	  place	  of	  sentences	  (1c)-­‐(1f).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  I	  consider	  the	  reasons	  expressed	  by	  (1c)	  and	  (1d)	  only	  here	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
simplicity.	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Indeed,	  Russellianism	  about	  reasons	  rightly	  predicts	  that	  Paul	  acts	  for	  one	  reason	  in	  
this	  case,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  it	  predicts	  that	  (1c)-­‐(1f)	  express	  the	  very	  same	  reason.	  	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  is	  
not	  a	  challenge	  to	  Fregean	  propositions.	  	  Rather	  it	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  
reasons	  are	  only	  Fregean	  propositions.	  	  Indeed,	  many	  agential	  reasons	  are,	  to	  be	  
sure,	  Fregean	  propositions.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  the	  problems	  Fregean	  propositionalism	  
faces	  gives	  us	  additional	  evidence	  for	  thinking	  that	  Russellian	  reasons	  are	  needed	  in	  
a	  complete	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  
	  	  
5.3.4	  Conclusion	  to	  Section	  5.3	  
At	  this	  point	  in	  the	  discussion	  I	  think	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Russellian	  
theory	  of	  propositionalism	  is	  the	  more	  viable	  candidate	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  The	  
too	  many	  reasons	  problem	  for	  motivating	  reasons	  just	  examined	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  
significant	  cost	  for	  Fregeanism.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  significant	  challenges	  to	  Russellian	  
propositionalism	  seem	  to	  have	  plausible	  solutions,	  and	  Russellian	  propositions	  
appear	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5.4	  Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  5	  
I	  began	  this	  chapter	  by	  citing	  the	  propositional	  nature	  of	  reasons	  in	  practical	  
reasoning	  as	  supporting	  propositionalism	  over	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  states	  of	  
affairs.	  	  Otherwise,	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  knockdown	  argument	  against	  the	  latter	  thesis.	  	  
We	  saw	  that	  Dancy	  thinks	  that	  propositionalism	  is	  false,	  but	  we	  struggled	  to	  get	  
	   177	  
clear	  on	  exactly	  why	  he	  thinks	  this.	  	  Every	  effort	  we	  made	  to	  get	  clear	  on	  his	  
argument	  failed	  to	  produce	  an	  argument	  against	  propositionalism.	  
	   Then	  I	  tried	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  Russellian	  or	  Fregean	  theory	  of	  
propositionalism	  is	  to	  be	  preferred.	  	  We	  saw	  that	  the	  Fregean	  theory	  has	  what	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  problem,	  and	  so	  Russellian	  propositionalism	  is	  the	  theory	  of	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Chapter	  6:	  
The	  Ontology	  of	  Reasons	  




In	  this	  chapter	  I	  deal	  with	  two	  further	  issues	  for	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons	  defended	  here.	  	  First,	  I	  argue	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  motivating	  in	  virtue	  of	  
having	  motivational	  properties.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  motivating	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  
believed	  by	  agents.	  	  The	  role	  reasons	  have	  in	  the	  motivational	  features	  of	  action	  is	  to	  
provide	  the	  content	  to	  our	  beliefs,	  which	  are	  the	  things	  that	  have	  motivational	  
properties.	  	  
	   Second,	  after	  clarifying	  the	  debate	  regarding	  whether	  purposes	  are	  reasons,	  I	  
briefly	  argue	  that	  purposes	  are	  not	  reasons.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  conception	  of	  practical	  
reasoning	  preferred	  here	  is	  one	  whereby	  purposes	  are	  things	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  
we	  reason	  in	  the	  first	  place	  regarding	  our	  actions,	  and	  consequently	  are	  things	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  which	  we	  act.	  	  Strictly	  speaking,	  then,	  purposes	  are	  not	  reasons	  for	  which	  
we	  act	  even	  though	  there	  are	  significant	  connections	  between	  reasons	  and	  
purposes.	  
	   Finally,	  I	  conclude	  this	  chapter	  by	  looking	  back	  briefly	  at	  Chapter	  3	  in	  order	  
to	  resolve	  the	  unfinished	  business	  regarding	  the	  Normativity	  Argument	  against	  
psychologism.	  	  There	  I	  offered	  theoretical	  unity	  objections	  against	  psychologism,	  
which	  can	  now	  be	  properly	  stated.	  	  Recall	  also	  that	  I	  argued	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  
regarding	  normative	  reasons,	  so	  if	  psychologism	  were	  true	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons,	  then	  it	  would	  mean	  that	  reasons	  are	  theoretically	  less	  unified	  than	  a	  theory	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of	  reasons	  where	  all	  reasons	  are	  of	  the	  same	  ontological	  kind.	  	  As	  claimed	  in	  Chapter	  
3,	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  cost	  to	  psychologism.	  	  
	  
6.1	  Propositionalism	  and	  Causes	  
	   There	  is	  a	  causal	  objection	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  I	  would	  briefly	  
like	  to	  respond	  to.	  	  The	  objection	  has	  it	  that	  if	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  then	  reasons	  
cannot	  have	  causal	  powers.	  	  And,	  if	  reasons	  cannot	  have	  causal	  powers,	  then	  they	  
cannot	  motivate	  action.202	  This	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  have	  the	  power	  to	  motivate	  action.	  	  In	  standard	  form:	  
	  
Causation	  Argument	  Against	  Propositionalism	  
13.	  If	  propositionalism	  is	  true,	  then	  reasons	  cannot	  have	  causal	  powers.	  
14.	  If	  reasons	  cannot	  have	  causal	  powers,	  then	  they	  cannot	  motivate	  action.	  
	  
15.	  	  Therefore,	  if	  propositionalism	  is	  true,	  then	  reasons	  cannot	  motivate	  action.	  
	  
On	  one	  reading	  of	  this	  argument,	  it	  appears	  sound,	  and	  thus	  propositionalism	  seems	  
committed	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  cannot	  motivate	  action.	  	  According	  to	  this	  
reading,	  premise	  13	  and	  14	  would	  be	  more	  precisely	  formulated	  thusly:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  reasons	  are	  causes	  has	  a	  longstanding	  history.	  	  I	  
assume	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  causes	  because	  of	  their	  abstract	  nature.	  	  However,	  in	  
what	  follows	  in	  this	  section	  I	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  implications	  this	  has	  for	  
reasons	  as	  motivating	  reasons.	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(13a)	  If	  propositionalism	  is	  true,	  then	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  cannot	  have	  causal	  
powers.	  
(14a)	  If	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  cannot	  have	  causal	  powers,	  then	  by	  themselves	  they	  
cannot	  motivate	  action.	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  what	  propositionalism	  is	  committed	  to	  regarding	  the	  
noncausal	  nature	  of	  reasons.	  	  Reasons	  are	  propositions,	  which	  are	  members	  of	  the	  
kind	  abstracta,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  lack	  causal	  powers.	  	  Call	  this	  view	  
noncausalism.	  	  So,	  keeping	  this	  in	  mind	  premise	  (13a)	  is	  true.	  	  Assuming	  motivation	  
is	  a	  species	  of	  causation	  (14a)	  is	  also	  true.	  	  Thus	  (15a)	  follows:	  
	  
(15a)	  Therefore,	  if	  propositionalism	  is	  true,	  then	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  cannot	  
motivate	  action.	  
	  
	   Should	  propositionalists	  accept	  (15a)?	  	  If	  we	  do,	  then	  this	  seems	  to	  mean	  that	  
propositionalism	  is	  faced	  with	  a	  serious	  problem:	  	  how	  can	  a	  theory	  of	  motivating	  
reasons	  not	  countenance	  the	  motivational	  efficacy	  of	  reasons?	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  
is	  a	  problem.	  	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  an	  account	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  does	  not	  
need	  an	  account	  whereby	  reasons	  themselves	  have	  motivational	  efficacy.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  
is	  an	  agent’s	  accepting	  (or	  believing)	  her	  reason	  that	  has	  motivational	  efficacy	  and	  
what	  accounts	  for	  why	  some	  reasons	  are	  motivating	  reasons.203	  Therefore,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  See	  Hilliard	  Aronovich	  (1979)	  for	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  reasoning	  for	  developing	  an	  
account	  of	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  Aronovich	  argues	  that	  reasons	  are	  considerations,	  
which	  lack	  causal	  powers,	  but	  agents’	  having	  reasons	  do	  have	  such	  powers.	  	  See	  also	  
Robert	  Audi	  (1986),	  who	  argues	  that	  reason-­states	  and	  not	  reasons	  proper	  have	  
causal	  powers.	  	  Finally,	  Markus	  Schlosser	  (2011)	  also	  recognizes	  Audi’s	  claim	  as	  a	  
viable	  option.	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argument	  continues,	  reasons	  are	  not	  motivating	  reasons	  because	  they	  motivate;	  
instead,	  they	  are	  motivating	  reasons	  because	  they	  are	  appropriately	  related	  to	  
agents’	  psychologies.	  	  For	  example,	  Oedipus’	  believing	  that	  his	  fiancé	  is	  waiting	  to	  
marry	  him	  at	  the	  church,	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  his	  fiancé	  is	  waiting	  to	  
marry	  him	  at	  the	  church,	  motivate	  him	  to	  go	  to	  the	  church.	  	  However,	  the	  reason	  
here,	  namely,	  that	  Oedipus’	  fiancé	  is	  waiting	  at	  the	  church	  to	  marry	  him,	  by	  itself	  is	  
causally	  and	  thus	  motivationally	  inert.	  	  Once	  Oedipus	  believes	  what	  he	  does,	  then	  
the	  fact	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  his	  fiancé	  is	  waiting	  to	  marry	  him	  at	  the	  church	  is	  what	  
has	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  getting	  Oedipus	  to	  go	  to	  the	  church.	  
	   Since	  noncausalism	  about	  motivating	  reasons	  appears	  correct,	  we	  see	  that	  it	  
is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  the	  technical	  philosophical	  term	  ‘motivating	  reason’	  refers	  
to	  a	  reason	  that	  has	  the	  property	  of	  motivating.	  	  On	  this	  view	  reasons	  do	  not	  have	  
such	  properties.	  	  But	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  believing	  can	  have	  the	  property	  of	  being	  
motivating.	  	  Thus,	  a	  motivating	  reason	  is	  (typically)	  a	  reason	  that	  the	  agent	  believes,	  
where	  this	  psychological	  state	  (or	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  in	  the	  psychological	  state,	  
which	  consists	  of	  the	  reason)	  motivates	  agents.	  	  	  
	   It	  seems	  true	  that	  psychological	  states	  (including	  those	  with	  propositional	  
contents)	  have	  causal	  properties.	  	  If	  the	  view	  defended	  here	  is	  right	  and	  reasons	  are	  
propositions,	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  as	  if	  reasons	  themselves	  lack	  causal	  properties.	  	  
However,	  some	  might	  argue	  that	  it	  seems	  manifestly	  false	  that	  reasons	  by	  
themselves	  cannot	  motivate	  action.	  	  If	  these	  three	  seemings	  are	  correct,	  then	  (14a)	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is	  false	  because	  reasons	  can	  be	  motivational	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  causal.204	  	  Some	  
might	  argue	  that	  agents	  are	  motivated	  to	  action	  by	  reasons	  all	  the	  time,	  but	  this	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  their	  reasons	  cause	  their	  actions.	  	  Defenders	  of	  this	  thesis	  maintain	  
that	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  motivate	  action	  without	  thereby	  causing	  action.	  	  Call	  this	  
view	  rational	  motivationism.	  	  Let’s	  look	  at	  a	  case	  where	  it	  might	  appear	  that	  agents	  
are	  motivated	  by	  reasons	  themselves.	  	  I	  will	  show	  that	  this	  move	  ultimately	  fails,	  
and	  that	  rational	  motivationism	  is	  false.	  
	   Leah	  listens	  to	  a	  documentary	  put	  together	  by	  activists	  on	  the	  killing	  of	  
dolphins	  in	  the	  seas	  surrounding	  Japan.	  	  We	  can	  suppose	  that	  this	  documentary	  
does	  not	  appeal	  to	  emotional	  language	  or	  violent	  descriptions.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  
sustained	  valid	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  dolphins	  are	  killed	  unnecessarily.	  	  She	  
believes	  the	  argument’s	  premises,	  so	  she	  agrees	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  dolphins	  
are	  killed	  unnecessarily.	  	  Leah	  then	  becomes	  an	  activist	  for	  dolphins.	  	  Someone	  who	  
argues	  that	  reasons	  themselves	  can	  motivate	  might	  claim	  that	  it	  was	  the	  argument	  
for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  dolphins	  are	  killed	  unnecessarily	  that	  motivated	  her	  to	  
become	  an	  activist	  for	  dolphins.	  	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  the	  reasons	  (qua	  premises)	  
motivated	  Leah	  to	  become	  an	  activist.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  Sehon	  (2005:	  chapter	  10)	  argues	  against	  those	  who	  take	  motivations	  to	  be	  causal	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  considerations	  involving	  statements	  we	  might	  make	  in	  ordinary	  
language	  such	  as:	  	  her	  overwhelming	  desire	  to	  win	  motivated	  her	  to	  cheat.	  	  Sehon	  
claims	  that	  he	  does	  not	  “hear”	  the	  term	  ‘motivated’	  to	  imply	  anything	  causal,	  and	  
then	  he	  claims	  that	  ‘motivate’	  just	  originates	  from	  the	  French	  ‘motif’,	  which	  just	  
means	  ‘reason’.	  	  Of	  course,	  etymology	  will	  not	  decide	  this	  matter.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  Sehon	  thinks	  that	  desires	  can	  be	  agential	  reasons,	  which	  means	  that	  he	  
thinks	  that	  mental	  states	  can	  be	  agential	  reasons.	  	  Nevertheless,	  he	  denies	  that	  
agential	  reasons	  and	  mental	  states	  have	  causal	  powers.	  
	   183	  
However,	  opponents	  of	  rational	  motivationism	  have	  an	  objection	  to	  this	  
argument.	  	  They	  might	  describe	  this	  case	  as	  Leah	  becoming	  convinced	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  
the	  premises	  of	  the	  valid	  argument,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  Leah’s	  being	  convinced	  that	  
motivated	  her	  to	  become	  an	  activist.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is,	  for	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  Leah	  is	  
convinced,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  eat	  dolphins	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
healthy	  that	  motivates	  her	  to	  be	  an	  activist.	  	  The	  basic	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  Leah’s	  
psychology	  has	  to	  be	  appropriately	  related	  to	  the	  abstract	  claims	  of	  the	  argument	  
such	  that	  she	  can	  be	  motivated	  to	  act	  for	  them.	  	  Being	  convinced	  by	  a	  premise	  or	  
argument	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  this	  psychological	  relation	  can	  be	  satisfied.	  	  If	  this	  is	  
right,	  then	  we	  do	  not	  have	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  
motivate	  action,	  because	  being	  convinced	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  eat	  dolphins	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  healthy	  is	  a	  psychological	  state.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  rational	  motivationist	  might	  object	  here	  by	  making	  the	  following	  
distinction.	  	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  claim	  that	  motivation	  depends	  on	  an	  agent’s	  
psychological	  states,	  and	  quite	  another	  to	  say	  that	  this	  thereby	  shows	  that	  reasons	  
do	  not	  have	  a	  role	  in	  motivating	  agents.	  	  We	  should	  all	  agree	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  
motivation	  depends	  on	  an	  agent’s	  psychological	  states.	  	  But	  by	  agreeing	  to	  it,	  the	  
argument	  goes,	  we	  are	  not	  compelled	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  are	  
motivationally	  impotent,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  causally	  inert.	  	  More	  positively,	  the	  
counter-­‐objection	  continues	  with	  an	  argument	  that	  goes	  like	  this:	  	  what	  Leah	  is	  
convinced	  by	  has	  some	  role	  in	  her	  becoming	  a	  dolphin	  activist	  as	  opposed	  to	  
becoming	  or	  doing	  something	  else.	  	  What	  role	  could	  this	  be	  except	  for	  a	  motivational	  
one?	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The	  opponent	  of	  the	  rational	  motivationist	  counter-­‐replies	  here	  by	  claiming	  
that	  the	  role	  reasons	  have	  in	  motivating	  action	  is	  to	  provide	  content	  for	  the	  beliefs	  
we	  have	  which	  in	  turn	  have	  the	  power	  to	  motivate	  us.	  	  This	  means	  that	  beliefs	  
motivate,	  and	  they	  motivate	  in	  the	  manners	  consistent	  with	  their	  propositional	  
contents.	  	  Not	  all	  beliefs	  are	  the	  same,	  of	  course.	  	  They	  vary	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  
contents,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  content	  of	  Leah’s	  belief	  (her	  being	  convinced)	  that	  we	  
do	  not	  need	  to	  eat	  dolphins	  in	  order	  to	  be	  healthy	  has	  a	  role	  in	  her	  becoming	  a	  
dolphin	  activist.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  role	  reasons	  have	  is	  not	  motivational;	  rather,	  it	  is	  to	  
provide	  the	  content	  to	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  beliefs	  in	  turn	  motivate	  us	  as	  they	  do	  in	  
accordance	  with	  that	  content.	  
One	  further	  response	  to	  someone	  who	  wishes	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  conceptual	  
disconnect	  between	  motivation	  and	  causation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  
motivation	  would	  be	  were	  it	  not	  a	  species	  of	  causation.	  	  Perhaps	  those	  who	  think	  
that	  motivation	  is	  not	  causation	  are	  led	  to	  this	  claim	  because	  they	  think	  that	  were	  it	  
causal,	  then	  human	  action	  would	  be	  determined	  by	  our	  motivations.	  	  But	  this	  move	  
seems	  wrong.	  	  Motivations	  can	  have	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  influencing	  agents	  without	  
thereby	  determining	  their	  behaviors.	  	  What	  motivations	  might	  causally	  determine	  is	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  influence	  that	  will	  be	  had	  on	  an	  agent,	  but	  again	  this	  influence	  need	  
not	  in	  turn	  causally	  determine	  what	  agents	  do.205	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  I	  have	  Timothy	  O’Connor’s	  (2000,	  2005)	  work	  on	  agent	  causation	  in	  mind	  here.	  	  
O’Connor,	  rightly	  in	  my	  opinion,	  thinks	  that	  agents’	  actions	  are	  not	  wholly	  uncaused	  
causes.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  partially	  caused	  by	  internal	  influences	  (reasons,	  intentions,	  
motivations,	  etc.).	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  assume	  here	  that	  agents	  as	  substances	  also	  have	  a	  
causal	  role	  in	  their	  actions	  where	  ‘agents’	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  
sense.	  	  I	  cannot	  take	  up	  a	  defense	  of	  these	  claims	  here,	  but	  they	  are	  part	  of	  my	  larger	  
picture	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  agency.	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   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  say	  just	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  the	  necessary	  
connection	  between	  agential	  psychologies	  and	  their	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  In	  Chapter	  4	  
I	  solved	  the	  psychology	  problem	  for	  anti-­‐psychologism	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  
necessary	  connection	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  acting	  for	  reasons	  consists,	  in	  part,	  of	  
believing	  one’s	  reasons.	  	  To	  add	  to	  this,	  the	  reason	  that	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  just	  
consists,	  in	  part,	  of	  believing	  one’s	  reasons	  is	  that	  believing	  one’s	  reason	  has	  a	  
causal-­‐motivational	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  action.	  	  Acting	  for	  a	  reason	  is	  being	  so	  
motivated	  by	  one’s	  believing	  a	  reason	  that	  one	  acts	  for	  it,	  and	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  this	  
motivation	  has	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  an	  action.	  	  Nevertheless,	  we	  have	  
also	  seen	  that	  reasons	  themselves	  do	  not	  have	  motivational	  powers,	  but	  when	  
reasons	  are	  properly	  related	  to	  agents’	  psychologies	  the	  resulting	  psychological	  
states	  can	  be	  motivating.	  	  We	  see	  again	  where	  psychologists	  have	  gone	  wrong	  in	  
their	  thinking	  about	  motivating	  reasons.	  	  They	  take	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  to	  be	  
motivating,	  and	  in	  order	  for	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case	  reasons	  must	  themselves	  be	  
psychological	  states.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  they	  are	  wrong	  about	  this	  even	  though	  they	  
are	  right	  that	  psychological	  states	  are	  the	  things	  with	  the	  power	  to	  motivate	  action.	  
	   We	  have	  one	  final	  issue	  here	  with	  which	  to	  contend.	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  
section	  appear	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  reasons	  supported	  in	  
Chapter	  5	  (Section	  5.3).	  	  If	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  that	  motivate	  in	  virtue	  of	  
being	  believed	  by	  agents,	  then	  what	  about	  Saul’s	  denial	  that	  he	  believed	  that	  Samuel	  
Clemens	  was	  signing	  autographs	  at	  the	  bookshop?	  	  How	  can	  the	  reason	  expressed	  
by	  (1b)	  be	  said	  to	  be	  Saul’s	  motivating	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop?	  	  To	  remind	  
the	  reader:	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(1a)	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  signing	  autographs	  at	  the	  bookshop.	  
(1b)	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  signing	  autographs	  at	  the	  bookshop.	  
	  	  	  
The	  Russellian	  propositionalist	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  apparent	  
problem.	  	  Saul	  believes	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1a),	  so	  he	  also	  believes	  the	  reason	  
expressed	  by	  (1b);	  only	  he	  fails	  to	  see	  that	  the	  latter	  expresses	  the	  same	  reason	  
expressed	  by	  (1a).	  	  Thus,	  Saul	  actually	  believes	  the	  reason	  expressed	  by	  (1b)	  but	  
only	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  sentence	  (1a).	  
	   We	  can	  offset	  much	  of	  the	  counterintuitiveness	  of	  the	  Russellian	  move	  here.	  	  
Since	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  motivating	  reasons	  for	  which	  Saul	  went	  to	  the	  
bookshop,	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  he	  believed	  a	  reason,	  and	  was	  thus	  able	  to	  
act	  for	  that	  reason.	  	  When	  we	  think	  about	  the	  case	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  Saul	  
went	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  reason	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  was	  there	  giving	  out	  autographs,	  
and	  this	  is	  right;	  this	  was	  his	  reason.	  	  Now	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  claim	  that	  Saul	  
went	  to	  the	  bookshop	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  there	  signing	  
autographs,	  we	  hesitate	  to	  think	  that	  this	  was	  also	  his	  reason	  for	  going.	  	  We	  do	  this	  
because	  we	  are	  tempted	  (falsely)	  to	  think	  that	  this	  is	  a	  different	  reason	  than	  the	  
reason	  that	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	  	  The	  
Russellian	  maintains	  that	  these	  propositions	  are	  the	  same.	  	  Thus,	  according	  to	  the	  
Russellian	  propositionalist,	  if	  Saul	  acted	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  was	  at	  the	  
bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs,	  he	  thereby	  acts	  for	  the	  very	  same	  reason	  that	  
Samuel	  Clemens	  was	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs.	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The	  confusion	  here	  is	  partly	  based	  in	  already	  thinking	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  
Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  giving	  out	  autographs	  at	  the	  bookshop	  is	  a	  different	  reason	  than	  
the	  claim	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  this	  is	  wrong.	  	  Saul’s	  motivating	  
reason	  for	  going	  to	  the	  bookshop	  is	  one	  proposition	  with	  two	  guises.	  	  We	  clear	  up	  
the	  confusion	  here	  by	  maintaining	  that	  Saul	  does	  not	  think	  he	  believes	  the	  reason	  
when	  it	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  sentence	  with	  the	  name	  ‘Samuel	  Clemens’	  in	  it.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  he	  believes	  this	  very	  same	  reason	  when	  it	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  
sentence	  with	  the	  name	  ‘Mark	  Twain’	  in	  it.	  	  	  
So	  we	  see	  that	  that	  Russellian	  theory	  of	  reasons	  defended	  in	  Section	  5.3	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  motivational	  role	  reasons	  have	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  
action.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  agents	  must	  believe	  a	  reason	  for	  it	  to	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  
in	  action.	  	  The	  Saul	  case	  does	  not	  count	  against	  this	  because	  he	  does	  believe	  the	  
reason	  expressed	  by	  (1b);	  only	  he	  believes	  it	  under	  a	  different	  guise,	  namely	  as	  the	  
claim	  that	  Mark	  Twain	  is	  at	  the	  bookshop	  giving	  out	  autographs,	  which	  is	  the	  reason	  
expressed	  by	  (1a).	  
	  
6.2	  Propositionalism	  and	  Purposes	  	  
The	  next	  issue	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  teleology.	  	  There	  are	  teleological	  theories	  of	  
reasons,	  which	  have	  it	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  purposes.	  	  Many	  seem	  to	  
countenance	  the	  claim	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  purposes.206	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  
argue	  that	  the	  teleological	  theory	  of	  reasons	  is	  false	  and	  that	  the	  general	  claim	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  See	  Schueler	  (2003),	  Sehon	  (2005),	  and	  Goetz	  (2010)	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all	  purposes	  are	  reasons	  is	  false.	  	  Then,	  I	  sketch	  a	  brief	  argument	  against	  the	  more	  
modest	  claim	  that	  some	  purposes	  are	  reasons.207	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   A	  teleological	  theory	  of	  reasons	  has	  it	  that	  reasons	  are	  the	  goals	  or	  purposes	  
for	  which	  agents	  Φ.	  	  Consider	  Katherine.	  	  Katherine’s	  reason	  for	  driving	  to	  Napa	  
Valley,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  is	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  enjoying	  a	  wine-­‐tasting	  vacation	  with	  her	  
girlfriend.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Katherine	  drives	  to	  Napa	  Valley	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  a	  wine-­‐
tasting	  vacation	  with	  her	  girlfriend.	  	  Additionally,	  Katherine	  saying	  “I	  drove	  to	  Napa	  
Valley	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  a	  wine-­‐tasting	  vacation	  with	  my	  girlfriend”	  would	  appear	  to	  
be	  a	  very	  natural	  response	  to	  a	  query	  for	  Katherine’s	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  Napa	  
Valley.	  	  	  
There	  are	  other	  standard	  teleological	  expressions	  that	  we	  use	  to	  state	  what	  
we	  take	  to	  be	  our	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  	  Linda	  might	  claim	  that	  her	  reason	  for	  drinking	  
an	  iced	  tea	  is	  because	  she	  is	  thirsty.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  be	  natural	  for	  Daniel	  to	  
claim	  that	  his	  reason	  for	  going	  to	  night	  school	  is	  in	  order	  to	  get	  his	  college	  degree	  
while	  he	  works.	  	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  including	  the	  Katherine	  case	  above,	  the	  
common	  feature	  of	  the	  explanation	  is	  the	  statement	  of	  the	  goal	  or	  purpose.	  	  The	  
latter	  are	  frequently	  indicated	  by	  teleological	  connectives	  like	  ‘in	  order	  to’,	  ‘because’	  
or	  even	  ‘to’.	  
In	  general,	  human	  actions	  are	  goal-­‐oriented	  or	  end-­‐seeking.208	  	  Katherine’s	  
goal	  is	  to	  enjoy	  a	  wine-­‐tasting	  vacation.	  	  Linda’s	  goal	  is	  to	  quench	  her	  thirst.	  	  Daniel’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  I	  specify	  the	  relevant	  subset	  of	  purposes	  below.	  	  	  
208	  My	  discussion	  here	  will	  focus	  on	  instrumental	  purposes	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  though	  much	  
of	  what	  I	  say	  in	  regard	  to	  them	  applies,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	  intrinsic	  purposes	  for	  
Φ-­‐ing.	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goal	  is	  to	  earn	  his	  college	  degree.	  	  Very	  often	  our	  goals	  are	  present	  to	  us	  when	  we	  
act,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  not	  present,	  they	  are	  easily	  retrievable.	  	  Moreover,	  sometimes	  
our	  goals	  are	  made	  tacitly;	  we	  form	  them	  sometimes	  without	  conscious	  reflection	  on	  
the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  form	  them.	  	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  in	  these	  cases	  the	  
goals	  are	  not	  themselves	  had	  for	  reasons.	  	  If	  some	  of	  our	  desires	  are	  had	  for	  reasons,	  
then	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  some	  of	  our	  goals	  are	  had	  for	  reasons	  too,	  provided	  desires	  
determine	  the	  content	  of	  our	  goals.	  	  Daniel	  might	  have	  the	  desire	  to	  earn	  his	  college	  
degree,	  and	  thereby	  have	  the	  goal	  of	  earning	  his	  college	  degree,	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  
he	  believes	  it	  will	  help	  him	  find	  employment	  in	  line	  with	  his	  interests.	  
We	  also	  form	  goals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  non-­‐rational	  factors	  like	  bodily	  desires,	  
e.g.,	  hunger,	  thirst,	  and	  sex	  urges.	  	  The	  example	  above	  of	  Linda’s	  goal	  to	  quench	  her	  
thirst	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐rational	  goal.	  	  However,	  some	  goals	  based	  on	  bodily	  
appetites	  or	  needs,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  can	  also	  be	  rational	  goals.	  	  Someone	  can	  
desire	  to	  have	  sex	  for	  reasons,	  and	  insofar	  as	  this	  is	  possible	  a	  person	  can	  also	  have	  
the	  goal	  to	  have	  sex	  but	  do	  so	  for	  reasons	  and	  not	  just	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  an	  urge.	  
We	  now	  have	  a	  decent	  sense	  of	  what	  purposes	  are	  and	  what	  the	  teleological	  
theory	  is	  committed	  to.	  	  I	  have	  a	  straightforward	  argument	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  
agential	  reasons	  are	  purposes.	  	  At	  least	  some	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  propositional	  
contents	  of	  agential	  beliefs.	  	  If	  at	  least	  some	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  propositional	  
contents	  of	  agential	  beliefs,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  agential	  reasons	  are	  
purposes	  because	  purposes	  are	  (at	  least	  sometimes)	  the	  contents	  of	  agential	  desires,	  
and	  are	  never	  the	  content	  of	  agential	  beliefs.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  
agential	  reasons	  are	  purposes.	  	  I	  take	  it	  to	  be	  indisputable	  that	  if	  some	  agential	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reasons	  are	  not	  purposes,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  agential	  reasons	  are	  always	  
purposes.	  	  Support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  at	  least	  some	  agential	  reasons	  are	  the	  contents	  
of	  agential	  beliefs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  above.	  	  	  
It	  would	  be	  best	  to	  continue	  by	  considering	  the	  teleological	  claim	  that	  some	  
purposes	  are	  reasons	  instead	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  purposes.	  	  That	  is,	  
even	  if	  it	  is	  false	  that	  all	  agential	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  purposes,	  it	  might	  
still	  be	  true	  that	  all	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  claim	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  
here	  is	  whether	  purposes	  are	  agential	  reasons—reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ,	  not	  the	  
more	  generic	  claim	  that	  purposes	  are	  reasons	  why	  agents	  Φ.209	  	  Also,	  the	  view	  that	  
all	  purposes	  are	  reasons	  is	  false	  if	  we	  understand	  it	  to	  mean	  a	  universal	  claim	  about	  
purposes,	  i.e.,	  every	  purpose	  for	  which	  an	  agent	  acts	  is	  such	  that	  it	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  
which	  agents	  act.	  	  When	  we	  think	  about	  some	  purposive	  things	  agents	  do,	  e.g.,	  
spiders	  spin	  webs	  in	  order	  to	  catch	  insects,	  dogs	  dig	  holes	  to	  bury	  bones,	  et	  cetera,	  it	  
seems	  obvious	  that	  they	  are	  not	  acting	  from	  reasons	  at	  all.	  	  We	  will	  even	  see	  in	  the	  
next	  paragraph	  that	  some	  things	  human	  agents	  do	  purposively	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  
done	  for	  reasons.	  	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  someone	  thinks	  that	  some	  purposes	  are	  agential	  
reasons	  because	  agents	  act	  for	  them,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  actions	  that	  are	  done	  
purposively	  are	  done	  as	  a	  result	  of	  agents	  performing	  their	  actions	  for	  their	  
purposes.	  	  Let’s	  turn	  to	  Alvarez’s	  argument	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  human	  
purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  Even	  if	  purposes	  are	  not	  agential	  reasons,	  they	  could	  be	  among	  the	  things	  that	  
are	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  why	  it	  is	  that	  agents	  Φ.	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Maria	  Alvarez	  offers	  the	  following	  line	  of	  argument	  against	  the	  teleological	  
view	  now	  under	  consideration.210	  There	  are	  many	  things	  we	  do	  purposively	  (for	  
purposes)	  that	  intuitively	  are	  not	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  My	  goal	  is	  to	  protect	  my	  face	  
from	  the	  oncoming	  baseball,	  but	  my	  behavior	  is	  reflexive.	  	  Shawn’s	  purpose	  in	  
reaching	  for	  her	  cigarettes	  is	  to	  smoke	  one,	  but	  her	  behavior	  is	  the	  result	  of	  habit	  
upon	  hearing	  bad	  news.	  	  In	  neither	  case	  are	  we	  acting	  for	  reasons.	  	  Cases	  like	  these	  
could	  be	  multiplied	  to	  show	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  purpose	  and	  reason	  pull	  widely	  
apart.	  	  Here	  we	  have	  only	  dealt	  with	  adult	  human	  behaviors.	  	  There	  are	  plenty	  of	  
non-­‐human	  cases	  that	  could	  be	  displayed	  or	  contrived	  to	  show	  even	  more	  variance	  
between	  reasons	  and	  purposes,	  again,	  e.g.,	  the	  spider	  spins	  its	  web	  to	  trap	  the	  fly.211	  
The	  argumentative	  strategy	  here	  is	  straightforward:	  	  we	  are	  able	  to	  think	  of	  cases	  
where	  agents	  act	  purposively	  but	  not	  for	  reasons;	  therefore,	  we	  conclude	  purposes	  
are	  not	  reasons.	  	  The	  case	  of	  my	  protecting	  my	  face	  from	  an	  oncoming	  baseball	  
appears	  to	  be	  one	  that	  is	  purposive:	  	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  protect	  my	  face.	  	  Yet	  I	  do	  not	  seem	  
to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  
	  The	  teleologist	  might	  object	  to	  Alvarez’a	  argument.	  	  They	  might	  challenge	  
the	  case	  of	  my	  reflexive	  response	  to	  the	  baseball	  traveling	  toward	  my	  face	  (and	  
cases	  like	  it)	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  	  It	  is	  agreed	  that	  I	  act	  purposively	  by	  lifting	  my	  
arm	  and	  hands	  to	  protect	  my	  face	  from	  a	  baseball.	  	  But	  surely,	  it	  is	  argued,	  I	  also	  
have	  the	  belief	  that	  a	  baseball	  is	  coming	  my	  way.	  	  The	  content	  of	  this	  belief	  is	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  Alvarez	  (2010:	  191-­‐194).	  
211	  The	  examples	  in	  the	  previous	  examples	  each	  show,	  at	  best,	  that	  acting	  
purposively	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  acting	  for	  a	  reason.	  	  There	  may	  still	  be	  a	  necessary	  
connection	  between	  acting	  for	  reasons	  and	  acting	  purposively.	  	  In	  fact,	  I	  suspect	  
there	  is,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  this	  issue	  up	  here.	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presumably	  the	  proposition,	  say,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  baseball	  coming	  my	  way,	  which	  
would	  in	  different	  circumstances	  be	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  I	  act	  to	  protect	  my	  face.	  	  
So,	  the	  objection	  goes:	  	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  ingredients	  are	  in	  place	  here	  for	  claiming	  
that	  I’m	  acting	  for	  a	  reason,	  so	  I	  appear	  to	  be	  acting	  for	  a	  reason;	  and,	  if	  I	  am	  acting	  
for	  a	  reason	  in	  this	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  also	  appear	  to	  be	  possible	  for	  my	  purpose	  to	  
be	  my	  reason	  in	  cases	  where	  I	  act	  reflexively.	  	  That	  is,	  I	  have	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  
baseball	  is	  coming	  at	  my	  face,	  where	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  in	  other	  cases	  would	  
serve	  as	  my	  reason.	  	  And,	  if	  I	  am	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  in	  this	  case,	  then	  it	  is	  false	  that	  I	  
am	  acting	  purposively	  and	  not	  for	  a	  reason.	  
I’d	  like	  to	  consider	  two	  lines	  of	  reply	  to	  this	  objection.	  	  First,	  it	  seems	  false	  
that	  I	  acted	  for	  a	  reason	  in	  the	  case	  of	  protecting	  my	  face	  from	  an	  oncoming	  baseball.	  	  
It	  can	  be	  agreed	  that	  many	  of	  the	  same	  ingredients	  are	  present	  in	  this	  case	  as	  are	  
present	  in	  cases	  where	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  agent	  is	  present,	  the	  
belief	  is	  present,	  and	  the	  propositional	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  is	  present.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
acting	  for	  a	  reason	  involves	  more	  than	  just	  agents	  having	  beliefs	  with	  their	  
propositional	  contents.	  	  What	  is	  also	  needed	  is	  that	  the	  proposition	  be	  part	  of	  a	  
reasoning	  process	  that	  in	  some	  way	  contributes	  to	  an	  action.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
baseball	  coming	  at	  my	  face,	  I	  believe	  the	  baseball	  is	  coming,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  
reasoning	  about	  what	  I	  believe.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  baseball	  threatens	  my	  well-­‐being,	  
and	  reflexive	  behavior	  takes	  over,	  so	  the	  proposition	  that	  I	  believe	  here	  is	  not	  part	  of	  
some	  rational	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  my	  face.	  	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  false	  to	  
claim	  that	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  cases	  just	  because	  some	  of	  the	  
ingredients	  necessary	  for	  acting	  for	  reasons	  are	  present	  in	  them.	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The	  second	  reply	  to	  the	  objection	  is	  that	  even	  if	  it	  were	  conceded	  that	  in	  
cases	  involving	  reflexive	  (or	  habitual)	  behavior	  based	  on	  our	  beliefs	  were	  ones	  in	  
which	  we	  acted	  for	  reasons,	  it	  would	  still	  not	  follow	  that	  some	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  
The	  strategy	  above	  used	  to	  show	  that	  reasons	  and	  purposes	  pull	  apart	  involved	  
trying	  to	  provide	  examples	  of	  behaviors	  that	  are	  done	  purposively	  but	  which	  do	  not	  
seem	  to	  be	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  Now,	  I	  think	  these	  cases	  show	  this,	  but	  even	  if	  they	  
don’t	  it	  could	  still	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  action	  was	  performed	  for	  reasons	  and	  was	  
done	  purposively.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  these	  cases	  the	  purposiveness	  itself	  seems	  to	  be	  
reflexive	  or	  habitual.	  	  The	  main	  point	  here	  is	  that	  even	  if	  it	  were	  true	  that	  every	  
purposive	  action	  were	  also	  done	  for	  a	  reason,	  this	  would	  not	  show	  that	  reasons	  are	  
purposes.	  	  It	  could	  turn	  out	  that	  reasons	  for	  action	  are	  contents	  of	  our	  beliefs	  and	  
that	  purposes	  are	  contents	  of	  our	  desires.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  
purposes	  are	  human	  agents’	  reasons	  to	  be	  true,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  these	  
purposes	  are	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ.	  	  It	  is	  insufficient	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  
conclude	  that	  all	  human	  purposes	  are	  reasons	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  purposive	  actions	  
are	  done	  for	  reasons.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  could	  well	  be	  that	  many	  purposive	  actions	  
are	  done	  for	  reasons,	  and	  the	  reasons	  are	  distinct	  things	  altogether	  from	  the	  
purposes.	  
I	  think	  Alvarez’s	  argument	  does	  well	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  view	  that	  all	  human	  
purposes	  are	  reasons.212	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  reflexive	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  our	  purposive	  
behavior	  speaks	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  human	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Alvarez	  may	  have	  hit	  her	  target	  when	  we	  she	  offered	  her	  
argument	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  human	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  I	  go	  on	  to	  consider	  
another	  claim	  here.	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Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  a	  more	  modest	  claim	  about	  human	  purposes	  that	  could	  still	  be	  
true,	  namely,	  that	  some	  human	  reasons	  are	  purposes.	  	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  
sometimes	  agents	  act	  purposively	  by	  having	  a	  purpose	  in	  mind	  for	  which	  they	  Φ.	  	  
Katherine	  goes	  to	  Napa	  Valley	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  enjoying	  a	  wine-­‐tasting	  vacation	  
there.	  	  Katherine	  is	  not	  acting	  purposively	  out	  of	  instinct	  or	  reflex	  or	  habit.	  	  She	  has	  a	  
purpose	  in	  mind	  and	  acts	  for	  it.	  	  Reasons,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  very	  similar.	  	  Agents	  have	  
reasons	  in	  mind	  for	  Φ-­‐ing,	  and	  then	  they	  act	  for	  these	  reasons.	  	  Thus,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  
the	  purposes	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ	  are	  also	  among	  their	  reasons	  for	  Φ-­‐ing.	  
It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  even	  though	  purposes	  are	  often	  things	  agents	  have	  in	  
mind	  when	  they	  Φ,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  also	  things	  for	  which	  they	  Φ,	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  
that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  agents	  Φ.	  	  We	  can	  see	  why	  
this	  doesn’t	  follow	  most	  clearly	  by	  considering	  a	  plausible	  manner	  of	  thinking	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  practical	  reasoning.213	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  agential	  purposes	  are	  
often	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  our	  practical	  reasoning	  even	  though	  purposes	  do	  not	  
feature	  as	  premises.	  	  Instead,	  the	  purposes	  are	  the	  things	  that	  our	  practical	  
reasoning	  attempts	  to	  aim	  toward	  accomplishing.	  	  Katherine	  wants	  to	  go	  on	  a	  wine-­‐
tasting	  vacation,	  so	  she	  has	  the	  purpose	  of	  going	  on	  a	  wine-­‐tasting	  vacation.	  	  
Katherine	  then	  reasons	  practically	  about	  satisfying	  her	  desire	  and	  accomplishing	  
her	  purpose.	  	  She	  reasons	  that	  Napa	  Valley	  is	  an	  excellent	  vacation	  place,	  that	  it	  
boasts	  of	  very	  good	  wines,	  and	  that	  she	  can	  afford	  to	  take	  a	  vacation	  there.	  	  She	  
concludes	  her	  practical	  reasoning	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  she	  will	  go	  to	  Napa	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  Alvarez	  (2010a).	  	  Alvarez’s	  view	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  Aristotle,	  St.	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  
and	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe.	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Valley.	  	  So	  Katherine’s	  reasons	  here	  are	  for	  the	  action	  that	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  
satisfaction	  of	  her	  goal	  to	  go	  on	  vacation.	  	  There	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  to	  
think	  that	  Katherine’s	  purpose—her	  going	  on	  vacation—provides	  an	  additional	  
reason	  for	  her	  going	  to	  Napa	  Valley.	  
Katherine’s	  purposes	  for	  acting,	  like	  her	  reasons	  for	  acting,	  do	  have	  a	  
motivational	  role	  in	  her	  actions.	  	  Aristotle	  says	  this	  about	  reasons	  and	  purposes:	  
	  
Both	  of	  these	  [reasons	  and	  purposes]	  are	  capable	  of	  originating	  local	  movement,	  thought	  
and	  appetite;	  thought,	  that	  is	  what	  calculates	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  i.e.,	  practical	  thought	  (it	  
differs	  from	  speculative	  thought	  in	  the	  character	  of	  its	  end);	  while	  appetite	  [desires	  and	  
purposes]	  is	  in	  every	  form	  of	  it	  relative	  to	  an	  end;	  for	  that	  which	  is	  the	  object	  of	  appetite	  
[content	  of	  desires]	  is	  the	  stimulant	  of	  practical	  thought.214	  
	  
Aristotle	  claims	  here	  that	  reasons	  and	  purposes	  are	  both	  capable	  of	  “originating	  
local	  movement”,	  i.e.,	  getting	  us	  to	  act.	  	  But	  our	  purposes	  (the	  objects	  of	  our	  
appetites)	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  prior	  to	  our	  reasons	  for	  acting	  because	  purposes	  
themselves	  stimulate	  practical	  thought,	  or	  practical	  reasoning,	  to	  occur.	  	  Katherine’s	  
purpose	  of	  going	  on	  vacation	  stimulates	  her	  to	  use	  her	  reasoning	  to	  achieve	  her	  
purpose.	  	  	  
The	  bottom	  line	  for	  why	  purposes	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  reasons	  is	  precisely	  
because	  of	  their	  distinct	  roles	  in	  practical	  reasoning	  and	  acting.	  	  We	  offer	  reasons	  for	  
acting	  because	  we	  have	  purposes	  we	  wish	  to	  realize,	  and	  then	  we	  act	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  Aristotle	  De	  Anima,	  Section	  10;	  433a,	  14-­‐18.	  	  My	  italics.	  	  Quoted	  in	  Alvarez	  
(2010a).	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our	  purposes.	  	  These	  roles	  are	  at	  least	  apparently	  distinct	  from	  the	  roles	  motivating	  
reasons	  have	  in	  practical	  reasoning	  and	  action.	  	  Their	  roles	  typically	  include	  
providing	  support	  (at	  least	  from	  the	  agent’s	  vantage	  point)	  for	  the	  actions	  we	  are	  
considering	  performing,	  and	  then	  being	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act.	  	  The	  
propositional	  content	  they	  have	  provides	  a	  kind	  of	  rational	  guidance	  for	  our	  actions.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  purposes	  are	  the	  things	  we	  strive	  to	  achieve;	  they	  are,	  according	  
to	  Aristotle,	  the	  things	  that	  trigger	  our	  practical	  reasoning	  and	  move	  us	  to	  act.	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  a	  competing	  theory	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  
(mentioned	  briefly	  in	  Section	  5.1	  above)	  that	  might	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  
argument	  here	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  That	  theory	  has	  it	  
that	  the	  premises	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  are	  claims	  about	  agents’	  psychological	  
states.	  	  In	  particular,	  there	  is	  a	  premise	  about	  an	  agent’s	  desire	  to	  Φ,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
premise	  about	  an	  agent’s	  belief	  about	  how	  to	  satisfy	  her	  desire.	  	  However,	  this	  
theory	  is	  typically	  thought	  to	  support	  a	  psychologistic	  account	  of	  reasons.	  	  Since	  we	  
have	  good	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  psychologism	  is	  false,	  we	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  
think	  this	  theory	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  is	  false.	  	  But	  even	  if	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  
work,	  the	  desire	  premise	  is	  a	  premise	  about	  the	  agent’s	  desires.	  	  A	  purpose	  is	  related	  
to	  a	  desire	  in	  that	  the	  former	  is	  the	  content	  of	  the	  latter,	  but	  a	  purpose	  should	  not	  be	  
confused	  with	  the	  psychological	  state.	  	  I	  take	  it	  that	  anti-­‐psychologism	  is	  on	  firm	  
footing,	  and	  that	  the	  premises	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  reflect	  this	  fact.	  	  Thus,	  we	  have	  
enough	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  psychologistic	  theory	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  is	  false.	  
We	  should	  return	  briefly	  to	  the	  issue	  concerning	  why	  it	  seems	  so	  plausible	  
for	  Katherine	  to	  offer	  her	  purpose	  for	  going	  to	  Napa	  Valley	  when	  she	  is	  asked	  her	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reason	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  straightforward.	  	  In	  ordinary	  
conversations	  we	  do	  not	  usually	  disambiguate	  between	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  do	  
things	  and	  the	  reasons	  why	  we	  do	  them.	  	  Thus,	  when	  Katherine	  responds	  by	  saying	  
that	  she	  is	  on	  vacation,	  or	  that	  she	  is	  in	  Napa	  Valley	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  her	  vacation	  
goals,	  she	  is	  usually	  providing	  a	  reason	  why	  she	  is	  in	  Napa	  Valley.	  	  That	  is,	  she	  is	  
providing	  an	  explanation	  for	  her	  behavior,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  reason-­‐explanation	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  she	  is	  providing	  the	  reason	  she	  was	  sensitive	  to	  when	  acting.	  	  Rather,	  she	  
provides	  a	  purpose-­‐explanation,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  explaining	  the	  reason	  
why	  someone	  does	  something.215	  So	  long	  as	  we	  keep	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  
explaining	  the	  reasons	  why	  agents	  do	  what	  they	  do	  properly	  distinct	  from	  each	  
other,	  we	  see	  that	  when	  Katherine	  explains	  her	  behavior	  by	  citing	  her	  purpose,	  she	  
is	  not	  citing	  her	  reason	  for	  being	  in	  Napa	  Valley.	  
	   Lastly,	  even	  if	  it	  were	  to	  turn	  out	  that	  purposes	  were	  reasons,	  the	  
propositionalist	  theory	  here	  would	  not	  be	  affected	  too	  much.	  	  As	  I	  have	  stated	  above	  
I	  take	  it	  that	  purposes	  are	  expressed	  by	  the	  contents	  of	  desires	  that	  we	  seek	  to	  
realize.	  	  I	  assume	  that	  contents	  of	  desires	  are	  typically	  propositions,	  so	  the	  main	  
addition	  to	  the	  theory	  developed	  here	  would	  be	  propositional	  contents	  of	  desires.216	  	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  false	  that	  some	  purposes	  are	  reasons.	  	  Finally,	  we	  see	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215	  Of	  course,	  reason-­‐sensitive	  reason-­‐explanations	  are	  also	  a	  manner	  of	  providing	  
the	  reasons	  why	  someone	  does	  something.	  
216	  I	  assume	  that	  many	  of	  the	  desires	  that	  attain	  to	  the	  status	  of	  purposes	  will	  have	  
propositions	  as	  their	  objects.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  all	  our	  goals	  serve	  as	  reasons	  would	  
also	  be	  false	  even	  if	  some	  purposes	  were	  reasons.	  	  This	  is	  because	  purposes	  can	  
motivate	  us	  without	  being	  reasons.	  	  There	  is	  a	  general	  point	  here	  not	  to	  be	  
overlooked,	  namely,	  not	  everything	  that	  motivates	  agents	  to	  act	  is	  thereby	  a	  reason	  
for	  her	  to	  act.	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the	  theory	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  developed	  here	  is	  a	  cognitivist	  one:	  	  cognitivist	  
propositionalism.	  
	  
6.3	  Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  6	  
	   From	  Chapter	  4	  to	  the	  present	  one,	  I	  have	  developed	  and	  defended	  an	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reasons	  that	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  many	  serious	  
problems	  we	  saw	  it	  was	  plagued	  with	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  
propositionalist	  anti-­‐psychologism	  has	  all	  the	  virtues	  for	  which	  we	  extolled	  
psychologism	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  That	  is,	  it	  can	  account	  for:	  	  agents	  acting	  for	  reasons	  in	  
error	  cases,	  factive	  reason-­‐explanations,	  and	  agents’	  reasons	  having	  a	  motivational	  
role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  action.	  
	   As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  there	  is	  some	  unfinished	  
business	  that	  we	  need	  to	  address.	  	  In	  Chapter	  3	  one	  of	  my	  arguments	  against	  
psychologism’s	  effort	  to	  account	  for	  agents	  acting	  for	  good	  reasons	  by	  claiming	  that	  
it	  was	  committed	  to	  a	  disjunctivist	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  	  That	  psychologism	  struggled	  
to	  account	  for	  agents	  acting	  for	  good	  reasons	  was	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  
it.	  	  Again,	  one	  of	  the	  serious	  problems	  with	  their	  effort	  is	  that	  it	  implied	  that	  
motivating	  reasons	  are	  psychological	  states	  and	  normative	  reasons	  are	  not.	  	  
However,	  unless	  the	  propositional	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reasons	  argued	  for	  
here	  is	  an	  anti-­‐disjunctive	  theory,	  it	  would	  not	  necessarily	  have	  an	  advantage	  over	  
psychologism	  on	  this	  score.	  	  Since	  we	  are	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  defense	  of	  
propositionalism,	  which	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  it	  is	  
appropriate	  to	  claim	  victory	  on	  this	  matter.	  	  Recall	  the	  reason	  an	  anti-­‐disjunctive	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theory	  is	  to	  be	  preferred	  to	  a	  disjunctive	  one,	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  is	  that	  the	  
former	  is	  more	  theoretically	  unified,	  which	  is	  a	  significant	  virtue	  of	  a	  theory.	  	  Thus,	  
another	  challenge	  to	  psychologism	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  motivating	  reasons	  fails	  because	  
it	  implies	  that	  reasons	  are	  at	  least	  of	  two	  ontological	  kinds,	  assuming	  my	  arguments	  
























The	  goal	  of	  the	  project	  here	  has	  been	  to	  determine	  which	  theory	  of	  the	  
ontology	  of	  reasons	  is	  correct,	  and	  then	  to	  develop	  and	  defend	  it	  further	  once	  it	  was	  
determined.	  	  We	  showed	  that	  psychologistic	  theories	  of	  reasons	  fail	  because	  they	  
cannot	  account	  properly	  for	  the	  plausible	  claim	  that	  we	  sometimes	  act	  for	  good	  
reasons.	  	  
This	  led	  us	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  correct	  theory	  is	  anti-­‐psychologism,	  and	  
the	  particular	  version	  of	  it	  defended	  here	  is	  cognivist	  propositionalism:	  	  reasons	  are	  
the	  propositional	  contents	  of	  agential	  beliefs.	  	  Much	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  for	  
a	  complete	  defense	  of	  cognitive	  propositionalism.	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  dissertation	  
has	  taken	  a	  significant	  step	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  defending	  the	  view	  of	  reasons	  I	  take	  to	  
be	  correct.	  
My	  dissertation	  has	  helped	  to	  salvage	  two	  significant	  intuitions	  about	  acting	  
for	  reasons.	  	  First,	  agents	  act	  for	  reasons	  even	  when	  they	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  false	  
beliefs—or	  when	  the	  propositional	  content	  of	  their	  belief	  that	  serves	  as	  their	  reason	  
is	  false.	  	  And	  second,	  even	  if	  agents	  act	  for	  false	  propositions,	  the	  reason-­‐
explanations	  of	  their	  actions	  are	  still	  factive.	  	  Anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  have	  
struggled	  to	  preserve	  both	  intuitions,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  of	  this	  project	  that	  it	  is	  able	  
to	  do	  so.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  does	  so	  without	  adding	  additional	  counterintuitive	  costs,	  and	  
where	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  counterintuitive	  costs,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  explain	  them	  
away.	  	  Furthermore,	  my	  project	  was	  able	  to	  preserve	  the	  virtues	  (laid	  out	  in	  Chapter	  
2)	  of	  both	  psychologistic	  and	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  theories	  of	  reasons.	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I	  was	  also	  able	  to	  defend	  a	  particular	  theory	  of	  propositionalism,	  
Russellianism,	  against	  significant	  challenges	  to	  it	  by	  Fregean	  propositionalist	  
philosophers.	  	  Two	  further	  claims	  argued	  for	  allowed	  the	  theory	  of	  reasons	  here	  to	  
be	  developed	  a	  bit	  more.	  	  First,	  reasons	  have	  a	  motivational	  role	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  
are	  believed.	  	  We	  saw	  that	  this	  means	  that	  reasons	  by	  themselves	  do	  not	  motivate	  
action.	  	  (We	  also	  saw	  that	  reasons	  are	  not	  causes	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  abstract	  things.)	  	  
Second,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  purposes,	  or	  
purposes	  with	  reasons,	  or	  even	  some	  purposes	  with	  reasons.	  	  Reasons	  have	  a	  
distinct	  role	  in	  action,	  and	  are	  typically	  the	  considerations	  in	  favor	  (from	  the	  agent’s	  
vantage	  point)	  an	  action,	  which	  are	  then	  acted	  for	  by	  the	  agent.	  
These	  developments	  put	  us	  in	  a	  better	  position	  in	  our	  theorizing	  about	  the	  
metaphysics	  of	  agency.	  	  Philosophers	  often	  talk	  about	  agents’	  reasons	  having	  a	  role	  
in	  agents’	  actions;	  now	  we	  are	  clearer	  about	  that	  role.	  	  In	  particular,	  if	  the	  theory	  of	  
reasons	  here	  is	  correct,	  then	  we	  have	  solid	  considerations	  for	  thinking	  that	  reasons	  
are	  not	  causes.	  	  This	  has	  been	  a	  hotly	  debated	  issue	  in	  history	  of	  twentieth	  century	  
philosophy,	  and	  even	  in	  more	  recent	  times.217	  Nevertheless,	  cognitive	  
propositionalism	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  settle	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  agents’	  actions	  can	  be	  
causally	  determined	  by	  other	  factors,	  e.g.,	  mental	  states,	  intentions,	  etc.	  	  	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  one	  last	  important	  issue	  to	  address.	  	  The	  propositionalist	  
theory	  of	  reasons	  developed	  here	  maintains	  that	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  but	  as	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  In	  the	  history	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe	  (1971)	  and	  Ludwig	  
Wittgenstein	  (1953)	  argued	  that	  reasons	  were	  not	  causes.	  	  Then	  Donald	  Davidson	  
(1963)	  led	  the	  charge	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  causes.	  	  Recently	  Alfred	  
Mele	  (2003)	  has	  argued	  that	  reasons	  are	  causes,	  and	  Scott	  Sehon	  (2005)	  and	  Carl	  
Ginet	  (1990)	  have	  rejected	  the	  causalist	  claims.	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have	  seen	  it	  also	  maintains	  that	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  essentially	  involves	  beliefs.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  ontology	  of	  my	  view	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  psychologism;	  only	  the	  
psychologist	  identifies	  reasons	  themselves	  with	  the	  psychological	  states.	  	  This	  might	  
lead	  some	  to	  think	  that	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  psychologist	  and	  the	  anti-­‐
psychologist	  is	  merely	  verbal—we	  are	  merely	  carving	  the	  stuff	  up	  differently.	  	  
Ultimately,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantive	  difference	  between	  anti-­‐
psychologistic	  propositionalism	  and	  psychologism,	  and	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  anti-­‐
disjunctive	  theory	  of	  reasons	  the	  former	  is	  able	  to	  develop.	  	  This	  means	  that	  there	  is	  
but	  one	  ontological	  kind—propositions—as	  reasons,	  even	  if	  acting	  for	  reasons	  
essentially	  involves	  psychological	  states.	  	  Nevertheless,	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  I	  am	  
wrong	  about	  these	  issues	  of	  substantiality,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  in	  itself	  is	  an	  
interesting	  conclusion.	  	  There	  are	  serious	  debates	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons.	  	  
However,	  suppose	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  when	  we	  examine	  the	  correct	  anti-­‐psychologistic	  
theory	  of	  reasons	  (cognitive	  propositionalism)	  against	  a	  psychologistic	  theory,	  we	  
learn	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  really	  merely	  verbal	  and	  not	  ontological.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  
even	  then	  we	  would	  have	  learned	  something	  very	  interesting	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  debate	  between	  the	  psychologists	  and	  anti-­‐psychologists.	  	  This	  is	  because	  many	  
participants	  in	  these	  debates	  are	  assuming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantive	  ontological	  
debate	  here.	  
This	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  would	  require	  much	  more	  attention	  than	  can	  be	  devoted	  
to	  it	  here.	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  be	  said	  here	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  (Chapter	  3)	  that	  there	  are	  
strong	  considerations	  against	  psychologistic	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  disjunctive	  theories	  
of	  reasons	  generally.	  	  While	  the	  ontology	  of	  an	  anti-­‐disjunctivist	  anti-­‐psychologistic	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theory	  of	  reasons	  for	  acting	  may	  well	  be	  same	  as	  a	  psychologistic	  theory	  of	  reasons,	  
there	  is	  more	  theoretical	  unity	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  of	  the	  former	  kind.	  	  Indeed,	  
one	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  propositionalist	  theory	  of	  reasons	  developed	  here	  is	  that	  
it	  is	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  primary	  virtues	  of	  a	  psychologistic	  account	  of	  reasons	  
without	  incurring	  its	  major	  costs,	  i.e.,	  not	  being	  able	  to	  account	  properly	  for	  how	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